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Iraq’s Weapons Of Mass Destruction – Full Report
IRAQ’S
WEAPONS OF
MASS
DESTRUCTION
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
BRITISH
GOVERNMENT
From http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/iraqdossier.pdf
CONTENTS
Foreword by the Prime Minister
3
Executive Summary 5
Part 1: Iraq’s Chemical, Biological,
Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programmes 9
Chapter 1: The role of intelligence 9
Chapter 2: Iraq’s programmes 1971–1998
11
Chapter 3: The current position
1998–2002 17
Part 2: History of UN Weapons Inspections 33
Part 3: Iraq under Saddam Hussein 43
FOREWORD
BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR
MP The document published today is based, in large
part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence
machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up
of the heads of the UK’s three Intelligence and Security
Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior
officials from key government departments. For over 60 years
the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime
Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign
policy and international security issues.
Its work, like
the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is
unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of
document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the
British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a
current and serious threat to the UK national interest. In
recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the
evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite
the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the
UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and
despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop
WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon
the region, and the stability of the world. Gathering
intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam’s is one of the
most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world. So I
believe people will understand why the Agencies cannot be
specific about the sources, which have formed the judgements
in this document, and why we cannot publish everything we
know. We cannot, of course, publish the detailed raw
intelligence. I and other Ministers have been briefed in
detail on the intelligence and are satisfied as to its
authority. I also want to pay tribute to our Intelligence
and Security Services for the often extraordinary work that
they do. What I believe the assessed intelligence has
established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to
produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues
in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has
been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile
programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document,
Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons
from UN inspectors. The picture presented to me by the JIC
in recent months has become more not less worrying. It is
clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of containment has
not worked sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from
developing these weapons. I am in no doubt that the threat
is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD,
and that he has to be stopped. Saddam has used chemical
weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his
own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the
building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas
that he would use these weapons, as vital to his Page
3 strategic interests, and in particular his goal of
regional domination. And the document discloses that his
military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready
within 45 minutes of an order to use them. I am quite
clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has
already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them
up. In today’s inter-dependent world, a major regional
conflict does not stay confined to the region in question.
Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using
WMD, I believe the international community has to stand up
for itself and ensure its authority is upheld. The threat
posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in
the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam’s,
is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we
risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions
he defies, but more importantly and in the longer term, we
place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own
people. The case I make is that the UN Resolutions
demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that
since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued
with this programme; that the inspectors must be allowed
back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or
if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he
has done in the past, the international community will have
to act. I believe that faced with the information
available to me, the UK Government has been right to support
the demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with. We
must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has,
or get hold of the weapons he wants. Page 4 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical
and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to
attack neighbouring countries with these weapons and
persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has
used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own
people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all
this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed
unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass
destruction. 2. Much information about Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN
reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to
Iraq’s continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and
biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War.
It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated
with the production of chemical and biological agents. And
it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these
agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and
ballistic missiles to deliver them. 3. An independent and
well-researched overview of this public evidence was
provided by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also
suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within
months of obtaining fissile material from foreign
sources. 4. As well as the public evidence, however,
significant additional information is available to the
Government from secret intelligence sources, described in
more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us
about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of
Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein
attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass
destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq’s
regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only
as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them,
including against his own population, and is determined to
retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR). 5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq
is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons,
including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections.
And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of
containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his
illicit weapons programmes. 6. As a result of the
intelligence we judge that Iraq has: - continued to
produce chemical and biological agents; - military plans
for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including
against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are
deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; -
command and control arrangements in place to use chemical
and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with
Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have
delegated this authority to his son Qusai); Page 5 -
developed mobile laboratories for military use,
corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of
biological warfare agents; - pursued illegal programmes to
procure controlled materials of potential use in the
production of chemical and biological weapons
programmes; - tried covertly to acquire technology and
materials which could be used in the production of nuclear
weapons; - sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power
programme that could require it; - recalled specialists to
work on its nuclear programme; - illegally retained up to
20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of
carrying chemical or biological warheads; - started
deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has
used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending
its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of
150km imposed by the United Nations; - started producing
the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to
extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the
limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations; -
constructed a new engine test stand for the development of
missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in
Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all
Iraq’s Gulf neighbours and Israel; - pursued illegal
programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal
development of long range missiles; - learnt lessons from
previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to
conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of
the return of inspectors. 7. These judgements reflect the
views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More
details on the judgements and on the development of the
JIC’s assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this
paper. 8. Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are in breach
of international law. Under a series of UN Security Council
Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these
weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of
the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions.
