Do Not Use Depleted Uranium Munitions Again

The radiological and chemical toxicity are due to uranium, plutonium, neptunium, and americium isotopes within each DU bullet. We also have all of the inherent contamination from the equipment, terrain, and facilities that were destroyed.

Upon the completion of the ground combat phase of the Gulf war, I was assigned by Headquarters Department of the Army and consequently the U.S. Central Command to clean up the depleted uranium contaminated U.S. equipment and provide initial medical recommendations for all individuals who were or may have been exposed as a consequence of military actions.

Our initial observations of the DU contamination can be summed simply by three words "OH MY GOD!"

Although my mission was limited to U.S. personnel and equipment all affected persons and equipment should have been processed identically. They were not!

Although I and U.S. Army physicians assigned to the 3rd U.S. Army Medical Command issued immediate verbal and written medical care recommendations those still have not been complied with for not only all U.S. and coalition military DU casualties but for Iraqi military personnel and especially noncombatants, women and children, who were exposed to DU munitions contamination.

A United States Defense Nuclear Agency memorandum written by LTC Lyle that was sent to our team in Saudi Arabia during March 1990 stated that”

"As Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), ground combat units, and civil populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq come increasingly into contact with DU ordnance, we must prepare to deal with potential problems. Toxic war souvenirs, political furor, and post conflict clean up (host nation agreement) are only some of the issues that must be addressed. Alpha particles (uranium oxide dust) from expended rounds is a health concern but, Beta particles from fragments and intact rounds is a serious health threat, with possible exposure rates of 200 millirads per hour on contact."

It took our team from March 1991 to June 1991 to collect and prepare 30 U.S. vehicles that were damaged or destroyed during friendly fire incidents involving DU munitions for burial or shipment to a specialized facility in South Carolina for decontamination and disposal.

Thousands of other DU contaminated pieces of equipment, bunkers, and terrain were just ignored. The approximate 1 million individual DU rounds and submunitions that were used by United States and British forces were never cleaned up but left where they fell.

During January 1993 following analysis of our written reports and personal discussions, scientists and physicians assigned to the United States General Accounting Office issued a report ("Operation Desert Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With Depleted Uranium Contamination", GAO/NSAID-93-90, January 1993, page 7) recommending that the Secretary of the Army:

”1. ensure that appropriate Army training schools provide adequate information and training to personnel who would come in contact with DU contaminated equipment;
2. develop time frames to implement the proposed DU testing policy involving the testing of all crew members inside vehicles penetrated by DU munitions;
3. expand testing to include personnel involved in the vehicle recovery process should testing of the Army National Guard personnel show that uranium is present in excess of the standards being applied in the medical tests; and
4. develop a formal plan for dealing with the recovery of DU-contaminated equipment.”

At approximately the same time that this report was being prepared, the United States Army's Environmental Policy Institute, AEPI, was tasked (December 13, 1992) by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational health to determine :

“1. The health and environmental consequences of using DU on the battlefield;
2. Which remediation technologies exist or might be developed to clean up DU contamination;
3. Ways to reduce DU toxicity;
4. How to best protect the environment from the long-term consequences of DU use.”

Therefore it was and still is obvious that United States military leaders knew that using DU would cause health and environmental problems. I was asked to help conduct the research and prepare the recommendations and final AEPI report because I was the Army health physicist who helped clean up the DU mess following Desert Storm and was working for the Army preparing environmental compliance procedures.

The findings issued in 1995 (Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the Army: Technical Report, U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute, June 1995) were quote:

“1. The battlefield is contaminated with many dangerous things. The impact of DU contamination on the battlefield is not well defined. Relative to many of the other hazards, such as unexploded ordnance. The hazards are probably small; however, additional environmental modeling and data are needed to support this judgment;
2. DU remediation technologies involve one or more of the following: excavation and earth moving, physical separation, chemical separation, and in-place stabilization. The Army will continue to identify and evaluate remediation technologies by comparing the cost and effectiveness. From this analysis, the Army will seek effective, less expensive DU remediation technologies;
3. There are no technologies available that can significantly change the inherent chemical and radiological toxicity of DU;
4. Range management and DU recovery systems have been implemented and are being improved. Models to better describe the environmental fate and effect are being developed. DU migration on test ranges in the United States has been minimal because soil and water conditions on those test ranges tend to prevent formation of soluable DU.”

