Analysis: Discreet Diplomacy in a Small Democracy

The political row over Air New Zealand charters carrying Australian troops to forward staging positions in Kuwait, coupled with the less vociferous debate over National’s acceptance of the nuclear-free policy and abandonment of the air combat wing (both Labour policy initiatives), raises the question of how New Zealand should conduct its diplomatic and military affairs regardless of the government of the moment. Unlike domestic policy, which can often change based upon shifts in public opinion or different government priorities, military and foreign policy requires a considerable degree of continuity in order to be effective. Consistency, reliability and commitment are the stock in trade of diplomatic and military relations, which demands that these policy areas receive some measure of insulation from the vagaries of domestic political competition.

This is especially the case in small democracies with multiple party proportional representation electoral systems such as New Zealand. Unlike two party, first past the post systems in which policy continuity can be assured by parliamentary or congressional majorities, the requirements of coalitional politics often run counter to consistent foreign and security relations, Even when winning re-election, government coalitions often confront a “tail wagging the dog” syndrome whereby minority coalition partners can determine, or at least veto, the policy initiatives of their larger partners. Many of these smaller coalition partners are single-issue or highly ideological in nature, which means that they can extract broader policy concessions in order to satisfy their more narrow concerns. This can seriously jeopardize the conduct of foreign affairs should coalitional politics turn divisive on matters of international import.

Under such political conditions the most effective approach to foreign policy, including foreign military operations, is discreet diplomacy. Evident in the “neither confirm or deny” policy regarding deployment of Special Air Service units abroad, discreet diplomacy was seen in the Air New Zealand charter affair. The government was asked for its approval well in advance of the flights. Senior diplomatic officers, officials from the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and the Combined Counter-Terrorism Group (which has senior representatives from the GCSB, SIS, Police, Foreign Affairs, Immigration and External Assessments Bureau) vetted the risks involved and decided that they were acceptable so long as the operation was conducted in a discreet fashion. Ministers may or may not have been involved, but the practice of plausible deniability (in which there is no paper trail linking senior government officials to the actual go-ahead) was applied in any event. Thus the charter flights wore no Air New Zealand livery in recognition of the sensitivities at play, and the entire operation would have flown under the radar of public attention had the details not been published. At that point the political stoush began, although the protestations of government ministers appeared to be a bit rich to anyone vaguely familiar with the story.

The charter flights would have been spotted by Iranian and Arab intelligence (since Kuwait is the largest staging point for coalition forces in Iraq and a potential staging point for an assault on Iran), but it was publicity about the flights—not the flights themselves—that raised New Zealand’s target profile in the eyes of the international Islamicist movement. To make matters worse, the parliamentary debate in New Zealand about the charters annoyed officials in Canberra to the point that they announced that they will never again use Air New Zealand to ferry Australian troops anywhere. Both military-politically and commercially, the situation turned out to be lose-lose for the government and the national airline—but only because the issue was publicized, then politicized.

The larger point is that for small democracies discretion is the better part of valor when it comes to diplomatic and military affairs. Unlike major powers and aspiring regional actors such as Australia that like to trumpet their achievements and policy positions as symbolic reaffirmation of their international weight, doing things quietly ensures long-term continuity of foreign policy in New Zealand. Be it intelligence collection, analysis and sharing, military operations under multinational command, diplomatic negotiations between antagonists on issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, peacekeeping and nation-building efforts in conflict zones, or in bridging the differences between the Islamic world and the West, New Zealand has consistently played a quiet but important role as an honest broker and reliable partner to the international community and traditional allies alike. It has public differences with major and minor powers on issues of human rights, fair trade and war, but underneath the umbrella of rhetorical condemnation and diplomatic difference, international economic and security relations quietly proceed in consistently reliable fashion.

Discreet diplomacy allows New Zealand governments, regardless of their specific political orientation, to balance the need for reliability and commitment in foreign affairs against the requirements of domestic coalition politics. Plausible deniability allows senior government officials to distance themselves from international policy decisions that prove unpopular with coalition partners, thereby ensuring coalition stability at home and diplomatic and military reliability abroad. Until the voting public takes priority interest in foreign affairs and impresses that interest upon political parties, discreet diplomacy allows diplomatic and military policy to recede from the limelight, which in turn facilitates continuity of its implementation.

Given the mix of domestic politics, geopolitical position and diplomatic and military orientation, New Zealand has no need to embark on the “loud and proud” diplomacy characteristic of Australia and the USA. Its strategic position, threat environment, domestic political system and ideological makeup differ significantly from its traditional allies, which makes use of discreet diplomacy all the more effective as a tool of state policy given the differences in perspective such factors inevitably generate. In spite of their public posturing, politicians on both side of the parliamentary aisle are acutely cognizant of this fact.

Paul G. Buchanan writes on issues of comparative and international politics. He is Founding Director of the Buchanan International Advisory Group, Ltd., which specializes in foreign political risk, threat assessment and investment advice to public and private organizations.

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