It also summarises the history of the UN inspection regime
and Iraq’s history of deception, intimidation and
concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors. Page
6 9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on
the capabilities we have described. It arises also because
of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein’s
regime. His record of internal repression and external
aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he
poses. The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam’s rise to
power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional
aggression. Saddam’s human rights abuses are also
catalogued, including his record of torture, mass arrests
and summary executions. 10. The paper briefly sets out how
Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on
illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq
generated illegal income of some $3 billion in 2001. Page
7 Page 8 CHAPTER 1: 1. Since UN inspectors were withdrawn
from Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information
on Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes. Much of the publicly available
information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is
dated. But we also have available a range of secret
intelligence about these programmes and Saddam Hussein’s
intentions. This comes principally from the United Kingdom’s
intelligence and analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ), the Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence
Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close
allies. 2. Intelligence rarely offers a complete account
of activities which are designed to remain concealed. The
nature of Saddam’s regime makes Iraq a difficult target for
the intelligence services. Intelligence, however, has
provided important insights into Iraqi programmes and Iraqi
military thinking. Taken together with what is already known
from other sources, this intelligence builds our
understanding of Iraq’s capabilities and adds significantly
to the analysis already in the public domain. But
intelligence sources need to be protected, and this limits
the detail that can be made available. 3. Iraq’s
capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to
the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues on the
developing assessment, drawing on all available sources.
Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant
views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002. Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) The JIC is a Cabinet
Committee with a history dating back to 1936. The JIC brings
together the Heads of the three Intelligence and Security
Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government
Communications Headquarters and the Security Service), the
Chief of Defence Intelligence, senior policy makers from the
Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office,
the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry and
representatives from other Government Departments and
Agencies as appropriate. The JIC provides regular
intelligence assessments to the Prime Minister, other
Ministers and senior officials on a wide range of foreign
policy and international security issues. It meets each week
in the Cabinet Office. Page 9 Page 10 CHAPTER 2 1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and
biological warfare research for over 30 years. Its chemical
warfare research started in 1971 at a small, well guarded
site at Rashad to the north east of Baghdad. Research was
conducted there on a number of chemical agents including
mustard gas, CS and tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated
organisation called al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham was established.
In the late 1970s plans were made to build a large research
and commercial-scale production facility in the desert some
70km north west of Baghdad under the cover of Project 922.
This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known
as al-Muthanna, and operated under the front name of Iraq’s
State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became
operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development
sections, each tasked to pursue different programmes. In
addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent
production facility, and it also took the lead in
weaponising chemical and biological agents including all
aspects of weapon development and testing, in association
with the military. According to information, subsequently
supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in
1991 was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it
could have been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three
separate storage and precursor production facilities known
as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, north west of
Baghdad, parts of which were not completed before they were
heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War. 2. Iraq started
biological warfare research in the mid-1970s. After
small-scale research, a purpose-built research and
development facility was authorised at al-Salman, also known
as Salman Pak. This is surrounded on three sides by the
Tigris river and situated some 35km south of Baghdad.
Although some progress was made in biological weapons
research at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on
developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at
al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the
early 1980s, the biological weapons programme was revived.
The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small
biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna,
Effects of Chemical Weapons Mustard is a
liquid agent, which gives off a hazardous vapour, causing
burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard
damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes
vomiting and diarrhoea. It attacks and damages the eyes,
mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming
organs. Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents
of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous
system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little
as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause rapid
death. Page 11 helped to develop the programme. At about
the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site
into a secure biological warfare research facility. Dr Taha
continued to work with her team at al-Muthanna until 1987
when it moved to Salman Pak, which was under the control of
the Directorate of General Intelligence. Significant
resources were provided for the programme, including the
construction of a dedicated production facility (Project
324) at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and
weaponisation testing and later filling of munitions was
conducted in association with the staff at Muthanna State
Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were
taken over and some adapted for use in the production and
research and development of biological agents. These
included: - al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute
which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research.
There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also
conducted on anthrax; - al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water
Research Centre where Iraq admitted it undertook aflatoxin
production and genetic engineering; - Amariyah Sera and
Vaccine Institute which was used for the storage of
biological agent seed stocks and was involved in genetic
engineering. 3. By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was
producing very large quantities of chemical and biological
agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN during
the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced at
least: - 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of
anthrax, 2,200 litres of aflatoxin and were working on a
number of other agents; The effects of biological
agents Anthrax is a disease caused by the
bacterium Bacillus Anthracis. Inhalation anthrax is the
manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in
biological warfare. The symptoms may vary, but can include
fever and internal bleeding. The incubation period for
anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2
days of exposure. Botulinum toxin is one of the
most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of
poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as
late as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period
between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by
suffocation. Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which
are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms take a long time to
show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxins can cause
liver inflammation and cancer. They can also affect pregnant
women, leading to stillborn babies and children born with
mutations. Ricin is derived from the castor bean
and can cause multiple organ failure leading to death within
one or two days of inhalation. Page 12 - 2,850 tonnes of
mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and
cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes of VX. 4. Iraq’s nuclear
programme was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation
agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear
research centre, equipped with a research reactor, was built
at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre. The
research reactor worked up to 1991. The surge in Iraqi oil
revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the
research programme. This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by
the acquisition of two research reactors powered by highly
enriched uranium fuel and equipment for fuel fabrication and
handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in
uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli
air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become
operational; the other was never completed. 5. By the
mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq’s position in the war
with Iran prompted renewed interest in the military use of
nuclear technology. Additional resources were put into
developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile
material (material that makes up the core of a nuclear
weapon) for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was
preferred because it could be more easily produced covertly
than the alternative, plutonium. Iraq followed parallel
programmes to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU),
electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge
enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing
completion and another was under construction. However,
Iraq never succeeded in its EMIS technology and the
programme had been dropped by 1991. Iraq decided to
concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for producing
the necessary fissile material. Centrifuge facilities were
also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still
being developed. In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash
programme to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year.