Once more we can see that Army officials acknowledged that DU is toxic forever and that specific remediation procedures are required to clean up DU contamination. I then developed and verified these procedures while the DU Project Director.

Consequently, in response to the GAO report, initial reports submitted by AEPI scientists, and my/our efforts the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an order that was consequently reissued on August 14, 1993 and signed by General Eric Shinseki that DOD shall:

"1. Provide adequate training for personnel who may come in contact with depleted uranium equipment;
2. Complete medical testing of personnel exposed to DU contamination during the Persian Gulf War;
3. Develop a plan for DU contaminated equipment recovery during future operations."

The criteria describing unusual DU exposures requiring medical screening within 24 hours of exposure and consequent medical care were specified in a message from Headquarters Department of the Army dated October 14, 1993. These exposures included:

"a. Being in the midst of smoke from DU fires resulting from the burning of vehicles uploaded with DU munitions or depots in which DU munitions are being stored.
b. Working within environments containing DU dust or residues from DU fires.
c. Being within a structure or vehicle while it is struck by DU munitions."

Today, at least one decade after thousands and maybe millions of individuals were exposed to DU contamination and who should have received medical care per our original 1991 recommendations and as specified in the October 14, 1993 directive less than 500 individuals have ever been provided the required radio-bioassay testing and consequent medical care.

We must note that if United States personnel should receive medical care then all exposed individuals also must receive medical care. A letter sent to General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project (the development of the first atomic bomb), during 1943 that I obtained during Fall 1999 emphasized the need for immediate medical care.

In that memorandum dated October 30, 1943, senior scientists assigned to the Manhattan Project suggested that uranium could be used as an air, water, and terrain contaminant. According to the letter sent by the Subcommittee of the S-1 Executive Committee on the "Use of Radioactive Materials as a Military Weapon" to General Groves (October 30, 1943) inhalation of uranium would result in "bronchial irritation coming on in a few hours to a few days".

This is exactly what happened to those of us who inhaled DU dust during Operation Desert Storm, U.S. and KFOR soldiers and civilians in the Balkans, and residents of Vieques, Puerto Rico.

The subcommittee went on further to state that:

"Beta emitting products could get into the gastrointestinal tract from polluted water, or food, or air. From the air, they would get on the mucus of the nose, throat, bronchi, etc. and be swallowed. The effects would be local irritation just as in the bronchi and exposures of the same amount would be required. The stomach, caecum and rectum, where contents remain for longer periods than elsewhere would be most likely affected. It is conceivable that ulcers and perforations of the gut followed by death could be produced, even without an general effects from radiation."

Verified adverse health effects from personal experience, reported by physicians, and from personal reports from individuals with known DU exposures include:
(a) Reactive airway disease,
(b) neurological abnormalities,
(c) kidney stones and chronic kidney pain,
(d) rashes,
(e) vision degradation, cataracts, and night vision losses,
(f) gum tissue and teeth problems,
(g) lymphoma,
(h) various forms of skin and organ cancer,
(i) neuro-psychological disorders,
(j) uranium in semen,
(k) sexual dysfunction, and
(l) birth defects in offspring.

Similar health effects also have been documented in uranium processing facility employees of and residents living near Puducah, Kentucky, Portsmouth, Ohio; Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Hanford, Washington who made the DU.

Employees at uranium manufacturing or processing facilities in New York, Tennessee, Iowa, Massachusetts, and the four corners area of southwest Colorado also have repeatedly reported health effects similar to those reported by verified Gulf War DU casualties.

Iraqi and other humanitarian agency physicians are reporting the same health effects in exposed populations. Scottish scientists recently verified that residents of the Balkans were excreting uranium in their urine.

This indicates that the uranium is mobile in the environment and is more evidence to support what we found during the DU tests in 1994 and 1995. Consequently we can not ignore the serious adverse health effects from DU exposures and these known effects substantiate the banning of DU munitions.

As a result of the 1993 GAO report, congressional inquiries, our recommendations, and an increase in observed adverse health and environmental effects; I was recalled to active duty in the United States Army as Director of the Depleted Uranium Project.

