TELECOMMUNICATIONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
GOVERNMENT
OBJECTIVE
What is the Government’s objective for
telecommunications?
The Government’s objective is to
ensure delivery of cost-efficient, timely and innovative
telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair and
equitable basis to all existing and potential users.
To meet this objective the Government has:
established a regulatory framework that will maximise the
contribution of the sector to economic growth, including by
maintaining incentives for investment and innovation;
and
taken steps to support its broader policy
objectives, in particular to ensure affordable access to
telecommunications services and participation in the
information society.
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT REGIME
Why
does the current regime not deliver on the Government’s
objective?
There have been major problems with the
length, cost and clarity of dispute resolution through the
court process. This has impeded competition and resulted in
higher prices than could otherwise have been achieved. Other
countries do not rely on the courts to resolve these issues
– they have specialist agencies (inside or outside general
competition authorities) to resolve disputes.
There is also uncertainty surrounding several aspects of the Kiwi Share obligations, such as whether it applies to Internet calls. It is appropriate to clarify these issues and update the Kiwi Share since it is ten years since these obligations were established.
How does the new regime address these
problems?
A Telecommunications Commissioner will be
established in the Commerce Commission with the power to
resolve disputes between industry players over regulated
services. The Telecommunications Commissioner will be able
to make recommendations to the Minister for regulation of
other services in the future to ensure any emerging problems
can be dealt with.
A revamped Kiwi Share will be established to:
clarify that Internet calls are
covered under the Kiwi Share; and
upgrade the
rural network to provide data service capability of 9.6
kilobits per second to 99 percent of lines.
REGULATORY
INSTITUTIONS
Why has the Government decided not to create
a separate agency for the Commissioner?
There are greater
benefits to be gained from locating the new Commissioner
within the Commerce Commission, including:
peer
review that would not be otherwise possible;
the
greater efficiencies possible through increasing the
capacity of an existing body rather than creating a new
one.
How does the role of the Telecommunications
Commissioner compare to the role envisaged by the
Inquiry?
The proposed role is very similar, although it
is likely that the Commissioner will not be able to
undertake a facilitative role to the extent envisaged by the
Inquiry. This would have been the case whether inside or
outside the Commission, as fair and impartial dispute
resolution may be compromised by mixing the dispute
resolution function with powers to facilitate commercial
negotiation.
Why is the Commissioner called the Telecommunications Commissioner?
The Inquiry envisaged regulation of a broad range of services. While the possibility exists in the regime to regulate a broader range of services than is initially proposed, only telecommunications services specifically will be able to be regulated, so the term ‘Telecommunications Commissioner’ is appropriate.
The term ‘Electronic Communications Commissioner’ is more appropriate in overseas regimes where there is a history of sector specific regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting. Some of these countries are seeking to restructure their regimes to achieve coherent regulation across differently regulated sectors in the face of convergence.
Why is there no full right of appeal from a determination of the Commissioner?
The limited right of appeal proposed is consistent with decisions made in relation to general price control determinations and electricity pricing decisions of the Commerce Commission. It is desirable that the substance of the Commissioner’s determinations on extremely complex issues not be re-litigated in the courts, which has the potential to create further delays and costs. The involvement of two other Commissioners in final pricing review provides sufficient peer review for matters of substance.
Rights of appeal on points of law and judicial review remain available.
Why has the Government decided
not to mandate an industry forum?
An industry forum would
play a useful role in achieving the objectives of industry
self-regulation. However, the Government does not consider
it necessary to mandate a forum in legislation. The
industry has indicated they want to establish a forum, and
there are ample incentives for industry to work together to
create codes. If they do not, the Commissioner can impose
binding terms and conditions on technical issues during
dispute resolution in any event.
Why is the Government not establishing a telecommunications ombudsman?
The Inquiry recommended against establishing an ombudsman on the basis that the industry would establish one if it so desired. While vigorous retail competition is relatively new in the electricity market, competition is already well-established in the telecommunications industry and problems are much less likely to arise.
FORM OF REGULATION
Why do we need
three different categories of regulation?
The Government
recognises the potential adverse impact of regulation on
incentives to invest and innovate.
The three categories
of regulation proposed will give the Government sufficient
flexibility to introduce only as much regulation as it
considers necessary to ensure that the long term interests
of end users are promoted.
What is the precise difference
between designation, deferred designation and specification?
