Fonterra CEO Speech To Auckland University
Address by Andrew Ferrier, CEO, Fonterra Co-operative
Group to The University of Auckland Business School's "New
Hemisphere" Speaker Series - 10 June 2004
"The Unique Opportunities and Challenges of the Co-operative Model"
At the top of New Zealand's list of top 200 companies are two very different organisations.
At one is Fonterra, with $12.5 billion in revenues in 2003. At two is Telecom, with $5.1 billion in revenues in the same year. The first is a co-operative, the second a corporate.
We share many similarities. Both Fonterra and Telecom are the products of change. Telecom was born out of the old New Zealand Post Office in the days when the government was withdrawing from the business of business, privatising its commercial assets and exposing them to deregulation. Fonterra too was created through deregulation, but it was deregulation that was threatened by Government, and ultimately brought about by farmers themselves with the Government's co-operation.
We are alike, but we also have fundamental differences. Telecom's website, for example, lists 12 broking houses with analysts dedicated to studying and commenting on its operations for the benefit of shareholders. Its shareholders can be anyone with capital willing to invest voluntarily in the company. They enter and exit at will, simply by trading their shares on the market. Fonterra, by contrast, has one formal mechanism for studying and commenting on our performance - and that is a self created mechanism through our Shareholders' Council. Our shareholders must be dairy farmers. To supply us, they must make compulsory capital investments and these are invariably for the long term.
It is not surprising then, that I believe Fonterra is not well understood as New Zealand's largest company. Much of this stems from the lack of understanding about the traditional and the modern co-operative model.
In today's session, I want to close this information gap by examining why the co-operative model survived as such a cornerstone for the New Zealand dairy industry - and indeed the economy. I want to trace the evolution of this model from one exhibiting some very real disadvantages, to one which combines traditional co-operative values with modern corporate standards in terms of governance and performance measurement.
Finally, having put the co-operative into a clear context, I want to examine what challenges the co-operative model poses for management, and how these challenges have unique solutions.
Before doing so, I want to place on record the contribution of co-operatives to the New Zealand economy. The figures may surprise you. The total revenue from New Zealand's top 200 companies is some $101 billion per annum. Of that, over $53 billion is generated by the top 20 companies.
Of those top 20 companies, the top six
co-operatives[1] Yet there is
this lingering notion that co-operatives are an anachronism,
riddled with problems like lack of performance transparency,
capital constraints and cumbersome decision-making
processes. Despite this, they have survived. In today's
session, we will return to history to consider why that is
and to learn why they are so tightly woven into the fabric
of the dairy industry, that any alternative seems
impossible. The Historical Perspective Dairy
co-ops have been part of New Zealand's history since 1871
when the country's first cheese company was created on Otago
Peninsula. Like co-operatives all over the world, they were
established to create the power that comes from pooling
resources. By the 1930s, more than 400 separate
dairy co-operative companies were operating throughout the
country. They were export focused, and had their own
international marketing arm in the Dairy Export Produce
Control Board. >From the 1930s to the 1960s, we saw
the beginnings of the industry consolidation which
ultimately led to Fonterra. As technologies in transport and
refrigeration improved - for example, cooling of milk
on-farm was introduced 1955 - co-ops began joining forces to
become more efficient. By the 1960s, 400 co-ops had become
168. >From today's perspective, the industry of the
1960s was fragmented, high-cost and inefficient. In the 168
manufacturing companies the average herd size was just over
60 (it's 285 today) and the overwhelming bulk of earnings
came from the sales of butter and cheese to the United
Kingdom. Nonetheless, the foundations for the modern
co-operative were laid back then. In the 1960s the menace of
dumping in the international market place was already a
reality worrying New Zealand's farmers. The walls of
agricultural protectionism were being built and the use of
production subsidies by the developed economies was
widespread. It became increasingly clear that in order to
compete, New Zealand's dairy co-operatives were going to
have to become much more efficient. Driven by technology and
cost efficiencies, the processing industry began to
consolidate and by 1995 had shrunk to 13 dairy companies.
