The Path to Venezuela’s “Surprise” Election

This Sunday’s election in Venezuela seemed to be a foregone conclusion: many assumed Nicolás Maduro, right hand man of Hugo Chavez and his hand-picked successor, would easily claim victory. And they did so with just cause: only six months ago, Chávez handily won re-election by an 11-point margin, winning even more votes than his 2006 victory. Yet this was not the case on Sunday. The announced result gave Maduro a victory of just over a percentage point – a surprise for many. But for those systematically listening to voters, Maduro’s win was always on shaky ground.

Greenberg Quinlan Rosner has done extensive public opinion research in Venezuela – hundreds of focus groups and scores of surveys – and the focus groups we conducted in Caracas just nine days after Chavez’s death among swing voters showed a new opening for challenger Henrique Capriles Radonski.[1]

First, these soft Chavista voters had some serious doubts about Nicolás Maduro and his ability to govern. To many, Maduro was an unknown, untested figure. “We don’t know anything about Maduro, about what he’s done,” states a woman who voted for Chavez in October. Another asks: “What do we know about him? We don’t know his work.” Some participants were aware of Maduro’s humble background and former career as a bus driver, but beyond that, participants worried that they do not know him as well as Chavez, who has been part of their lives for the past 14 years.

Whether through the blessing of a bird, or by referring to himself as his son, Maduro’s strategy was always to link himself to Chavez as closely as possible. But Chavista voters were skeptical. One man who voted for Chavez says: “The charisma is what concerns me; the charisma of Chavez can’t be compared to Maduro.” Another woman worries Maduro might not be the carbon copy some are looking for: “[He] doesn’t think like Chavez, the two are totally different,” she says.

Second, even those who voted for Chavez are willing to recognize some shortcomings in his legacy. While these voters are indeed able to point to the good that the Chavista government brought – the social programs, or misiones; more investment in education; a feeling of Venezuelan pride and an “awakening” of the poor – they are also able to be critical, in a way perhaps surprising in an electorate generally perceived as polarized. “The president did good and bad; he was a human man,” admits one Chavista woman. On the negative side, many list the division he fomented within the country. “The government has made many mistakes – with respect to attitude – there’s too much dissent,” says a Chavista voter. Participants also point to crime and insecurity as well as to rising prices. For them, it does not go unnoticed that Venezuela has the second-highest murder rate in the hemisphere and is suffering from currency devaluations.

While doubts about Maduro continued to surface, Capriles Radonski embraced the opportunity and actively worked to define Maduro for voters. During a short campaign period, Capriles Radonski raised doubts about Maduro’s past: from his previous experience as foreign minister and giving money away to Cuba, to his experience and ability to govern.

Finally, Capriles Radonski, unlike opposition leaders of the past, appealed to soft Chavistas voters by presenting himself as a social democrat – committed to maintaining and improving the social programs that brought benefit to so many. Since announcing his candidacy for the presidential primary in 2011, Capriles Radonski has been on a near non-stop campaign based on a platform of non-exclusion, ending the job-killing expropriations that sent so many Venezuelan jobs abroad, fighting crime and insecurity, and stopping the blank-check handouts to other Bolivarian states while Venezuelans suffered.

Ultimately, Maduro was not handed the victory he was expecting. And that’s the real story of this election: Chavismo. Without Chavez’s days are numbered. In a mere six months, the opposition shrank the margin from 11 points to fewer than 2. In a mere six months, the opposition gained more than 600,000 votes. Maduro and the government can no longer dismiss the opposition as the party of the burguesía, or the few. The opposition is now at least 49 percent of Venezuela.

In the coming months, many problems will continue to dog Venezuela: Maduro will likely not get the same free pass Chavez did, especially as these problems disproportionately affect the poor. Capriles Radonski has solidified his position as leader of the opposition – an opposition that now represents fully half the population and that will likely get stronger in the upcoming municipal and legislative elections as Maduro starts to be blamed for the continuing ills. It should be no surprise, then, that the era of Chavismo dominance has ended in Venezuela.

[1] On March 14 and 15, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner conducted 4 focus groups among swing voters – that is, voters who voted for Chavez in his October re-election, but were undecided or uncertain of their support for Maduro; and voters who voted for Henrique Capriles Radonski in October, and were unsure or less likely to vote in April.

ENDS

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