The distinguishing feature of designation is that
pricing principles will be prescribed for access to the
service, allowing the Telecommunications Commissioner to set
a price for access to the designated service in the event of
a dispute.
Deferred designation is a ‘threat’ of designation that enables designation to be triggered immediately by the Minister of Communications if the industry does not resolve disputes within a prescribed deadline.
Specification is a lower tier of regulation that requires the service to be provided on request but does not allow the Commissioner to set a price if there is a dispute. It effectively sends a signal to industry that the service is being monitored and that a designation process could be initiated if disputes are not resolved.
Is designation of
a service the same as price control?
No. A regulated
price will only be set if there is a dispute over the price
that the parties cannot resolve themselves. The
Commissioner does not have the power to overturn
commercially negotiated agreements.
Clarification of pricing principles will provide greater certainty for telecommunications firms when they negotiate over access to designated services, thereby solving one of the key problems with the current regime. The Government would prefer firms to reach their own agreements on a commercial basis.
REGULATED SERVICES
Scope of services
Why are the
initial designations limited to certain Telecom
services?
The Government considers that existing problems
in the telecommunications sector derive from the essential
facility nature of Telecom’s fixed telephone network.
Because Telecom’s competitors need access to Telecom’s
services to compete effectively, Telecom may be able to
charge higher than efficient prices for access, or unduly
delay the provision of access.
The Government considers that at this point there is no evidence of similar problems in relation to a wider range of services. However, other services could be brought under regulation in the future if the need arises.
Interconnection
Why are pricing
principles for interconnection with Telecom’s fixed
telephone network reciprocal (excluding cellular networks)
in the event of a dispute?
If pricing principles were not
reciprocal for other fixed networks, then the party
interconnecting with Telecom would have the ability to set
higher than cost interconnection prices for Telecom on its
own network. This may provide an incentive to artificially
stimulate Internet traffic to gain more termination revenue
– one of the factors that may have given rise to the 0867
problem. The reciprocal mechanism removes these perverse
incentives by requiring interconnection with the non-Telecom
network to also be cost-based or on a bill and keep
basis.
However, the Commissioner will only have the ability to examine the non-Telecom network’s interconnection prices if that network brings a dispute about interconnection before the Commissioner.
Wholesaling
Why does the wholesaling
designation only apply to non-price capped services?
A
price capped service (e.g. residential line rental) may be a
loss making activity for Telecom in some areas where the
costs of provision are high. Requiring Telecom to offer
such a service to a competitor at a discount would
effectively require Telecom to make further losses on that
service.
Why is Telecom not being required to wholesale unbundled elements of a retail service offering where the unbundled elements are not offered as a retail product?
This would essentially be a form of local loop unbundling and would involve complex calculations requiring Telecom and the Commissioner to impute a retail price for a service that is not retailed, as the basis for determining the wholesale price.
Number portability
Why has the
Government recommended designation of number portability as
opposed to deferred designation (as recommended by the
Inquiry)?
The Inquiry recommended a deadline of 31 July
2001 for the industry to resolve outstanding issues relating
to number portability. Because of the likelihood that
legislation will not commence until around the deadline
recommended by the Inquiry, and the delays and disputes
arising out of the industry process, the Government has
decided to designate number portability from the
commencement of the legislation.
Industry will still be required to determine the best number portability system and how this is paid for. However, if there is a dispute over the provision of the service, then the Commissioner will determine which is the best system and how it should be paid for.
What will happen to number administration?
Number administration has been functioning well under the existing Number Administration Deed. The Deed will need to be amended to retain the processes in respect of number administration and reflect the designation of number portability. Number administration could be designated in the future if problems arose.
Carrier pre-selection
Why
has the Government recommended deferred designation of fixed
to mobile carrier preselection on the Telecom network (as
opposed to specification as recommended by the
Inquiry)?
Any disputes over pre-selection are likely to
concern the price of the service, rather than whether it is
provided at all. The Government therefore considers that
specification (which does not include pricing principles)
would not address the potential problem.
Mobile
services
The Inquiry recommended specification of a
number of mobile services. Why has the Government chosen
not to regulate these services?
The Government considers
that there have not been proven problems with access to
these services to date. The Government is concerned that
regulating mobile services in these circumstances,
particularly when the market for mobile services is growing
rapidly, may dampen investment and innovation in these
services. However, a watching brief over these services
will be maintained.
Sky’s conditional access system
The
Inquiry recommended limited specification of Sky’s
conditional access system – why has the Government decided
not to specify this service?