In contrast to this consolidation at home,
internationally the industry's marketing operations were
expanding - and for good reason. The 1960s threat of Britain
joining the EU sent the Dairy Board into a diversification
drive. Milk recombining plants were established in South
East Asia and contracts established for the supply of milk
powder and milk fat to other countries. The
industry's marketing arm also started down the value-added
road, establishing what we now know as New Zealand Milk, to
improve returns to farmers. Brands and a consumer marketing
infrastructure were built, products developed and people
trained and recruited. By the 1980s, the Dairy Board
had 19 subsidiaries and associated companies around the
world. By 1990 it had 40 and by 1995, 80. In a little over
10 years, the New Zealand Dairy Board became the world's
largest dedicated dairy marketing network. Talk to any
industry leader and they will tell you that the UK's move
into the EU represented a watershed for the industry. The
diversification I have just described took place at home as
well as in our markets. Co-operatives began to expand their
manufacturing capabilities, shifting from butter and cheese
- the mainstay of our UK exports - to begin investing in the
infrastructure to manufacture the milk powders which are an
important part of today's product mix. You can see a
pattern forming here. Co-operatives moved with the times,
but kept to the traditional model because it made sense.
There was no need to change. The system worked. Farmers kept
control of assets built up over generations and the whole
business of marketing products was efficiently taken care of
by a separate, monopolistic marketing arm. The
Question of Disconnection But it is fair to say there
was a curious disconnection between manufacturing and
marketing - even though both were supposed to be working for
the farmers' good. This may go to partly explain the
exasperation the business world had with dairy co-operatives
in terms of efficiency and performance transparency.
How did this disconnection come about? A lot of it was
due to ownership structures. When Government
legislation created the Dairy Board in 1961, it created an
entity where capital and assets were provided by the
co-operatives, but the primary accountability was not to the
industry, but to the Government. Legal ownership of
the Board was never clearly defined under the 1961
establishing act. It is probable that at the time,
Parliament did not envisage the Board becoming a
multi-billion dollar global enterprise with net assets of
US$1.2 billion - an enterprise in which co-operatives had
millions of dollars invested. This lack of clarity led to
two things. The industry did not behave as owners and the
Board did not treat them as such. The one measure of
performance for the Board was payout. Payout forecasts were
made three times a year and there was no long-term reporting
of performance. This tended to shift the focus onto
the co-operatives, who added the cream on the top of payout
with their margins. A co-operative's success was always
measured by its margin and so there was fierce competition
between New Zealand's co-operatives to beat their
neighbours. How did this disconnection manifest
itself? Industry veterans talk about the Board working the
market to secure contracts for milk powder, while
co-operatives were going their own way and producing cheese
because they thought it had more value. In other words, the
Board had no real influence over what co-operatives could,
or would, produce. The co-ops, hell bent on beating their
neighbours, had little interest in the shifts of market
demand. It's fair to say farmers were also
disconnected from the global markets that bought their
products. For most, the world ended at their co-operative
and they had little understanding, or interest, in the key
factors influencing payout. It was not until 1996
that this disconnection started to be resolved. It was then
that the Dairy Board Amendment Act transferred ownership of
the Dairy Board's assets to New Zealand's 12 dairy
co-operatives. Even then, the transformation was not
instant. A year after the transfer of the assets, it
is apparent that the co-operatives still hadn't come to
grips with what this meant. In a speech to co-operative
chairmen, John Storey, then Chairman of New Zealand Dairy
Group, tried to argue for a charter of owners to set down
some performance parameters. "The Board's assets are
now on our balance sheets," he said. "We can no longer
sit back - as we have sometimes done in the past - and leave
the Board to carry all the responsibility for its
performance. There's not much point in paying lip service
to principles like transparency and accountability unless
we're prepared to put down on paper how we want these
principles observed." He also forecast that the
industry had to take ownership very seriously because, and I
quote, "all the signs point to a future which may see the
Board lose its statutory support." This threat of
deregulation, which became a reality, is the pivotal point
in the development of the modern dairy co-operative.
