What Next on the Maoist Roadmap?

A snapshot of any newspaper on a given day portrays a bewildering picture of Maoist activity. Take 24 June 2007 and the Kathmandu Post for instance. The bold headline proclaiming that Lena Sundh "tells YCL to cease and desist" in the latest UNOHCHR report, is reinforced by the UML Chief's assertion that "YCL atrocities are worse than reported". Obviously quite unfettered by any of that, the YCL meanwhile "threatens to kill Madi injured," while other Maoists "obstructs highway to free cadre" in Sarlahi. That the cadre in question was arrested by the police force of the interim government in which the Maoists themselves are partaking; for illegal possession of arms, seems lost on the Maoist senior leadership, who were busy registering a "note of dissent" over the promotion of army brass. The list goes on, but there is no need to belabor the point.

While all this certainly highlights the rising fluidity and anarchy in the country, the deeper and darker truth which is really unnerving the experts, is that there is actually method to this madness. As the latest International Crisis Group (ICG) report correctly deduces, there is one thing in the equation that has not changed at all - Maoist intent. The executive summary of the think tank's 18 May 2007 report starts with, "Nepal's Maoists have changed their strategy and tactics but not yet their goals". Yet another long time Nepal watcher and frequent visitor, Dr. Tom Marks, further elaborates this idea in his 16 June article - "[In the past] all efforts by knowledgeable members of the state, especially within the security forces, to mobilize citizen capacity, whether in local defense forces or even watcher groups, were thwarted by incomprehension, outright opposition, or alliances made with the donor community. In contrast, the entire thrust of the Maoist effort was to form a counter-state that could challenge the state. In this, they have never faltered. Their present participation in the Government is for no purpose other than to facilitate their eventual takeover".

The assumption, increasingly substantiated by events on the ground, that the Maoist machine is not really ready to roll over and satisfy itself as one party in a liberal, multi-party, parliamentary, democratic setup, paints a rather bleak picture and sadly demonstrates the desecration of the achievements of Jana Andolan II. Painful as it may be, there is no shaking off this notion. Such is the overwhelming evidence glaring at the face of all who dare to take a hard look at reality instead of indulging in denial or succumbing to the 'peace at all costs' mindset so prevalent in the chattering class.

Since the Maoist strategy appears to merely be a switch of tracks towards the same destination rather than the much hoped for shift in direction itself, one question emerges with utmost urgency. What next on the Maoist roadmap?

Before attempting to arrive at the answer to that critical question, it is necessary to try and comprehend the context within which it is posed. Despite the proven ability to create and manipulate chaos, all is not honky dory for the Maoists. For a start, the very election for the constitutional assembly that formed the cornerstone of their demands for so long is no longer looking quite so attractive. True, the impotence of the mainstream political parties coupled with the limitations imposed upon the state security apparatus still facilitates their de facto grip over most of Nepal. But even in their self declared base areas, the heavy handed excesses of the Maoists and their sister organizations have unleashed a series of backlashes. Likewise, even the thinly veiled hints of the Information Minister for whom party interest outweighs government policy any day, has failed to totally muzzle the free press. Moriartry, apparently unfazed by the rocks of Jhapa, continues to raise an accusing finger. What's worse, even Martin, whom some would call their 'traditional ally', frustrated with the obstacles erected by the Maoists at every step UNMIN takes these days, is starting to frown at their antics.

What all this means, in essence, is that the Maoists appear primed to seek to switch tracks once again. The relentless and increasingly whimsical rhetoric leveled at the Nepalese Army is a clear indication of their recognition that, when all is said and done, it is only the Army, still relatively intact, and in the control of the Prime Minister and increasingly morally aligned to the democratic forces, that still bars a Cambodia or Bolshevik Russia type takeover. If only the Maoists can compromise the army, nothing and no one, no matter how solid their Janatantrik credentials can stop them from walking in and grabbing the reins of power.

As their two overt routes to power - a landslide victory in the CA elections or a street based mass uprising - appear increasingly elusive, a third and less obvious 'indirect approach', one of securing a manipulative integration of the PLA into the National Army and its eventual subversion and mobilization for party interest, may appear more attractive. Indeed, it may even be the only viable option remaining to the Maoists in the pursuit of their stated and unchanged strategic objective.

The modalities of integration of ex-rebels into the army are therefore on the top of the Maoist agenda today. In their cunning albeit twisted minds, it is the one factor that can still deliver them total power. Having taken advantage of the recent distribution of citizenship papers, allegedly legitimizing the bulk of their cadres in the cantonments, the party is seeking to maximize the numbers verified for integration. They oppose integration into civil society, the police or even the APF. Furthermore, the attempt will be to induct intact units and politically astute leaders into command positions in the army. At the end of the day, the handover of 3400 odd 'crummy' weapons in the containers are a small price to pay if the party can inherit some 15000 to 30000 military grade weapons through mass induction of cadres into the NA. If a rebel force with 3400 old weapons caused so much consternation in the last decade, it does not take the brains of a rocket scientist to imagine what the Maoists may achieve with five or ten times as many modern arms - especially if there would no longer remain an intact army to fight them onto the negotiating table again.

At a time when some people still claim that the loyalty of the relatively disciplined army that takes every opportunity to demonstrate its acceptance of civilian supremacy is still in doubt due to its traditional linkage to the monarchy, can the political parties afford to accept its transformation into a force that would be confirmed loyal to a single party. At the least such damaging integration would undoubtedly result in an army that is mutinous and fragmented. While the political parties may smugly view the process as mutually beneficial compromise, as Tom Marks noted wryly, the Maoists see it as being nothing less than "accepting the surrender of the old-order ... to form a people's republic. In these plans, the 'old military' is to be cut back dramatically, and in its place are to be substituted armed popular groups as seen, for example, in Iran ..."

It is imperative, as much for the sake of sustained democracy as anything else, that the Nepalese Army is kept as intact as possible. Integration, if it is unavoidable, must be carried out only after the settlement of the remaining political questions, especially the formation of an elected government. The primary effort must be first and foremost to integrate them back into society. Only then can the remaining merge into all the security forces, with little or no influx into the army. In India, Subash Chandra Bose's Indian National Army (INA), formally regarded as heroes of the independence struggle against the British, was nevertheless not accepted into the new Indian Army, lest it change its professional character. In Nepal, if the integration has to be accepted as part of yet another 'package deal' as the Maoists are likely to demand, it should be 'packaged' at the very end of the peace process and carried out in a manner and quantum that does not fundamentally damage and alter the core nature of the only remaining viable obstacle to a forceful and singular takeover of power by the Maoists.

ENDS

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