The Inquiry considered that
the only form of regulation appropriate for this service was
the development of an access code. The Government considers
that as there are likely to be a number of competing set top
boxes there is no purpose at this point to regulating access
to Sky’s system.
Data tails
Why has the Government
chosen not to designate data tails as recommended by the
Inquiry?
Unlike the telephone service, it is not clear
that designation of data services is justified at this
point.
Wholesale provision of Telecom’s data services will be available in areas where Telecom is the sole provider. This ensures access by other data service suppliers to resources they require to complete point-to-point data connections, enabling them to make a full service offering and compete more effectively with Telecom.
Data network interconnection is being commercially negotiated currently and has the potential to provide much of the ‘data tail’ functionality sought by entrants. In the event that ‘data tail’ access issues prove to be a competition problem, the designation process is available as a backstop.
Local loop unbundling
Why is
the Government not mandating local loop unbundling
(LLU)?
The Government agrees with the Inquiry’s
conclusions that:
LLU does not seem to offer
significant benefits to end users over and above those that
could be achieved by requiring Telecom to wholesale its
fixed network services;
the objective of LLU –
competitive delivery of fixed network and high speed data
services – is likely to be achieved in many areas and
through a variety of technologies without regulatory
intervention;
full LLU may not be exploited in
areas where local loop competition is not likely given that
such investment may be unprofitable; and
full
LLU is technically complex, and involves very complex
pricing issues.
The Government has decided not to
designate local loop unbundling at present for these
reasons, taking into account:
the risk that such
a requirement could significantly reduce entrants’
incentives to invest in alternative infrastructure at a time
when a number of new technologies are becoming
available;
the difficulty of setting accurate
prices for unbundled local loop elements; and
that cost-benefit studies do not conclusively support LLU;
and
it is possible to designate local loop
unbundling in the future. This will be a key issue for the
Telecommunications Commissioner to monitor.
Competition
law
Will the Commerce Act still apply to
telecommunications?
Yes. The Commerce Act will continue
to apply to telecommunications services in the same way as
before. The new regime will simply add a layer of necessary
industry-specific regulation to complement the generic
competition regime under the Commerce Act.
Spectrum
management
Do the Government’s decisions affect the
current spectrum management regime?
No. The Government
considers that a robust process for spectrum allocation and
management is best provided for through the strengthening of
section 47 of the Commerce Act and by Government policy
decisions on a case-by-case basis (as was the case with the
decision to impose a competition rule for acquisition of 3G
spectrum).
The Government considers that the introduction of ‘use or sell’ requirements for spectrum is unnecessary at this time, provided there is robust competition law.
HOW
IS THE GOVERNMENT PROMOTING ITS SOCIAL OBJECTIVES?
Why is
it necessary to revamp the Kiwi Share?
These measures are
seen by the Government as necessary to address existing
weaknesses with the Kiwi Share in terms of the Government’s
social objective in telecommunications. As part of an
upgraded Kiwi Share:
Telecom will upgrade its
data service capability to 9.6 kilobits per second for 99
percent of residential lines and 14.4 kbps for 95
percent;
the obligations will be clarified to
include Internet calls within the free local calling
option;
an improved monitoring and enforcement
regime will be implemented; and
an improved
funding mechanism will be adopted.
How many people will
benefit and how much will it cost?
The upgrade will enable basic Internet access for 22,000 of the 35,000 lines that currently are not able to obtain this access (leaving only 13,500 lines that do not currently have access, out of the total of 1,350,000 residential lines).
The capital cost of upgrading the network to the required standard will be about $100 million. This capital cost will be met by Telecom, with industry contributing to its share of any ongoing net operating costs under the funding arrangements for the Kiwi Share.
Why has the new Kiwi Share data standard been set
at 9.6 kilobits per second?
9.6 kbps is the current level
of capability required for use of satellite-based Internet
download services, which provide a much better Internet
access solution in outlying rural areas than reliance on
copper wires, and which will be available over the whole of
New Zealand.
While it would be possible to mandate a higher level of data capability, the Government has taken its decision having regard to the effect on investment and the cost of mandating a higher level.
Why has the upgrade
not been provided for 100% of lines?
The cost of
upgrading the additional one percent of residential lines is
considerable compared to the costs of upgrading to 99
percent. Internet access in the most remote rural areas
may well be provided more efficiently through other
technologies and other initiatives. The Information Society
Initiative will be considering such issues.
