Brazil: Lula No Long Ball Hitter With Land Reform
Lula No Long Ball Hitter When it Comes to Land Reform
• Brazil nears the 10 anniversary of the massacre that drew international attention to the country’s intense struggle for land reform.
• The Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST) carries tremendous political clout in Brazil’s rural regions, which it will likely wield as the presidential election approaches.
• Lula, who arrived in office with the full support of the MST, has failed to deliver a comprehensive land reform program, leading to widespread unease over his rule.
• The orthodox economic policies Lula has pursued, while lauded by international financial institutions, have left many longstanding social problems in Brazil, unaltered due to underfunding and neglect.
As Brazil approaches the 10th anniversary of the April 17, 1996 Eldorado dos Carajás massacre, which saw six unarmed demonstrators killed when police opened fire on protestors over land distribution policies, attention will again be focused on the disappointing performance of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s government regarding this issue. The killings drew international attention to the struggles of Brazilian activists who sought to confront their country’s tremendous agrarian inequalities, and helped to further solidify the political clout of the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra). The MST, which was a key player in Lula’s finally victorious quest for power in 2002, has become increasingly dissatisfied with the distance between the president’s promises and his actions. With the October elections looming, the MST again hopes to bring the rural reform issue to the center of the political debate, and transmit to Lula the message that Brazilian camponês will not wait another fifty years for land reform. For Lula, this is a crucial juncture, as his presidency has increasingly rested on eroding pillars, with corruption and orthodox economic policies casting doubt on his legitimacy as a reformer. A demonstrated unwillingness to confront the question of agrarian reform will prove even more damaging to the leader’s stature, and whether he exhibits capacity for trust from his people.
The Context of the Brazilian
Land Struggle
Brazil is one of the most unequal
societies in the world in overall statistics, with the
second highest gini coefficient. The discrepancies are
countrywide, but particularly painfully obvious in the
countryside. According to the Brazilian Census Bureau, 1% of
landowners currently control 45% of the nation’s farmland,
while approximately 37% of Brazil’s 184 million citizens
hold less than 1% of land. Meanwhile in Brazil, the
so-called “South American breadbasket,” about 4.8 million
landless farmers struggle to survive with temporary or
part-time work, on meager wages, and under conditions, as
reported by the U.S. State Department Human Rights Bureau,
as being analogous to slavery. For example, due to long
hours and inhumane working conditions, eleven sugar cane
cutters have reportedly died within the past two years.
According to Brazil’s National Institute for Settlement and Agrarian Reform (a public body), 150 million hectares of farmland is presently underused in the country, including 20 million fertile and easily accessible hectares that could be put into production almost immediately. The MST estimates that up to 60% of the Brazilian countryside lies fallow, producing a devastating social backlash as millions of the rural poor join the ranks of the nation’s favela (urban slum) dwellers. “Indeed,” the MST insists, “the wealthiest 20% of the Brazilian population own 90% of the land, much of it being idle, used for ranching, tax write-offs, or to produce crops exclusively for export, while millions starve in the country.”
The MST
Horrendous conditions
existing in the Brazilian countryside gave rise to a
powerful political and social movement, the MST. After
emerging in 1984 as a coalition of peasant groups involved
in a series of disparate, widely scattered land struggles,
the MST has since become the largest social movement in the
hemisphere, and arguably the most significant in democratic
land reform history. About 30% of all government-granted
agrarian settlements can be attributed to MST bargaining.
Although such data can be shaky, Brazilian land reform
expert, Dr. Miguel Carter of American University, estimates
that the organization encompasses over 1 million in Brazil.
Also, according to Carter, “MST engagements with Brazil’s
political institutions are multifarious and dynamic. These
include public activism and acts of civil disobedience,
lobbying and bargaining, ad hoc societal corporatism,
electoral participation, and manifold relations with the
rule of law.” In this sense, he argues, MST’s nonviolent
tactics – land occupations, marches, road blockades, and
petitions – have demonstrably strengthened Brazil’s civil
society by incorporating its most marginalized masses into
its inner recesses. Perhaps this record of success helps to
explain why, despite the fact that the Brazilian media
overwhelmingly portrays the group as radical, and therefore
dangerous, opinion polls by April of 1997, revealed that 94%
of the population felt the MST’s struggle was just, and that
85% supported its non-violent method of land occupations as
a proper vehicle for accelerating lethargic government
reforms.