I supervised the research to verify DU hazards and processing procedures and to develop the training and education and formal guidelines for management of DU contaminated equipment, facilities, and terrain. The products of the DU project included:

- Three training curricula:
(1) Tier I: General Audience,
(2) Tier II: Battle Damage and Recovery Operations,
(3) Tier III: Chemical Officer / NCO;

- Three video tapes:
(1) "Depleted Uranium Hazard Awareness",
(2) "Contaminated and Damaged Equipment Management", and
(3) "Operation of the AN/PDR 77 Radiac Set";

- the draft Army Regulation: "Management of Equipment Contaminated with Depleted Uranium or Radioactive Commodities";
- an United States Army Pamphlet specifying "Handling Procedures for Equipment Contaminated with Depleted Uranium or Radioactive Commodities"
- and a redesigned radiac capable of finding and quantifying DU contamination.

The recommendations that I derived and issued, based on extensive research and first hand experience were:

1. All DU contamination must be physically removed and properly disposed of to prevent future exposures;
2. Specialized radiation detection devices that detect and measure alpha particles, beta particles, x-rays, and gamma rays emissions at appropriate levels from 20 dpm up to 100,000 dpm and from .1 mrem/ hour to 75 mrem/ hour must be acquired and distributed to all individuals or organizations responsible for medical care and environmental remediation activities involving depleted uranium / uranium 238 and other low level radioactive isotopes that may be present. Standard equipment will not detect contamination.
3. Medical care must be provided to all individuals who did or may have inhaled, ingested, or had wound contamination to detect mobile and sequestered internalized uranium contamination.
4. All individuals who enter, climb on, or work within 25 meters of any contaminated equipment or terrain must wear respiratory and skin protection.
5. Contaminated and damaged equipment or materials should not be recycled to manufacture new materials or equipment.

The United States Army's own task performance standards for exposure to DU are very specific and require both respiratory and skin protection. They also state that:"NOTE: Contamination will make food and water unsafe for consumption."

The specific task performance requirements are that an individual can:

"Evaluation Preparation
HANDS-ON EVALUATION
DATE:
TASK TITLE TASK NUMBER
Respond To Depleted Uranium/Low Level Radioactive Materials (Dullram) Hazards (SL 1-4) 031-503-1017 ITEM PERFORMANCE STEP TITLE (CIRCLE ONE)
1 Identified possible hazards GO / NO GO NOTE: Method used depends on scenario selected
2 Assumed field expedient respiratory protection cravat/handkerchief) immediately or donned protective mask as required GO / NO GO
3 Warned others of DULLRAM hazard GO / NO GO
a. Alerted other crew members or individuals within 50 meters of the possible DULLRAM hazard GO / NO GO
b. Got out of vehicle and seek shelter if vehicle or munitions are on fire GO / NO GO
4 Protected himself from contact with DULLRAM
a. Administered first aid (1) Flushed open wounds with water. (2) Covered open wounds with field dressing. Did not attempt to remove any imbedded fragments GO / NO GO
b. Covered exposed skin within 50 meters of hazard (pulled down sleeves, bloused pants, put on MOPP gloves, and buttoned up coat) GO / NO GO
c. Sealed loose contamination on equipment surfaces GO / NO GO
5 Reported suspected contamination to supervisor GO / NO GO

Score the soldier GO if all performance measures are passed.
Score the soldier NO GO if any performance measure is failed.
If the soldier scores NO GO, show the soldier what was done wrong and how to do it correctly.
Allow the soldier time to retrain and retest.

EVALUATOR'S NAME UNIT:
SOLDIER'S NAME STATUS:
GO / NO GO “

It is very important to note that respiratory and skin protection must be worn by all individuals who are or may be exposed to DU contamination.

If this is required for United States Army personnel then it must required for all citizens of the world.

Of special significance is that Army officials acknowledge that DU contamination will make water and food unsafe as specified during October 1943.

Consequently, it is apparent the use of DU munitions is simply too dangerous to use even by the U.S. Army's own safety standards.

Today, eleven years after the extensive use of depleted uranium munitions during the Gulf War, followed by use of DU in the Balkans; on Vieques, Puerto Rico in preparation for combat use in the Balkans, in Okinawa, and on many military installations around the world; visual evidence, personal experience, and published reports verify that:

1. Medical care has not been provided to all DU casualties.
2. Environmental remediation has not been completed.
3. Contaminated and damaged equipment and materials have been recycled to manufacture new products.
4. Training and education has only been partially implemented.
5. Contamination management procedures have not been distributed and implemented.