It forced the industry to really consider the future, and
what changes were needed to move into a future without a
single desk export monopoly. It also forced competing
co-operatives to work together, to counter the threat of
forced deregulation with a proposal to manage the transition
themselves. But the single, integrated co-operative that we
have today was not their immediate solution.
Deregulation as a spur to change The industry
examined no fewer than 32 different options, some which
tinkered with the idea of opening up the dairy industry to
external investment. To the corporate world, this may have
seemed a very sensible model indeed, but to the co-operative
world, it was an anathema. The co-operative principles of
farmer ownership and control are not lightly relinquished.
After considering 32 options, the industry determined
that the single integrated company looked the best. Farmers
understood the relationship between the ownership of the
value chain and capturing in payout their share of the value
created beyond the farm gate. They saw, in the integrated
model, the opportunity to create a new co-operative that
would extend from the farm gate out into the world, do away
with the disconnection between manufacturing and marketing
and introduce some really tough and transparent performance
measures. But it's a measure of corporate scepticism
about co-operatives that their new found vision looked very
flawed to many commentators. One, for example, cautioned
farmers there was a "real threat of an unaccountable,
bloated primary manufacturing business soaking up the
benefits, with the farmer-owner little better off".
Many commentators doubted the industry would ever make
the change - especially as the merger discussions to create
this one company looked more like two parties arguing over a
hostile takeover. What these commentators failed to see was
that co-operatives, by their nature, can only move forward
by consensus. While this is a slow and sometimes painful
process, it is important to recognise what an historic
consensus was being reached here. It was pan industry
agreement that we needed a new co-operative model - one that
integrated marketing and manufacturing and addressed the
major issues such as fair entry and exit and governance,
which I will deal with shortly. Despite these
improvements, there were still critics who felt the industry
lost an opportunity to do away with the co-operative model
altogether. Comments by John Roadley, founding Chairman of
Fonterra, sum up why this option was never seriously
considered. "We are organised as a co-operative not
because we espouse a sort of vague collectivism. It is
firstly because this suits the long-term nature of our dairy
farming business and secondly, most importantly, because it
gives us market power. Market power has always been
exercised by those who have it over those who do not. By
having market power, Fonterra gives the farmers the only
viable means by which they can move more of their milk
towards the higher end of the value chain and utilize the
value creation potential of the business itself."
Market Power The industry voted for just that,
market power. If you are one of our 12,634 shareholders, you
have that. What you own is the largest dairy ingredients
company in the world. What you own ranks at six in the
world's top dairy companies and is responsible for 40% of
global dairy trade. What you own is 25 ingredients
manufacturing sites in New Zealand and a further 37 sites in
New Zealand and around the world that produce consumer dairy
products. What you own is a consumer brand portfolio that
includes household names in New Zealand like Meadow Fresh,
Mainland, Tip Top, Kiwi and Hutton, and internationally,
like Fernleaf, Anchor, Soprole, Anlene and Anmum. What you
own is a share of nearly $11 billion[2]
And speaking of
market power, Fonterra generates 23% percent of New
Zealand's export receipts by value and dairy is our leading
export industry. No wonder our shareholders have faith in
the co-operative model. This faith is not based purely
on history. It is based on their determination that in
creating Fonterra, they would create a modern co-operative
which is far superior in terms of governance, performance
transparency and efficiency. I should make it clear that not
all of this determination came from a deep dissatisfaction
with the old co-operative model. Most farmers were happy
with the way their co-operatives performed. The key driving
force was the need to convince the regulators, whose
co-operation was needed, that this virtual monopoly could,
and would behave in line with modern standards of governance
and performance transparency. The new co-operative model
needed to abide by new rules, captured under the heading New
Economics, that would allow the empowering legislators to
take the leap of faith to create Fonterra. The new
co-operative model addressed all the problems of the old,
including fair exit and entry, governance and clear pricing
signals, while maintaining the commitment to co-operative
principles. Let me explain how these issues were
resolved. Fair Exit and Entry Fonterra's
adoption of fair exit and entry values represented a
significant shift in co-operative thinking. Shares in
a dairy co-op used to be something you bought at a nominal
price in order to supply milk. You sold them at the same
price, probably many years later, when you ceased to
supply. On exit, you would almost certainly leave a
co-operative that had enjoyed significant growth in its
assets. The farmers coming in to replace you would
immediately benefit from those assets without paying more
for the privilege. Today, the value of our shareholders'
investment in us is not only far more transparent, but is
also bankable. The rules are the same. Our shareholders must
buy shares based on the volume of their supply. But those
shares are now independently valued by Standard & Poor's.