Fresh Hopes Fade
The MST’s public
demonstrations and the positive public opinion ratings that
they inspired, helped create a powerful political force,
which the organization wielded with great effect in the 2002
presidential election. Although the MST claims no political
affiliation, it has strong historic ties to the leftist
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), and when Lula launched his
presidential bid as the PT’s standard bearer, the MST was
there to offer support. Lula’s historic landslide victory
offered fresh hope to the nearly 200,000 landless peasants
living in plastic tents across the countryside.
As a former union factory worker and agrarian reform campaigner before becoming a major union president, when Lula took office in January of 2003, he was championed by the disenfranchised. He had long voiced his support for the MST, visiting its camps, even sporting its trademark baseball cap, much to the dismay of the Brazilian elite. Riding to victory upon the support of the marginalized masses, his charismatic and passionate speeches were studded with promises to create 10 million jobs in 4 years, as well as to double the minimum wage, and build social infrastructure. However, once in office, he created only 3.7 million jobs, and increased the minimum wage by just 42%. And, like many of Lula’s other promises regarding social change, it was soon glaringly obvious that land reform would come second to his administration’s neoliberal economic policies which Lula claimed were essential in order to attract the foreign investment needed to generate funds for his proposed social justice programs.
The Case Against Lula
Lula’s
sluggish and seemingly indifferent approach to land reform
is consistent with the apathy that he, in general, has
displayed toward social issues that impact most Brazilians.
Lula won the MST’s support by pledging to give land to
400,000 families, and allowing 500,000 squatters to acquire
formal deeds to the land on which they live. However,
according to the Brazilian National Institute of
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), only 235,000
families have been given land. “Under the previous
government, agrarian reform was going at a snail's pace, and
it has continued at a snail's pace," said MST leader Marina
dos Santos. "We are very disappointed, we expected so much
more from him."
While his neoliberal economic policies are drawing praise from the nation’s elites, other Brazilians are not so convinced of the benefits generated by such orthodoxy, and claim that the policies have hindered land reform and have been an inadequate vehicle for job creation, while exacerbating inequalities and disproportionately draining the nation’s resources. Lula’s economic strategy “concentrates income and only generates an economy aimed at foreign trade, with no repercussion in the internal market,” says economist João Pedro Stédile. “The export dollars do not come back to the economy.” He linked this capital drain to the deepening of rural poverty in areas such as Goiás, which despite the prosperity brought on by being the largest exporter of cotton in Brazil, has turned into a “large slum.”
With violence surging in urban poor communities during Lula’s presidency, culminating in last year’s dreadful “social cleansing” of 29 poor Rio de Janeiro residents during what also has been described as a raid by a military-police group, it has also become increasingly clear that there is no sanctuary for Brazil’s numberless landless, who historically have poured into the cities’ favelas when rural realities seemed too harsh to bear. Indeed, in the fifth largest economy in the world, the asymmetrical land distribution system seems to represent the heart of Brazil’s ills, along with the unequal gains and social costs of such progress, which have bred violence, corruption, and abject poverty.
The MST Moves
Forward
Land reform in Brazil was almost entirely
absent from the government’s initial planning agenda until
landless movements began to demand the exaction of basic
resources on their behalf from the political system,
beginning in the 1980s. Embedded in Brazil’s original
constitution, which embodies the fundamentals of Brazil’s
modernist slogan of “progress-at-all-costs,” is the idea
that unproductive land can be “occupied” to be made
productive. The 1988 Constitution, which marked Brazil’s
shift to democracy, states that “land should be used for the
benefit of all society.” Lula has only partially changed
this, and the strategies employed by local activists remain
in effect. In accordance with these constitutionally
established rights, peasants began to stage sit-ins on
unproductive and speculative plots, while demanding land
redistribution initiatives. Often living in tents and armed
only with farm tools, landless activists have been able to
make impressive gains, acquiring a total land area of
roughly the size of the state of Louisiana. Approximately
200,000 landless still wait in make-shift encampments,
sleeping under tarps on the sides of highways, or squatting
on vacant plots.