This programme envisaged the rapid development of a small 50
machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce weapons-grade HEU
using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was
already substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the
reactor bombed by the Israelis. By the time of the Gulf War,
the crash programme had made little progress. 6. Iraq’s
declared aim was to produce a missile warhead with a
20-kiloton yield and weapons designs were produced for the
simplest implosion weapons. These were similar to the device
used at Nagasaki in 1945. Iraq was also working on more
Effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation A
detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might
flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6
miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause
80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal.
Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would
still be 10% casualties. Page 13 advanced concepts. By
1991 the programme was supported by a large body of Iraqi
nuclear expertise, programme documentation and databases and
manufacturing infrastructure. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iraq had: -
experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock
waves; - invested significant effort to understand the
various options for neutron initiators; - made significant
progress in developing capabilities for the production,
casting and machining of uranium metal. 7. Prior to the
Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed ballistic
missile industry. Many of the missiles fired in the
Gulf War were an Iraqi modified version of the SCUD missile,
the al-Hussein, with an extended range of 650km. Iraq had
about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to the Gulf War
plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and
components. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD
variants, such as the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km.
Iraq was also seeking to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine
with a view to producing new missiles. Recent intelligence
indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In
particular, Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile
with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight
test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD
technology, known as the al-Abid. Also during this period,
Iraq was developing the Badr-2000, a 700-1000km range
two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part
of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with
Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200–1500km range
solid propellant follow-on systems. The use of
chemical and biological weapons 8. Iraq had made
frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the
Iran-Iraq War. Many of the casualties are still in Iranian
hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous
types of cancer and lung diseases. In 1988 Saddam also used
mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in
northern Iraq (see box on p15). Estimates vary, but
according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were
killed. SCUD missiles The short-range mobile
SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in
the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2
developed in World War II. For many years it was the
mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces
and it was also widely exported. Recipients of
Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran,
and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet
Union. Page 14 9. Iraq used significant quantities of
mustard, tabun and sarin during the war with Iran resulting
in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. A month after the attack
on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tonnes of sarin
against Iranian troops on the al-Fao peninsula. Over the
next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve
agents on Iranian troops causing extensive casualties. 10.
From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know
that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means
for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000
free-fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and
shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads
available for its ballistic missiles. The Attack on
Halabja On Friday 17th March 1988 the village of
Halabja was bombarded by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over
in minutes. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his
own people. A Kurd described the effects of a chemical
attack on another village: “My brothers and my wife had
blood and vomit running from their noses and their mouths.
Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I
couldn’t do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from
their mouths and try in every way to make them breathe
again. I did artificial respiration on them and then I gave
them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on my wife
and two brothers.” (From “Crimes Against Humanity” Iraqi
National Congress.)
Among the corpses at Halabja,
children were found dead where they had been playing outside
their homes. In places, streets were piled with
corpses. Page 15 The use of ballistic
missiles 11. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at
Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military
targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf
War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition
forces stationed in the Gulf region. 12. At the end of the
Gulf War the international community was determined that
Iraq’s arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and
ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen
to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out
intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its
chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with
a range of over 150km. The IAEA was charged with the
abolition of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991
and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very
large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles
as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also
destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq’s nuclear weapons
programme and removed key nuclear materials. This was
achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programme of
harassment, obstruction, deception and denial (see Part 2).
Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable
to fulfil its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in
December 1998. 13. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN
Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports,
we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were
unable to account for: - up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical
warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent; -
up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including
approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical
warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX; -
growth media procured for biological agent production
(enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of
anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured); - over
30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and
biological agents. 14. The departure of UNSCOM meant that
the international community was unable to establish the
truth behind these large discrepancies and greatly
diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq’s
continuing attempts to reconstitute its programmes. Page
16 CHAPTER 3 1. This chapter sets out what we
know of Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, nuclear and
ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available
evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN
inspections and other publicly available information, it
also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi
efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since
1998. The main conclusions are that: - Iraq has a useable
chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of
UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical
and biological agents; - Saddam continues to attach great
importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis
for Iraq’s regional power. He is determined to retain these
capabilities; - Iraq can deliver chemical and biological
agents using an extensive range of artillery shells,
free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles; - Iraq
continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach
of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in
breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa
that has no civil nuclear application in Iraq; - Iraq
possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic
missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching
Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also
developing longer-range ballistic missiles; - Iraq’s
current military planning specifically envisages the use of
chemical and biological weapons; - Iraq’s military forces
are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with
command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The
Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45
minutes of a decision to do so; - Iraq has learnt lessons
from previous UN weapons inspections and is already taking
steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and
documentation in advance of the return of inspectors; -
Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles
programmes are well-funded. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
Assessment: 1999–2002 2. Since the withdrawal of the
inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence, including from
secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive
chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first
half of 2000 the JIC noted Page 17 intelligence on Iraqi
attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and on the
reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites
formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme.
Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials and
equipment which could be used for a biological warfare
programme. Personnel known to have been connected to the
biological warfare programme up to the Gulf War had been
conducting research into pathogens. There was intelligence
that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents
in mobile production facilities. Planning for the project
had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab Taha, known to have been a
central player in the pre-Gulf War programme. The JIC
concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and
material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks
using its legitimate bio-technology facilities. 3. In
mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical
warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons
from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq
to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within
weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC concluded
that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological
warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil
production pointed to a continuing research and development
programme. These chemical and biological capabilities
represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass
destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence of
inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which
was providing hard currency. 4. In the last six months the
JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical
and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq
has the means to deliver chemical and biological
weapons. Recent intelligence 5. Subsequently,
intelligence has become available from reliable sources
which complements and adds to previous intelligence and
confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and
biological weapons. The intelligence also shows that the
Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues
related to these weapons. This intelligence covers: -
Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an
important role in Iraqi military thinking: intelligence
shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the
possession of chemical and biological weapons which he
regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power. He
believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of
these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them.
Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain
this capability and recognises that Iraqi political weight
would be diminished if Iraq’s military power rested solely
on its conventional military forces. - Iraqi attempts
to retain its existing banned weapons systems: Iraq is
already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors
finding evidence of Page 18 its chemical and biological
weapons programme. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has
learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has
identified possible weak points in the inspections process
and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and
papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is
already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent
production facilities will also aid concealment efforts.
Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he
has been able to develop further in the four years since
inspectors left. - Saddam’s willingness to use
chemical and biological weapons: intelligence indicates
that as part of Iraq’s military planning Saddam is willing
to use chemical and biological weapons, including against
his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the
Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological
weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.
Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks 6.
When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks,
Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it had retained any
chemical agents from before the Gulf War they would have
deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. But Iraq
has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and
capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other
chemical warfare agents which would prevent such
decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions
which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and
found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign
of deterioration. 7. Iraq has claimed that all its
biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No
convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support
this claim. In particular, Iraq could not explain large
discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients
required for the specialised growth of agent) it procured
before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having
manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than
three times the amount of anthrax allegedly
manufactured. Chemical agent: production
capabilities 8. Intelligence shows that Iraq has
continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf War a
number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated
were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq’s chemical
weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following the
ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities
and equipment used in Iraq’s chemical weapons
programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use
either in industry or academic institutes, where it was
tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed
under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being
misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from
Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the
main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was
completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been Page
19 rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the
chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These include
the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah.
In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are
used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the
production of chemical agents. 9. Other dual-use
facilities, which are capable of being used to support the
production of chemical agent and precursors, have been
rebuilt and re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been
built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are
probably fully operational or ready for production. These
include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah (see figure 1),
which is a chemical research centre. It undertakes
research, development and production of chemicals previously
imported but not now available and which are needed for
Iraq’s civil industry. The Director General of the
research centre is Hikmat Na’im al-Jalu who prior to the
Gulf War worked in Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme and
after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq’s chemical
expertise. FIGURE 1: THE IBN SINA COMPANY AT
TARMIYAH 10. Parts of the al-Qa’qa’ chemical complex
damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are
operational. Of particular concern are elements of the
phosgene production plant at al-Qa’qa’. These were severely
damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM
supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene
does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a
chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent. 11. Iraq
has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research,
agent production and weaponisation. Most of the personnel
previously involved in the programme remain in country.
While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called
“cook books”) for the production of chemical agents and
critical precursors, Iraq’s claim to have unilaterally
destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed
and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence
indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of
concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is
not discovered by any future UN inspections. Page 20
Biological agent: production capabilities 12. We know
from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce
biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment,
UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly
linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its
own engineering capability to design and construct
biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer
dryers and other equipment and is judged to be
self-sufficient in the technology required to produce
biological weapons. The Page 21 The Problem of
Dual-Use Facilities Almost all components and supplies
used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
programmes are dual-use. For example, any major
petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health
organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials
and equipment required to manufacture chemical and
biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very
difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many
of Iraq’s facilities. For example, Iraq has built a large
new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north
west Iraq at al-Sharqat (see figure 2). This site is a
former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during
the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the
IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting
in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the
site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by
a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards.
Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric
acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in
the purification of uranium. FIGURE 2: AL-SHARQAT CHEMICAL
PRODUCTION FACILITY experienced personnel who were active
in the programme have largely remained in the country. Some
dual-use equipment has also been purchased, but without
monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to
their biological weapons programme. This newly purchased
equipment and other equipment previously subject to
monitoring could be used in a resurgent biological warfare
programme. Facilities of concern include: - the Castor Oil
Production Plant at Fallujah: this was damaged in UK/US air
attacks in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox) but has been rebuilt.
The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the
production of the biological agent ricin; - the al-Dawrah
Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute: which was involved
in biological agent production and research before the Gulf
War; - the Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib:
UNSCOM established that this facility was used to store
biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological
warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf War.
It has now expanded its storage capacity. 13. UNSCOM
established that Iraq considered the use of mobile
biological agent production facilities. In the past two
years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of
such facilities. Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi
military have developed mobile facilities. These would help
Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from
military attack or UN inspection. Chemical and
biological agents: delivery means 14. Iraq has a
variety of delivery means available for both chemical and
biological agents. These include: - free-fall bombs: Iraq
acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two sites of
free-fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990–91.