It is an annual process that takes into account the
likely future earnings of Fonterra by looking at our added
value businesses, corporate overhead, R&D, and other
operations, as well as the forecasted volume of milk
supplied to Fonterra, expected exchange rates, commodity
prices, and the number of shares. From a valuation range
given by S&P, the Board selects the share value for each
season. Two weeks ago, our Board set the value for
04/05 season at $4.69, an increase of 31 cents, or 7%. This
compares with $4.38 in 03/04 and $3.85 in the 02/03
season. Our new shareholders buy into Fonterra at a
price that reflects the full value of the co-operative.
Those leaving, exit at a price that reflects any increase in
our value. Exiting farmers are paid out immediately, in
full, in the form of Fonterra capital notes, which are
freely traded. This mechanism also prevents the possibility
of a run on the company's shares. Because any major
outflow of capital would be serious for the company, we have
a brake mechanism within the Fonterra Constitution so the
Board can buy time and protect our viability if more than 5%
of shareholders decide to leave at one time. This contrasts
with earlier co-operative models which allowed co-ops to
retain a farmers' processing capital for up to five years.
In addition to the Fair Value Share, our farmers have
other means of scrutinising our performance, and hence the
value of their investment. One is by comparing their Actual
Milk Return with the Commodity Milk Price, also set
independently by Standard and Poor's. The CMP is the
highest theoretical price that an efficient competitor could
afford to pay for New Zealand's milk, while making an
adequate return on capital. It optimises product mix, and
minimises capital investment and other costs, to set out
what is an extremely challenging benchmark. Our challenge is
to reduce the gap between the CMP and what we actually pay
farmers. Our shareholders also have the performance
measure of Total Shareholder Return. TSR is our total return
to shareholders, before tax, divided by the value of their
total equity invested at the beginning of the year. Our
TSR, excluding foreign exchange hedging related to the
Commodity Milk Price, was 10.2% last season and 16.7%
including hedging. World Class Governance
Poor governance is constantly being cited as a problem
with old-style co-operatives. Some of that criticism is
justified. Many boards were very large and decision-making
was often slow, even by co-operative standards. This
stemmed from a tradition of local, rather than national
representation on Boards. Co-operative shareholders were
accustomed to ringing their local director and believed he
represented their interests. This is despite the Companies
Act stating clearly that directors must always act in the
best interest of the company. In other words - of all
shareholders. Fonterra, by contrast, began life with
an already lean governance model of nine elected farmer
directors and four appointed outside directors. Our
shareholders, every year, have the opportunity to pass
judgement on their performance, as three farmer directors
must retire by rotation and contest an election. The
appointed directors, as well, must be ratified by a
shareholder vote. These annual elections mean the Board's
performance is under constant scrutiny, as is the
performance of individual directors. Fonterra's
performance is also subject to a further layer of scrutiny
which is unheard of in the corporate world. We have a
Shareholders' Council, with 46 councillors elected in
geographic wards. It came about because farmers were
worried that with the merger they would lose the traditional
direct access to Directors that they enjoyed in small
companies. The Council works with the Fonterra Board
to advance the company's co-operative philosophy and it also
formally monitors and reports on our performance. It is no
lapdog. In the corporate world you have to deal with
large institutional investors or controlling shareholders
who scrutinise the performance of the board in much more
detail than the average shareholder. In Fonterra, through
the Shareholders' Council, our shareholders have a unique
independent body mandated to evaluate the Board's
performance in governing Fonterra. Clear Pricing
Signals Another constant criticism of co-operatives is
that they did not give their members the clear pricing
signals needed for those members to make decisions on
increasing or reducing production. Fonterra addressed
this issue with a mechanism called Peak Notes. Our
shareholders hold one Fonterra share for every kilogram of
milk solids they supply, but we also take into account the
fact that shareholders may exceed their average seasonal
supply patterns in any given season. Peak Notes, which cost
$30 each, are the mechanism through which shareholders
contribute extra capital to cover the processing of this
extra milk. The overall aim is to ensure that price
signals are transmitted as directly as possible to farmers,
and that farmers are able to make the most informed
decisions about their investments and production. I have to
say that farmers are not the world's most enthusiastic
supporters of Peak Notes, which they regard as complex. We
continue to grapple with how we might simplify the
system. We also need to grapple more effectively with
how we ensure farmers know the underlying value of their
milk. The industry attracted fair criticism for its past
practice of bundling returns. This lack of transparency
encouraged farmers into inefficient over-production.
