The Resignation of Stanley McChrystal

Bitter wars often result in bitter decisions between civilian commanders and their military subordinates. Dissatisfied commanders in the field can stray. Comments can be made out of turn. General Stanley McChrystal’s resignation as the United States’ top commander in Afghanistan and replacement by General David Petraeus is yet another instance of this. The General, and his associates, had been rather loose lipped on how the Obama administration had conducted the war in Afghanistan. The grateful recipient of such candid views was Rolling Stone magazine.

A few snippets then, of this undermining interview. The first meeting by the commander with the President produced a degree of dissatisfaction. An advisor’s remarks after that one-on-one meeting summed it up: a mere ‘10 minute photo op’ which demonstrated the ignorance of the commander-in-chief. ‘Here’s the guy who is going to run this fucking war, but he didn’t seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed.’ The general also felt a degree of betrayal from US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry.

This was certainly not the first time McChrystal has been in the news for public airings. He has, in fact, shown a pattern of verbal enthusiasm. His ‘60 Minutes’ interview sent ripples through the establishment; his criticism of Vice President Biden’s proposal to trim back operations in Afghanistan sank like a lead balloon.

Historians have been busy scouring the records for precedents on what US presidents do with their difficult generals. Doris Kearns Goodwin reminds readers (NYT, Jun 23) about the over cautious and insolent General of the Union forces, George McClellan, who pushed President Abraham Lincoln to the limits of patience. Lincoln famously remarked of the general that, if he wasn’t ‘going to use his army, I’d like to borrow it for a time.’ Despite such difficulties, Lincoln exercised a different judgment in that case. Breaches of protocol were tolerated as long as the general could exercise a ‘positive affect’ on the forces.

Robert Dallek had little room for tolerating McChrystal’s public deviations, writing in the same paper that the very agreement to conduct an interview with Rolling Stones was itself a grave error. ‘If a top officer feels strongly that his commander in chief is mistaken, he can resign and take his case to the public as a private citizen.’ Such an absolutist line is surely not desirable from the military’s top brass. It would hardly be appropriate to have mere automata implementing foolish policies either. Striking a balance might, however, be impossible.

That said, the forces were already marshaled against the general as he made his way to the White House to fall on his sword. Rep. Dave Obey (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee found the general ‘bull-headed’, accusing him of ‘repeated contempt for the civilian chain of command.’

There is little doubt that McChrystal exercised ‘poor judgment’ in these moments of candor, but the entire American deepening of the war has demonstrated an impoverishment of thinking that has produced frustration in the chain of command. Elaborate terms of counter-insurgency tactics have embroidered the military and civilian efforts with only ‘stabilizing’ effects. McChrystal has been feted by those in the conservative establishment as a doyen of counter-insurgency tactics, and was initially endorsed by various liberals. Max Boot, writing in Commentary (Nov 2009), spoke of the ‘McChrystal way’ of war as ‘the only way.’ What the Obama administration has done is effectively shoot the architect but retained his plans.

There is only one clear factor in the current, sapping conflict. The forces the coalition is fighting in this instance have no doubts about their objectives. The foreign forces in Afghanistan have them accumulating on a daily basis. McChrystal may well have gone, but the crisis remains.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

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