These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and
aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types
of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including
sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and cyclosarin; - artillery
shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive use of artillery
munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq
War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery.
Iraq is known to have tested the use of shells and rockets
filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery
munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM; - helicopter
and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried out studies into
aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these
platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for
many of these devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a
capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and
biological agent over a large area; - al-Hussein ballistic
missiles (range 650km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25
warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq
also Page 22 developed chemical agent warheads for
al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads
for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a
mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis
of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation
product which indicate that some additional warheads were
made and filled with VX; - al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic
missiles (range 150km plus): it is unclear if chemical and
biological warheads have been developed for these systems,
but given the Iraqi experience on other missile systems, we
judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing
so; - L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme (see figure
3): we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to
modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable
of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large
area. Chemical and biological warfare: command and
control 15. The authority to use chemical and
biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam but
intelligence indicates that he may have also delegated this
authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation
(SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be
involved in the movement of any chemical and biological
weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds
artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the
Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The
Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of
strategic missile systems and some Multiple Launcher Rocket
Systems. Chemical and biological weapons:
summary 16. Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert
chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN
Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce
chemical and biological agents. Iraq has: - chemical and
biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf
War stocks and more recent production; - the capability to
produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin,
cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass
casualties; Page 23
FIGURE 3: THE L-29 JET TRAINER - a
biological agent production capability and can produce at
least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq
has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological
agents; - a variety of delivery means available; -
military forces, which maintain the capability to use these
weapons with command, control and logistical arrangements in
place. NUCLEAR WEAPONS Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) Assessments: 1999–2001 17. Since 1999
the JIC has monitored Iraq’s attempts to reconstitute its
nuclear weapons programme. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that
Iraq had continued its nuclear research after 1998. The JIC
drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its
nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998. Since 1998 Iraq
had been trying to procure items that could be for use in
the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of
uranium. Iraqi nuclear weapons expertise 18.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter 2 describe the Iraqi nuclear
weapons programme prior to the Gulf War. It is clear from
IAEA inspections and Iraq’s own declarations that by 1991
considerable progress had been made in both developing
methods to produce fissile material and in weapons design.
The IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi
nuclear weapons Elements of a nuclear weapons
programme: nuclear fission weapon A typical nuclear
fission weapon consists of: - fissile material for the
core which gives out huge amounts of explosive energy from
nuclear reactions when made “super critical” through extreme
compression. Fissile material is usually either highly
enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium: — HEU
can be made in gas centrifuges (see separate box on
p25); — plutonium is made by reprocessing fuel from a
nuclear reactor; - explosives which are needed to compress
the nuclear core. These explosives also require a complex
arrangement of detonators, explosive charges to produce an
even and rapid compression of the core; - sophisticated
electronics to fire the explosives; - a neutron initiator
to provide initial burst of neutrons to start the nuclear
reactions. Page 24 programme, including the dedicated
facilities and equipment for uranium separation and
enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and
removed the remaining highly enriched uranium. But Iraq
retained, and retains, many of its experienced nuclear
scientists and technicians who are specialised in the
production of fissile material and weapons design.
Intelligence indicates that Iraq also retains the
accompanying programme documentation and data. 19.
Intelligence shows that the present Iraqi programme is
almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich
uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon. It
indicates that the approach is based on gas centrifuge
uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq was following for
producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq
needs certain key equipment, including gas centrifuge
components and components for the production of fissile
material before a nuclear bomb could be developed. 20.
Following the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998 there
has been an accumulation of intelligence indicating that
Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use
technology and materials with nuclear applications. Iraq’s
known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA
supervision. But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought
the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programme or nuclear
power plants and therefore has no legitimate reason to
acquire uranium. Gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride
is separated into its different isotopes in rapidly spinning
rotor tubes of special centrifuges. Many hundreds or
thousands of centrifuges are connected in cascades to enrich
uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to more
than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear
weapon. Weaponisation Weaponisation is the
conversion of these concepts into a reliable weapon. It
includes: - developing a weapon design through
sophisticated science and complex calculations; -
engineering design to integrate with the delivery
system; - specialised equipment to cast and machine safely
the nuclear core; - dedicated facilities to assemble the
warheads; - facilities to rigorously test all individual
components and designs; The complexity is much greater for a
weapon that can fit into a missile warhead than for a larger
Nagasaki-type bomb. Page 25 21. Intelligence shows that
other important procurement activity since 1998 has included
attempts to purchase: - vacuum pumps which could be used
to create and maintain pressures in a gas centrifuge cascade
needed to enrich uranium; - an entire magnet production
line of the correct specification for use in the motors and
top bearings of gas centrifuges. It appears that Iraq is
attempting to acquire a capability to produce them on its
own rather than rely on foreign procurement; - Anhydrous
Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) and fluorine gas. AHF is commonly
used in the petrochemical industry and Iraq frequently
imports significant amounts, but it is also used in the
process of converting uranium into uranium hexafluoride for
use in gas centrifuge cascades; - one large filament
winding machine which could be used to manufacture carbon
fibre gas centrifuge rotors; - a large balancing machine
which could be used in initial centrifuge balancing
work. 22. Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to
acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of
specialised aluminium tubes. The specialised aluminium in
question is subject to international export controls because
of its potential application in the construction of gas
centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no
definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear
programme. Nuclear weapons: timelines 23. In
early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were
hindering the import of crucial goods for the production of
fissile material. The JIC judged Iraq’s civil nuclear
programme - Iraq’s long-standing civil nuclear power
programme is limited to small scale research. Activities
that could be used for military purposes are prohibited by
UNSCR 687 and 715. - Iraq has no nuclear power plants and
therefore no requirement for uranium as fuel. - Iraq has
a number of nuclear research programmes in the fields of
agriculture, biology, chemistry, materials and
pharmaceuticals. None of these activities requires more than
tiny amounts of uranium which Iraq could supply from its own
resources. - Iraq’s research reactors are
non-operational; two were bombed and one was never
completed. Page 26 that while sanctions remain effective
Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they
were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at
least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for
a weapon indigenously. However, we know that Iraq retains
expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons. We
therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and
other essential components from foreign sources the timeline
for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and
Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two
years. BALLISTIC MISSILES Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002 24. In mid-2001
the JIC drew attention to what it described as a
“step-change” in progress on the Iraqi missile programme
over the previous two years. It was clear from intelligence
that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the
UN and supposedly limited to 150kms was being extended and
that work was under way on larger engines for longer-range
missiles. 25. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq
had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000kms.