Today in payout, we separate the underlying value of our
suppliers' milk, which we call the Actual Milk Return, from
Fonterra's "profit", or the return on our value-added
activities. This is because there is a need for strong
signals about the value of a bucket of milk at the farm
gate. Let me explain why. New Zealand farmers are
among the world's most cost efficient. They have enjoyed no
subsidies since the mid-1980s, so they have had good
incentives to keep their production costs as lean as
possible. They drive hard to bring production up, using
everything available from selective breeding to the
management of their pastures to do this without increasing
their costs. As a result, they have generally profited from
their production, even at times of low commodity prices.
Currently, the bulk of their earnings come from commodity
sales. Our expected payout this year includes around 12% of
value-add returns. But with all the long-term trends
pointing to a lessening in commodity prices - Fonterra is
strongly pursuing value-add strategies to increase our
payouts to farmers. As we push value-add earnings up, it's
important our suppliers are clear about the underlying value
of their milk. We want them to increase production,
but only of profitable milk. So it will become increasingly
important for them to differentiate clearly between
commodity and value add returns so they can make the right
judgements on production increases. Commitment to
Co-operative Principles The one thing that remains the
same in the old co-operative model and the new is the total
commitment to co-operative principles. At their heart is
the commitment to accept, process and sell all milk supplied
by shareholders. Whatever direction we take as a company
will always start from this point. Sustainability of the
co-operative is an important value held by all our
shareholders. The Unique Management Challenges &
Opportunities Having explained the new co-operative
model, the new rules that govern it and how the new model is
a vast improvement on the old, I will now move to the unique
management challenges and opportunities this model presents.
These challenges come under three main headings;
communications, internal competition and capital. The
opportunities include the ability to think long term and the
truly global potential of Fonterra. Let's consider the
challenges first, beginning with communication.
Communications Unlike a corporate, whose
relationship with shareholders is based purely on capital,
the co-operative has complex, and multi-dimensional
relationship with our farmers. They are our shareholders.
They are also our suppliers and they are the beneficiaries
of services and support. Like shareholders in a
corporate, they run the full gamut from the institutions
down to the Mum and Dad shareholders. Farming corporates,
with sophisticated organisational structures and intensely
professional planning disciplines are becoming increasingly
common. They run more than 1600 cows and supply, on average,
half a million kg/MS a year. The biggest provides almost one
million kg/MS. At the other end of the scale are the
smaller operators, with a typical herd size of around 234
cows and average supply of 71,000 kg/MS. Large or
small, they have invested heavily in their businesses. Our
shareholders' average capital investment in their farms
exceeds $2.2 million, or $25,000 per hectare. Last financial
year, the average shareholders' investment in Fonterra,
including the capacity funding instrument of peak notes, was
$5.39 kg/MS - or close to half a million dollars.