Why has the
Government decided not to introduce a universal service
obligation higher than the upgraded Kiwi Share requirements
at this point?
There are key trade-offs involved in
requiring higher data capability on existing copper
networks:
if higher levels of data capability on
the existing network is mandated, incentives to invest in
alternative technology are likely to decrease. There are a
number of exciting new technologies coming available and the
Government does not want to lock New Zealand into a copper
wire future if that is not the best way forward;
as a higher level of geographic coverage for
data capability is required, for a higher percentage of
lines, the costs of upgrading the existing network escalate
dramatically.
The approach decided on by the Government
is world-leading in terms of mandating a basic data
requirement as part of a universal service obligation. The
introduction of higher speed data services will be monitored
and reconsidered in eighteen months’ time, including uptake
in comparison with other countries, the desirability of a
higher level of data capability, and the desirability of a
competitive tendering mechanism.
Why should industry contribute to the Kiwi Share costs?
Industry will only be contributing to net Kiwi Share costs if it is established that there are any costs (using a robust costing process). Industry currently contribute to the costs through a premium on interconnection. The proposed mechanism will replace this. It will be more transparent and competitively neutral, and will give the Telecommunications Commissioner the final decision over the calculation of costs and cost contributions. It is also linked to the enforcement mechanism, as the Commissioner will be able to withhold the industry contribution if Telecom fails to meet its Kiwi Share obligations.
Why is the Government not putting the Kiwi Share upgrade out to competitive tender?
The Government has not ruled out this option for the future and will be referring to this possibility in legislation. Tendering out universal service obligations is a highly complex matter and is only just being considered in some countries. Australia, for example, has recently implemented a three year pilot study to determine whether the proposal has merit.
The Government will reconsider whether to introduce competitive tendering in eighteen months. At present, the Government considers that the complexities and costs involved in competitive tendering (including tender design, property rights issues, transitional issues) do not justify any change now.
How do the Government’s decisions on the Kiwi Share compare to the Inquiry’s recommendations?
The updated Kiwi Share obligations are consistent with the Inquiry’s view of what is required under the current Kiwi Share (i.e that the Kiwi Share currently includes low speed data capability). It is not envisaged that legislation will be necessary to implement the updated obligations since Telecom has indicated its willingness to upgrade the Kiwi Share through a revised Kiwi Share arrangement.
What will the Information Society Initiative
do?
The details of this Initiative will be decided early
next year, but the Government intends that the initiative
will facilitate a partnership between government, industry
and local communities in relation to measures that will
promote the information economy in New Zealand.
The functions of the Initiative will include considering issues relating to access to bandwidth in New Zealand, and promoting such access where possible.
BENEFITS OF THE
OVERALL PACKAGE
How will the new regime benefit
residential and business consumers?
An effective dispute
resolution mechanism and the ability to set a regulated
price in the event of a dispute will result in more
efficient introduction and pricing of telecommunications
services. This will lead to more efficient competition,
which will benefit all telecommunications users in New
Zealand through lower prices and a more diverse range of
services.
The upgraded Kiwi Share is designed to provide a solid platform for participation in the information society, with the aim of ensuring affordable Internet access for virtually all New Zealanders.
The regime will be good for those in the telecommunications industry as it will stimulate competition and provide regulatory certainty to ensure the focus is on achieving commercial outcomes rather than fighting disputes.
How does this package address the
‘digital divide’?
The Government considers that Internet
access will be critical to effective participation in the
information society. This package increases the level of
data service capability to users, providing a solid platform
for New Zealanders to take part in the information society.
The Information Society Initiative will be involved in ongoing work designed to encourage the development of the information society.
How does it address rural
issues?
Reliable Internet access is an issue of
particular concern to the rural sector in New Zealand. The
upgraded Kiwi Share requires Telecom to provide reliable
data service capability of 9.6 kilobits per second to 99
percent of residential lines and 14.4 kbps to 95 percent of
lines over two years from the passage of
legislation.
Improving the level of data service capability to 9.6 kbps, particularly in rural areas, will enable New Zealanders living in such areas to utilise satellite-based Internet download services.
A number of rural Internet users have problems with interference from electric fences. The Government will also be looking into the question of electric fence interference, in conjunction with key stakeholders, to identify possible solutions to this problem.
In addition, improved monitoring and enforcement of the Kiwi Share obligations will ensure that there is more accountability in relation to service standards.