Dan Lieberman: Gaza Aftermath
Gaza Aftermath - Synopsis: Digging out the pulverized ruins of Gaza revealed the extent of damage to the Palestinian community. Still not revealed are exact reasons for Israel's onslaught, its sudden willingness to halt the damage and what awaits a shaken Middle East in the future. The intensive emphasis on the rocket attacks being the reason for Israel's overly aggressive counterpunch, with almost all Israel and foreign newspapers reciting that theme, seemed too arranged, more of a propaganda concert and an attempt to disguise more valid explanations.
Gaza Aftermath
by Dan Lieberman
Digging out the pulverized ruins of Gaza revealed the extent of damage to the Palestinian community. Still not revealed are exact reasons for Israel's onslaught, its sudden willingness to halt the damage and what awaits a shaken Middle East in the future. Clues that contradict the given reason for the attack - rockets hitting Israeli soil - are: (1) rockets have been hitting Israel since 2002, (2) the initial rocket barrage caused no casualties, and (3) the intensive emphasis on the rocket attacks being the reason for Israel's overly aggressive counterpunch, with almost all Israel and foreign newspapers reciting that theme, seemed too arranged, more of a propaganda concert and an attempt to disguise more valid explanations.
Regardless of the conflicting views of events, an inevitable drift to war was set in motion for one overriding reason; Israel, International institutions and western nations refused to talk with Hamas.
A legitimately elected government requested halts to a punishing blockade and to attacks on its citizens in the West Bank and Gaza. Silence. More pleading and more silence. Finally militants fire an uncontrollable a salvo of rockets, positioned so no fatalities could occur; alerting Israel and a complacent world that Hamas could no longer permit its people to be starved into surrender.
Hamas' demands deserved discussion. Instead, Israel responded with missile strikes, which instantly killed 250 Palestinians, assured retaliating rockets would finally kill Israelis and signaled an eventual slaughter of Gazans and a politically motivated invasion of the territory.
Did rocket fire, which had been happening
continuously since 2002, cause the conflagration? The
initial break in the lapsed truce, which caused no
casualties, followed Israel's neglect of Hamas' pleas.
Combine Israel's ongoing refusal to give the slightest
recognition to a democratically elected Hamas government
with the world's refusal to counter Israel's intransigence
and we have, not the reason, but the cause of the latest
conflict.
The forces that control actions of the world
community seemed to have been guided by only what served
Israel's interests rather than what was beneficial for the
world, what would stabilize the Middle East and also be
helpful to the Palestinians. The inability to deter Israel's
attack resulted in the deaths of more than 1300
Palestinians, wounding of more than 5400, damage to more
then 22,000 buildings, including United Nation structures,
mosques, universities, a medical school and almost every
police station. Predictions have Gaza's flimsy gross
domestic product being reduced by 85 percent or almost to
nothing.
Hamas survived and Gaza was partially destroyed.
A credible conclusion is that if Israel could not succeed in
the former tactic, it was eager to accomplish the latter
result.
If the reasons for the IDF attack were dubious,
Israel's control of press coverage sufficiently clouded
reasons for the abrupt and unilateral cessation of
hostilities. Speculation and analysis discloses several
possible reasons for the rapid pullout. Israel of January
17, 2009 had no other choice but to cease its hostilities.
Israel's complaint of extensive arms smuggling was
proving doubtful
Similar to the 2006 invasion of
Lebanon, Israeli forces slowly learned they had had nowhere
to go except to kill more civilians. The Israeli forces
neither exhibited many destroyed rocket launchers nor
demonstrated harm to the supposed 10,000 Hamas armed
insurgents. Except for the longer range Grad rockets, many
of the rockets and mortars that shelled Israel were homemade
devices. Therefore only the Grad rockets and some Qassam
rockets, few of which did much damage, were smuggled into
Gaza. Hamas demonstrated no military capability; that is no
capability and not just limited capability - no surface to
air missiles, no anti-tank rockets, no organized attacks on
invading soldiers. Media descriptions of coming battles
never materialized. Fighting, which requires two combatants,
was an exaggerated word. A killing field better described
the carnage. Since Hamas didn't display any weapons with
which to fight, how much smuggling of armaments could have
occurred? Neither facts nor images supported reports of
weapons caches and weapons destruction. Israeli forces moved
forward without much fear of attack and with only ten
reported deaths, of which five were accidental. Israel's
soldiers must have felt contrite and questioned what they
were doing.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy said: "We must give Israel the guarantee that weapons will not pass through that border.†Apparently that is an easy guarantee; few weapons seemed to have been displayed. Israel's principal reason for its attack was being exposed as a hollow defense of its violent tactics.
Loss of
moral high ground
The Israel government realized they
were losing any moral ground they had and separating from it
quickly. Even previously friendly nations, such as Qatar,
were cutting contacts. Israel did what the U.S. often
refused to do, declare victory and rapidly leave.
Prime
Minister Olmert Insulted President Bush
Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert's outspoken claim that he influenced
President Bush to abstain at a UN vote, which directly
contradicted a strong and convincing image that Bush was
trying to convey during his last days in office, must have
disturbed the departing president. Olmert sensed he could
lose major support from an angered Bush and Rice and that
added to his doubts of continuing the onslaught.
The
extent of the massacre was exposed
One event that
might have changed Israeli opinion from almost entirely
favorable to their government's attack to doubt and
uncertainty was the appearance on Israel TV of a renowned,
admired and often interviewed Gaza Doctor Ezzeldin Abu
al-Aish. The well-known doctor related the wanton killing of
three of his daughters by an Israeli shell. A tragedy that
could not be repudiated must have affected all Israelis to
realize the barbarity of their actions. Enough was
enough.
Unwillingness to challenge a new United States
administration
Finally, Israel faced an unknown -
how would the new U.S. administration react to its invasion
of Gaza? No government wants to face a possible challenge
from a new United States administration that it wants to
please.
Hamas looked bad but, in the end, emerged with more credibility. Israel initially looked good but, considering the final result, lost much consideration by a world troubled with its violent attitude.
So, what does
this portend for a Middle East future?
The attack on Gaza
cannot remain an isolated incident that slowly fades into
history. This attack has been etched into the psyche of an
embittered Arab world. Sympathy for the Palestinians has
been extended worldwide. These phenomena have dictated a new
look at the Middle East contestants and a new approach to
resolving the conflict. It's possible we will witness more
talk of defending the Palestinians and less of securing
Israelis, more efforts by Arab nations of uniting the Arab
world and its factions and less efforts by the western world
to dictate a path to unification, more attempts to resolve
Middle East problems and less considerations to Israel's
agendas.
These directions already have a start.
Lebanon's success in forming a more representative
government, in which Hezbollah plays an increased role, has
led to renewal of relations between Syria and Lebanon. Add
Iraq to the arrangement and a gap is bridged between Iran
and the Arab world. If they keep that ball rolling, there
could be a more unified Arab world.
This possible
direction might have been a hidden driving force to Israel's
aggressiveness, a sub-text that provoked Israel to remove an
irritant on its southern flank preparatory to engaging its
northern neighbors. Considering the productive direction of
the northern Arab nations and the counterproductive result
of Israel's attack on Gaza, the future of the Middle East
might be highly positive for the Arab nations and severely
discouraging, if not fatal, for the land of
Israel.
Dan Lieberman is the editor of Alternative Insight, a monthly web based newsletter. Dan has written many articles on the Middle East, which have circulated on websites and media throughout the world. He can be reached at alternativeinsight@earthlink.net