These are substantial investments and because the future of
their business is intrinsically linked with their
co-operative's performance, our shareholders need to
understand our business in its totality. For this reason, a
substantial amount of my management time is spent in direct
communication with our shareholders - all 12,634 of them.
When I talk to corporate leaders about the time I spend on
the road talking to shareholders, I can hear them thinking
this is excessive - or indeed obsessive. But let me
share a story. Last year, our shareholders experienced our
usual round of communications. This included: * Regular
Field Rep briefings * a monthly magazine * a website
dedicated to farmer needs which they can access daily for
their own on-farm production statistics * letters from the
Chairman updating them on any important issue * briefings
around our half year and annual accounts * director
roadshows on initiatives around the environment and milk
pricing * an AGM televised over nine venues, and * regular
district meetings with Shareholders Council You might
think our shareholders were communicated out. In fact, what
I was hearing is that despite all this effort, they still
felt we were too remote, too inaccessible and were not
giving them all the information they wanted about their
co-operative. They were right and they were wrong. There
was nothing wrong with the amount of information we were
providing, or the level of detail. What our farmers wanted,
however, was to hear it face to face and in small groups.
I cannot imagine a single corporate that would be able to
recruit hundreds of volunteers to form a network designed to
talk to shareholders. We've just done that. The Fonterra
Farmer Community Network is a team of farmer volunteers who
are going out there, in their communities, sharing the news
about Fonterra. They're working on a ratio of one network
member to every 20 of our shareholders. They will augment
the work we already do in shareholders communications, and
of course the onus is on us to ensure they are fully
informed about the company. The initiative comes under
a programme we called "Big in the World, Small at Home".
This sums up the communications task we have with our
shareholders. "Big in the World" means we are building their
understanding of what they own and what we are doing with
it. "Small at Home" addresses the concern our shareholders
had that the big, new Fonterra was too removed from them
and, in growing so large, had become remote. It
encapsulates everything we are doing to connect with our
farmers. Shareholder communications is undoubtedly one
of the biggest differences between managing a corporate and
a co-operative. In the corporate world, you can afford to
map out a strategy and pursue it without too much dialogue
with your shareholders. In the co-operative, you have to
take your shareholders every step of the way. You
must constantly invest in ensuring they understand the major
issues facing the business because, time and again, they
will be required to support the initiatives needed to
address those issues. When those initiatives involve major
change, the level of understanding among shareholders must
be such that 75% are prepared to commit to this change when
it is put to the vote. Internal Competition
Investing in the level of communications needed to keep
shareholders engaged and informed makes good commercial
sense. Engaged shareholders are also loyal shareholders and
therefore less likely to take their capital - and their
supply - to a competitor. One of the misconceptions
about Fonterra is that we have no real domestic competition,
given there are only two other dairy co-operatives in New
Zealand. One, Tatua, is closed to new supply. The other,
Westland, is geographically limited in what new supply it
can accept. New ventures, like the Open Country Cheese Co,
are looking for supply, but their needs are modest. So why
worry? In a word, deregulation. The Dairy Industry
Restructuring Act 2001 opened up the industry, creating
opportunities for setting up new domestic and export dairy
companies to enhance competition. It removed the export
monopoly enjoyed by the Dairy Board, and through them, the
dairy industry. It specifically restricts Fonterra
from entering into long term contracts that lock down total
supply in any geographic area - a third must always be open
to competition. Our shareholders have the right to allocate
20% of their production to another processor. If they are
dissatisfied with our performance, they can leave the
co-operative and take their investment with them. Fonterra
is also compelled to sell up to 400 million litres of milk,
effectively at cost, every year to any potential buyers.