The JIC assessed that if sanctions remained effective the
Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before
2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had
caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development.
In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts
for the missile programme had been bolder. The JIC also
assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles
from before the Gulf War. The Iraqi ballistic missile
programme since 1998 26. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has
been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a
range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security
Council Resolution 687. The al-Samoud liquid propellant
missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to
military units. Intelligence indicates that at least 50 have
been produced. Intelligence also indicates that Iraq has
worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of
UN Security Resolution 687. Production of the solid
propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 4) is also underway, probably
as an unguided rocket at this stage. There are also plans to
extend its range to at least 200km. Compared to liquid
propellant missiles, those powered by solid Page
27 FIGURE 4: ABABIL-100 propellant offer greater ease of
storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to
take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of
readiness for longer periods. 27. According to
intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles
(Figure 5), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.
These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete
systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines
and other components. We judge that the engineering
expertise available would allow these missiles to be
maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some
require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how
many could be available for use. They could be used with
conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a
range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of
countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Israel. Page 28 FIGURE 5:
AL-HUSSEIN 28. Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq wants
to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km,
enabling it to threaten other regional neighbours. This work
began in 1998, although efforts to regenerate the long-range
ballistic missile programme probably began in 1995. Iraq’s
missile programmes employ hundreds of people. Satellite
imagery (Figure 6) has shown a new engine test stand being
constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used
for al-Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD
engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision.
This new stand will be capable of testing engines for medium
range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges over 1000km,
which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution
687. Such a facility would not be needed for systems that
fall within the UN permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have
recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site.
Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology
to increase missile accuracy. Page 29 FIGURE 6:
AL-RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST
STAND 29. The success of UN restrictions means the
development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a
slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on
the: - availability of foreign expertise; - conduct of
test flights to ranges above 150km; - acquisition of
guidance and control technology. 30. Saddam remains
committed to developing longer-range missiles. Even if
sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile
capability of over 1000km within 5 years (Figure 7 shows the
range of Iraq’s various missiles). 31. Iraq has managed to
rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure
destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in
1998 (see Part 2). New missile-related infrastructure is
also under construction. Some aspects of this, including
rocket propellant mixing and casting facilities at the
al-Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the
prohibited Badr-2000 programme (with a planned range of
700–1000km) which were destroyed in the Gulf War or
dismantled by UNSCOM. A new plant at al-Mamoun for
indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key
ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket
motors, has also been constructed. This has been provided
illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian
chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq,
including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2
chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the Indian
authorities have recently suspended its export licence,
although other individuals and companies are still illicitly
procuring for Iraq. 32. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has
also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production
technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in
breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051. The embargo
has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as
requests to buy magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But
we know from intelligence that some items have found their
way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme. More will
inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes it clear
that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third
countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant
chemicals for Iraq’s ballistic missiles. This includes
production level quantities of near complete sets of solid
propellant rocket motor ingredients such as aluminium
powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated
polybutadiene. There have also been attempts to acquire
large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as
Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and
diethylenetriamene. We judge these are intended to support
production and deployment of the al-Samoud and development
of longer-range systems. Page 30 Page 31 FIGURE 7:
CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME 33. The UN has sought to
restrict Iraq’s ability to generate funds for its chemical,
biological and other military programmes. For example, Iraq
earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme
(OFF) established by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil
sold through the UN are used to buy humanitarian supplies
for Iraq. This money remains under UN control and cannot be
used for military procurement. However, the Iraqi regime
continues to generate income outside UN control either in
the form of hard currency or barter goods (which in turn
means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other
things). 34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi
regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as
purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the
OFF programme. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam
Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or
acquire military equipment, including for chemical,
biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We do
not know what proportion of these funds is used in this way.