While squatters carry out ad hoc land reform, the MST has stepped in with social services where the Brazilian government has failed, both under Lula and his predecessors. The MST draws funding from often creative sources, ranging from 400 farming cooperatives, to its own natural medicine plant in Ceara. Its 1,600 government-recognized settlements, spread across 23 Brazilian states, boast health care centers, 1,800 primary and secondary schools (serving 160,000 children), and a literacy program involving over of 30,000 adults. In 2005, the MST established its first university, Escola Nacional Florestan Fernandes, named after the famous Brazilian intellectual, on a campus outside of São Paulo. In addition, as a method to accelerate the spread of social services, the organization has signed a number of formal agreements with federal government and sub-national agencies to carry out a variety of development projects to provide services, including education and healthcare.
Days of
Struggle
Just 7 months before Brazil’s upcoming
presidential election, Lula still boasts a 20 point lead
over his main competitor, São Paulo governor Geraldo
Alckmin. Yet the numbers might belie a less certain
standing, as a long-simmering corruption scandal has come to
a head and blossomed over the last few months, with a report
that implicates many of Lula’s close PT associates.
Moreover, a widening gap between his leftist pledges and
centrist policies, has caused many to question his
credentials.
Many of those who most supported Lula as he
came into office have become his most ardent critics: human
rights groups, NGOs, and even the Catholic Church accuse him
of selling out to big landowners and giant corporations.
Disenchantment with Lula’s sluggish role in the realm of
land reform has been manifested in a wave of land invasions
by former Lula supporters, as they attempt to place the
issue in the center of the political debate come October.
"This was a government that didn't face up to the powerful
rural and economic oligarchies," says Maria Luiza Mendonca,
the director of the Human Rights and Social Justice Network,
an umbrella group. "He hasn't attacked the structural
problems that cause things like hunger, illiteracy, and
poverty. Lula has lacked courage and he has lacked daring."
While the month of April has been a major time for
mobilization ever since the 1996 massacre, this year the MST
is announcing record land occupations as part of its “days
of struggle.” According to Agência Brasil, the MST plans to
mobilize 120,000 encampment dwellers to occupy unproductive
properties in 23 states, including the Federal District.
João Paulo Rodrigues, a member of the movement's national
coordinating board, announced that while encampments that
will be not taking direct action to occupy land, they will
be exerting other pressures for land reform through
launching public debates, marches, and “block[ing] highways
if necessary.”
The scope of this “anti-neoliberal, anti-imperialist, popular, and national project” will become increasingly international as cities in Europe and the U.S. also mobilize in protest on April 17. The MST has solidarity groups within 14 European and North American countries, and maintains close ties to small farmers’ organizations in 43 nations through Vía Campesina, an international peasant coalition. Dr. Miguel Carter told COHA that he is planning a second annual march to the Brazilian Embassy in Washington D.C., along with family members of Dorothy Stang, an American nun and rural activist, who was murdered last year in Anapu. He predicts comparable demonstrations in Spain, France, and Italy as well as New York and Boston.
Impetus for Change?
As April 17 draws near, many will
be watching to see if escalated social movements provide
more conveyances for change, or if they will encounter
increased violence, or perhaps even worse, fall victim to
Lula’s indifference and complacency. The MST has
accomplished a great deal, but what some of them see as
Lula’s betrayal has cast doubt on whether political
solutions exist to deal with Brazil’s greatest problems. If
Lula is unwilling to commit himself to the principles of
agrarian reform ahead of the presidential elections, he will
likely be discarded as just another charlatan who wore the
mask of another reforming crusader but turned out to be only
the bearer of orthodox nostrums.