The absence of an immediate threat does not mean there
are no threats. Performance is our best defence. As long
as we continue to produce a high quality product at
competitive prices and to form strong partnerships with
important customers, such as Nestlé, we will lessen the
incentive for a competitor to set up in New Zealand. At the
same time, delivering sustainable and increasing returns to
our shareholders lessens the incentive for them to supply a
competitor. Of course, given Fonterra's size and scope, we
really view any real competitors in a global, rather than a
New Zealand-centric perspective. Capital One of
the principal challenges I face stems from the heart of
co-operative principles. As a co-operative with capital
linked to supply, we have fundamental tensions to deal with
that other commercial entities do not. First is the extent
to which supplier shareholders are prepared to accept
compulsory funding of opportunities that can create value.
Second is the unique role of our shareholders, who are also
our suppliers and have the right, in our deregulated market,
to take supply and capital elsewhere. Finally, Fonterra, as
a co-operative, has the commitment to process all milk from
our suppliers. Fonterra sought to resolve these
tensions by defining those activities that clearly fit under
the compulsory shareholder investment umbrella. We call
these our cornerstones. They are the activities
where there is a strong link to selling or adding value to
shareholders' milk. They include all commodity activities,
plus a sub-set of value-added activities that clearly fit
within the realm of compulsory shareholder investments.
What this means is that Fonterra should only own
value-added activities beyond the production and sale of
basic commodities when they have strong commercial merit,
when they use Fonterra's distinct capabilities and when they
support the selling of shareholders' milk. One of the
defining characteristics of a cornerstone is that Fonterra
is the natural owner because the activities are more
valuable to us than to any other owner. If an activity has
more value to another owner, it would be in shareholders'
interests to sell it and use the funds elsewhere in the
business. The cornerstones are designed to provide a
focus for the business, but it is important to recognise
that in defining them, we are not locking in an inflexible
view of the business. A critical component of our long term
strategy is in defining the cornerstones sufficiently
broadly to truly unleash the potential of our
co-operative. Our Strategic Plan takes into account
the long-term implications in defining the cornerstones. It
recognises our evolution from the Dairy Board with a mandate
to export New Zealand milk products, to the pre-eminent
global dairy products company that we are today. For
example, Fonterra not only sells products made from our
shareholders' milk, but also products made from milk sourced
from third parties. At first glance, this would appear to
work against the interests of our shareholders, since these
third parties are not providers of capital. However,
one of the real benefits of Fonterra is that this third
party supply has the ability to create better long-term
returns for our shareholders. Why? For two reasons. Firstly
milk supply in New Zealand is seasonal, but the demand from
major food manufacturers for commodity ingredients is not.
Secondly, the major players in the market seek security of
supply and they see supply from any single country as a
risk. Our presence in the market is such that we can
offer our customers security by sourcing supply from third
partners, thereby reducing perceived risks and offsetting
seasonality. This allows us to take more significant
positions with major multinationals and has the effect of
stabilising our sales portfolio somewhat. This brings
greater certainty to our sales, something that is very much
in our shareholders' interests. Similarly, Fonterra
owns a portfolio of global consumer brands that generates
value for our shareholders, even though, in numerous cases,
the products sold under these brand names may not always
include New Zealand-sourced milk solids. You can
see we have a degree of flexibility in terms of our
cornerstone activities and it is likely we will need more.