But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop
its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile
programme, for example through covert procurement of
equipment from abroad, has been inhibited in any way by lack
of funds. The steady increase over the last three years in
the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress the
programmes faster. Iraq’s illicit earnings
Year Amount in $billions 1999 0.8 to 1 UN Sanctions UN
sanctions on Iraq prohibit all imports to and exports from
Iraq. The UN must clear any goods entering or leaving. The
UN also administers the Oil for Food (OFF) programme. Any
imports entering Iraq under the OFF programme are checked
against the Goods Review List for potential military or
weapons of mass destruction utility. Page 32 1. During the 1990s, beginning
in April 1991 immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the
UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions [see box]
establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry
out the work of dismantling Iraq’s arsenal of chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons programmes and long-range
ballistic missiles. These resolutions were passed under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is the instrument that
allows the UN Security Council to authorise the use of
military force to enforce its resolutions. 2. As outlined
in UNSCR 687, Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons programmes were also a breach of Iraq’s commitments
under: - The 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the use of
chemical and biological weapons; UN Security Council
Resolutions relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept,
unconditionally, “the destruction, removal or rendering
harmless, under international supervision” of its chemical
and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range
greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks,
components, research and facilities. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of
Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must
report that their mission has been achieved before the
Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done
so. UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must
provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its
programmes for weapons of mass destruction and provide
unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For
over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution.
Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind
other than civil use of isotopes. UNSCR 715, October
1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the
ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to
implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this until
November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15
December 1998, when the UN left Iraq. UNSCR 1051,
March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment
of dual-use goods which could be used for mass destruction
weaponry programmes. Page 33 - the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention which bans the development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological
weapons; - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which
prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring
nuclear weapons. 3. UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide
declarations on all aspects of its weapons of mass
destruction programmes within 15 days and accept the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless under
international supervision of its chemical, biological and
nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range
beyond 150km. Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration
within the specified time-frame. Iraq accepted the UNSCRs
and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. The history of the UN
weapons inspections was characterised by persistent Iraqi
obstruction. Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the
Inspectors 4. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard
Butler, reported to the UN Security Council in January 1999
that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Iraqi
Government committee to provide inspectors with only a
portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production
capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi
policy was based on the following actions: - to provide
only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for
destruction only those that were least modern; - to retain
the production capability and documentation necessary to
revive programmes when possible; - to conceal the full
extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX
nerve agent project; to conceal the number and type of
chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range
missiles; - and to conceal the existence of its biological
weapons programme. 5. In December 1997 Richard Butler
reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a
new category of sites, “Presidential” and “sovereign”, from
which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be
barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such
limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow
UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential
sites. Many of these so-called “palaces” are in fact large
compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi
counter-measures designed to hide weapons material (see
photograph on p35). UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the
remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time,
review any document and interview any scientist, technician
or other individual and seize any prohibited items for
destruction. Page 34 Page 35 A photograph of a
“presidential site” or what have been called
“palaces”. The total area taken by Buckingham Palace and
its grounds has been superimposed to demonstrate their
comparative size Boundary of presidential site Page
36 Iraq’s policy of deception Iraq has admitted
to UNSCOM to having a large, effective, system for hiding
proscribed material including documentation, components,
production equipment and possibly biological and chemical
agents and weapons from the UN. Shortly after the adoption
of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security
Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising
Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM
and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military
Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction programmes. The Higher Security
Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall
command of deception operations. The system was directed
from the very highest political levels within the
Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his
youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding proscribed
material relies on high mobility and good command and
control. It uses lorries to move items at short notice and
most hide sites appear to be located close to good road
links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was
particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to
hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor,
delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its
overall deception plan. Intimidation 6. Once
inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent
that the Iraqis would resort to a range of measures
(including physical threats and psychological intimidation
of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from
fulfilling their mandate. 7. In response to such
incidents, the President of the Security Council issued
frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its
disarmament and monitoring obligations.
8. Iraq denied that it had pursued a
biological weapons programme until July 1995. In July
1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been
produced on an industrial scale at al-Hakam. Following the
defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamil, Saddam’s
son-in-law and former Director of the Military
Industrialisation Commission, Iraq released over 2 million
documents relating to its mass destruction weaponry
programmes and acknowledged that it had Iraqi
obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams - firing
warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from
intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991); -
keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and
refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents
on Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme (September 1991); -
announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were
“unlawful” (October 1991); - refusing UNSCOM inspectors
access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were
made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the
building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the
site contained archives related to proscribed
activities; - in 1991–2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its
own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans. In
January 1993 it refused to allow UNSCOM the use of its own
aircraft to fly into Iraq; - refusing to allow UNSCOM to
install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key
missile sites (June-July 1993); - repeatedly denying
access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998); -
interfering with UNSCOM’s helicopter operations, threatening
the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997); -
demanding the end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US
UNSCOM staff (October 1997); - destroying documentary
evidence of programmes for weapons of mass destruction
(September 1997). Page 37 pursued a biological programme
that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq
admitted producing 183 biological weapons with a reserve of
agent to fill considerably more. 9. Iraq tried to obstruct
UNSCOM’s efforts to investigate the scale of its biological
weapons programme. It created forged documents to account
for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s,
specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin
and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate
that the material had been imported by the State Company for
Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals
and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored
documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN
inspection team, removing all references to key individuals,
weapons and industrial production of agents.
