Government tests market appetite for social housing
Government tests market appetite for social
housing
31 August 2015
The Government today released information memoranda to test market appetite for social housing transfers in Tauranga and Invercargill.
The documents specify that it is a market sounding exercise only, and not part of any formal procurement process.
On offer
The Government owns and operates 371 properties in Invercargill and 1,257 in Tauranga. How many it will put up for transfer will be decided according to the response it receives to the market testing. 115 dwellings in Tauranga and three in Invercargill have been excluded from sale because they are subject to iwi rights of first refusal.
The two proposals differ in that the Government would prefer to make a single transfer transaction in Tauranga, but is looking for one to three transactions in Invercargill.
It is prepared to consider both lease and sale options. Potential providers could include:
• existing Community Housing Providers,
and
• providers who are currently operating in a
related sector (a description that would seem to take in
Serco).
Providers will not be expected to provide all of the services themselves. They could form a consortium or sub-contract partners to bring in requisite skills.
The Government is looking for providers who can bring in innovative thinking or new expertise to bring “a positive change” for tenants. This may be through:
• different
approaches to interacting with tenants
• enhancing
links across social services
• efficient housing stock
management and maintenance, and
• reconfiguring the
portfolio of properties to better match community
needs.
Two key contracts would be entered with the Government:
• an Outcome Agreement with the Ministry of
Social Development (MSD) for tenancy and property
management services paid through an Agreed Rent per
property, a proportion of which will be paid by the tenant
and the remainder through the Income Related Rent Subsidy,
and
• a Sale and Purchase or Lease Agreement with
Housing New Zealand through Treasury’s Transactions Unit,
the value of which would take into account the fact that the
properties were to be used for social housing. Whether a
sale or lease will be preferred is likely to be driven by
strategic considerations and perceived future demand for
that social housing (i.e. lack of demand would indicate
ultimate disposal).
•
The memoranda contain new
information that responds to some of issues that potential
participants have identified:
• the Government will take
vacancy risk provided social housing properties are required
and made available by a provider
• providers will have
specific maintenance obligations
• the Government’s
rent supplement will be indexed to market rent over the term
of the Outcome Agreement
• capital proceeds on any
properties that are subsequently divested will be shared
between providers and the Government
• properties will
be encumbered as “social housing properties” and the
Government will take a second mortgage to protect its
position (although allowance is made for direct agreements
with debt funders where the circumstances
require)
• Outcome Agreements will contain step-in
rights for MSD in case of provider failure (a provision
which would seem to allow an intervention similar to the
Department of Corrections in Mt Eden Prison),
and
• providers will be responsible for rent collection
from tenants, but the Government can redirect tenant rental
streams direct to providers.
•
The Tauranga
memorandum is available here, and the Invercargill memorandum,
here.
ENDS