Some of this flexibility may need to come from our
shareholders themselves. While Fonterra can fund the
immediate needs of the cornerstone activities and current
options within our existing balance sheet, as the business
evolves this may not always be the case. A change of
capital structure could provide Fonterra with access to new
pools of capital either from shareholders or, in some cases,
from external investors. Is this on the agenda? Our
capital structure has been identified as an issue by a
number of shareholders. And it is. Any inability to access
sufficient equity could undermine our ability to realise the
full potential of our value-add operations. That in turn
could prevent us from increasing the long-term wealth of our
farmers; a challenge in itself given that commodity pricing
long term is on a downhill slide. Yet any change to
the fundamental principles of how farmers provide capital to
the co-operative will require 75% of them to be absolutely
convinced that any alternative is better. This is not to
say farmers are so conservative that they will not
countenance change. They will accept change if they reach
the consensus view that it is in their best interests. But
as I observed before, reaching consensus can be a lengthy
process. One does not go out to challenge a fundamental
principle of co-operative ownership without preparing a
compelling argument. Opportunities Having dealt
with the challenges, I now move to the opportunities. First,
the luxury of the long-term view, and second, the truly
global potential of Fonterra. Fonterra's balance sheet
is secured by more than 12,000 shareholders who are in the
dairy industry for the long haul. They are not
opportunistic providers of capital. They think long-term,
and the corollary of this is that I too can take the long
term view. I do run into the realities of the moment, but
generally it is a long term view I can take. Let me
give you an example. We have confidence that China is a
market offering considerable long-term opportunities for
Fonterra. It is a market where milk consumption is low -
around 8 litres per person per year compared with around 30
litres elsewhere in Asia - but where consumption is forecast
to grow. One of the drivers here is Government
policies to encourage milk consumption and not only because
of the health benefits. Their view is that higher demand for
milk will transfer wealth to local dairy farmers. Higher
demand is being actively promoted through programmes such as
agricultural subsidies, milk in schools and the setting of
per capita consumption targets rising from 18kg in 2010, to
41kg in 2030. China is investing in increasing
domestic production, but since it has only 6% of the world's
arable land, it will always require dairy imports. We have
taken a long-term view of this reality. Our starting point
is the established base we already have in China. Our
consumer dairy products company and our Ingredients business
achieved combined sales of US$188 million last year.
From this well-established base we are looking to build
industry partnerships, and our discussions with the San Lu
dairy company are well known. We believe it is important to
work collaboratively in China, working with the local
industry to grow the consumption that will benefit both the
domestic producers and exporters like ourselves. As just
one example, Fonterra worked with the Ministry of
Agriculture in its Milk in Schools Programme, sharing our
expertise to provide training in food safety, technology and
quality management to providers to that programme. Trust is
important in doing business in China, so our focus is as
much on building relationships as building sales. Our
shareholders are accustomed to our industry building on a
market reputation to achieve incremental growth. They will
give us time to deliver. Contrast this to corporates from
New Zealand and elsewhere who have made the decision to
invest in China and have quickly gone under the blowtorch
from shareholders impatient for quick returns.
Fonterra's truly global presence provides our second
opportunity. We sell dairy products in 140 countries and
our top eight markets span the Pacific Rim. The United
States is our largest single market by revenue and Asia is
our largest export region. We have forged
partnerships with some of the industry's most important
players. With Nestle, for example, we have our Dairy
Partners Americas alliance with joint ventures in several
South American countries. Our partnership with Dairy Farmers
America, the United States' largest co-operative, enables us
to participate in the North American market and contributes
to Fonterra being the largest exporter of skim milk powder
from the United States. Our portfolio of brands
includes international household names like ANCHOR, and our
heritage includes New Zealand's outstanding reputation for
the quality of its milk. Our farmers are world-class and
our milk supply is growing, as demand for dairy products is
growing in global markets. We have a truly valuable
presence in the market place. We also have, in Fonterra, a
co-operative that has avoided the worst dysfunctionalities
of the traditional model, while retaining all that is strong
about collective partnerships. We have a massive
opportunity to build on our industry's competitiveness and
low-cost position long term to build strong relationships
with the world's major food companies. We also have the
massive opportunity to realise the full potential of our
value-adding activities, making full use of our considerable
assets, infrastructure, institutional capacity and
intellectual property. This will require finding the
right solutions to the issue of how we can best fund these
activities so that we provide our farmers with returns that
reflect more value-add earnings and less dependence on
commodities. My challenge is to see that potential
unleashed in a way that ensures long term growth in their
wealth, including the optimal mix of commodity-based and
value-added earnings, while maintaining the sustainability
they look to us to provide them as long-term investors in
the dairy industry. Thank you _____ [1]
1 Fonterra Co-op Group $12,474,000 2 Foodstuffs
(Auckland) $2,601,062 3 Foodstuffs (South Island)
$1,795,392 4 Foodstuffs (Wellington) $1,631,466 5
Alliance Group $1,184,453 6 PPCS $1,093,596 [2]