Inspection of Iraq’s biological weapons programme In the
course of the first biological weapons inspection in August
1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military
biological research programme. At the site visited,
al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even
entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the
al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the
facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived
from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently
discovered that the plant was a central site for the
production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for
weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi
officials to deceive inspectors. Iraq continued to develop
the al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about
its true purpose. Another key site, the Foot and Mouth
Disease Vaccine Institute at al-Dawrah which produced
botulinum toxin and probably anthrax was not divulged as
part of the programme. Five years later, after intense
pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of
bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at
al-Hakam. As documents recovered in August 1995 were
assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure
required by the UN was far from complete. Successive
inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater
understanding of the programme and to obtain credible
supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss
its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw
in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding
undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past
programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive
disclosures of its programme which were judged by UNSCOM and
specially convened international panels to be technically
inadequate. In late 1995 Iraq acknowledged weapons testing
the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production
information. Two years later, in early 1997, UNSCOM
discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin. Page
38 10. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning
production of agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq
destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological
weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons
impossible. In addition, Iraq cleansed a key site at
al-Muthanna, its main research and development, production
and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents, of
all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology
department, the animal-house and weapons filling
station. 11. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the
programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining
discussion to previous topics. In July 1998 Tariq Aziz
personally intervened in the inspection process stating that
the biological programme was more secret and more closed
than other mass destruction weaponry programmes. He also
played down the significance of the programme. Iraq has
presented the biological weapons programme as the personal
undertaking of a few misguided scientists. 12. At the same
time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme
via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997
the IAEA Director General stated that the IAEA was “severely
hampered by Iraq’s persistence in a policy of concealment
and understatement of the programme’s scope”.
Inspection achievements 13. Despite the conduct of the
Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA
Action Team have valuable records of achievement in
discovering and exposing Iraq’s biological weapons programme
and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons
stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq’s
nuclear weapons programme. 14. Despite UNSCOM’s efforts,
following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in
December 1998 there remained a series of significant
unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation
in a report to the UN Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman,
Richard Butler, indicated that: - contrary to the
requirement that destruction be conducted under
international supervision “Iraq undertook extensive,
unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of
proscribed weapons and items”; - and Iraq “also pursued a
practice of concealment of proscribed items, including
weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention
of Council resolutions”. Overall, Richard Butler declared
that obstructive Iraqi activity had had “a significant
impact upon the Commission’s disarmament work”. Page
39 Withdrawal of the inspectors 15. By the end
of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi
Government which was refusing to co-operate. The US and the
UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation
would make military action unavoidable. Richard Butler was
requested to report to the UN Security Council in December
1998 and stated that, following a series of direct
confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq
to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its
disarmament mandate. As a direct result on 16 December the
weapons inspectors were withdrawn. Operation Desert Fox was
launched by the US and the UK a few hours afterwards.
Operation Desert Fox (16–19 December 1998) Operation
Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq’s
ballistic missile programme and a suspect biological warfare
facility as well as military airfields and sites used by
Iraq’s security organisations which are involved in its
weapons of mass destruction programmes. Key facilities
associated with Saddam Hussein’s ballistic missile programme
were significantly degraded. UNSCOM and IAEA
achievements UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq,
carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi
obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered
details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes. Major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements
included: - the destruction of 40,000 munitions for
chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and
411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent; - the dismantling of
Iraq’s prime chemical weapons development and production
complex at al-Muthanna and a range of key production
equipment; - the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, 11
mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with
chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads; - the
destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility and
a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth
media for biological weapons; - the discovery in 1991 of
samples of indigenously-produced highly enriched uranium,
forcing Iraq’s acknowledgement of uranium enrichment
programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its
prohibited nuclear weapons programme; - the removal and
destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons
programme, including the al-Athir weaponisation/testing
facility. Page 40 The situation since 1998 16.
There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq
since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with
its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 1284 in December 1999. This
established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation
to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors
“immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and
all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of
transport”. It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take in
return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions.
A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full co-operation
with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and
unrestricted access to any and all sites, personnel and
documents. 17. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed
the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of
nuclear material (depleted natural and low-enriched
uranium). This has led some countries and western
commentators to conclude erroneously that Iraq is meeting
its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the
IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection
does “not serve as a substitute for the verification
activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN
Security Council”. 18. Dr Hans Blix, the Executive
Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr Mohammed El-Baradei, the
Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the
absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi
compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring
obligations. In April 1999 an independent UN panel of
experts noted that “the longer inspection and monitoring
activities remain suspended, the more difficult the
comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions
becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute
its proscribed weapons programmes”. 19. The departure of
the inspectors greatly diminished the ability of the
international community to monitor and assess Iraq’s
continuing attempts to reconstitute its chemical,
biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Page
41 Page 42 IRAQ’S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES
THE ROLE OF
INTELLIGENCE
IRAQ’S PROGRAMMES:
1971–1998
THE CURRENT
POSITION: 1998–2002
2000 1.5 to
2
2001 3
2002 3 (estimate) HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS
INSPECTIONS
Obstruction
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