The “Watchdog” That Didn’t Bark Or Bite
Bernie Madoff And the “Watchdog” That
Didn’t Bark Or Bite
Perhaps the most incredible aspect of the greatest Wall Street swindle ever was that despite repeated warnings from many different sources the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) over a period of 16 years refused to conduct a diligent probe into the operations of fraudster securities broker Bernard Madoff. The “watchdog” Federal agency, which didn’t bark or bite, not only disregarded the repeated warnings of knowledgeable whistle-blower Harry Markopolos, a fund manager, as well as the two examiners in its own Boston office who said that Markopolos likely had it right; the SEC also disregarded reports in Barron’s and other financial publications that questioned Madoff’s legitimacy; and, perhaps most damning of all, the SEC disregarded letters from an obvious insider who revealed that Madoff was keeping two sets of books and told the SEC to find the evidence on a computer Madoff always carried on his person. Even when, toward the end of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme charade, the SEC discovered Madoff was lying to them, SEC officials didn’t care to ask the elementary questions that would have revealed he was not trading stocks at all. Incredibly, Madoff had also been lying to his investors for years, saying that he was turning a profit on the funds they gave him when he was actually paying them “profits” with monies from new depositors. On one occasion, the Assistant Director of SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examination(OCIE) asked a financial institution that Madoff claimed he used to clear his trades whether they knew of any trading done by or in behalf of Madoff during a specific time period. Despite a negative reply, the SEC official decided it did not merit any follow-up. Madoff’s career of fraud, which Federal investigators believe may have started in the 1980s, did not collapse until 2008.
Besides
Markopolos, there were “plenty of others on Wall Street
who went to the SEC, some anonymously or who used their
names, so they had more than one warning,” says Erin
Arvedlund, the reporter who broke the first Barron’s story
in 2000. One inescapable conclusion of the Madoff disaster
was that the SEC didn’t know and likely didn’t want to
know he was running a Ponzi scheme. In 2006, for example,
Madoff actually gave the SEC the number of his Depository
Trust Account(DTC 646), yet its probers declined to make the
phone call to this record-keeping entity that would have
revealed Madoff’s claims of stock trading were a tissue of
lies. The call would have revealed Madoff had only $18
million in his DTC account although Fairfield Greenwich
feeder fund said he was handling $2.5 billion worth of their
business. The SEC might also have checked with the National
Association of Securities Dealers(NASD) to see if the stocks
Madoff claimed to be trading were, in fact, actually being
traded by him on the NASDAQ stock market. But Arvedlund said
the SEC decided “this would have been too time-consuming
for us to go through these records” so the records were
never requested. Its reluctance may have had something to do
with the fact that Madoff played a key role in NASDAQ’s
formation. When Madoff founded his firm in 1960, he made
trades using the National Quotation Bureau’s Pink Sheets.
In order to compete with firms that were New York Stock
Exchange members trading directly on the floor, according to
Wikipedia, Madoff began using innovative computer
information technology to disseminate its quotes---a
development that led to the creation of NASDAQ, which
swindler Madoff served as Chairman during 1990-91 and in
1993.
The SEC compounded its own malfeasance by issuing
a report in 1992 saying that it found Madoff’s operations
to be on the up-and-up, a finding it publicized only for
this favored entity---in short, a veritable endorsement that
brought investors flocking to “the lipstick building”
(nicknamed for the skyscraper’s shape and color) at 885
Third Avenue in New York that was the headquarters of
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, only to be
systematically parted from their money. Arvedlund said,
“He used the SEC’s Good Housekeeping seal to market the
fund. And I’ve talked to a lot of investors who said, ‘I
knew he’d been investigated and received a clean bill of
health from the SEC, and that’s why I gave them my
money.’” These included Elie Wiesel, the Nobel Peace
Prize laureate, who invested on behalf of a charity and
Hollywood director Steven Spielberg, who invested for the
Wunderkinder Foundation. Other notables taken in were real
estate mogul Mortimer Zuckerman; Philadelphia Eagles owner
Norman Braman, New York Mets owner Fred Wilpon, and
legendary Brooklyn Dodgers pitching great Sandy Koufax. In
its 1992 investigation, the SEC learned that New York
accounting firm Avellino & Bienes had been raising money
from clients and turning it over to Madoff to invest. The
SEC ordered the funds returned to the clients and never
inquired where Avellino & Bienes got the funds to do so. The
SEC may have overlooked Madoff’s role as it regarded him
as something of a hero for his role in developing NASDAQ in
competition with the New York Stock Exchange. It even used
him in an advisory capacity.
When accepting Madoff’s
guilty plea to 11 counts of fraud, perjury, money laundering
and theft, Judge Denny Chin termed Madoff “extraordinarily
evil” and sentenced him to 150 years in prison. This,
however, may have closed the window on the Ponzi scheme by
which Madoff looted at least $20 billion and perhaps as much
as $200 billion from the investing public. The New York
Times of March 13, 2009, quoted Madoff as confessing to the
packed courtroom, “I knew what I was doing was wrong,
indeed criminal. When I began the Ponzi scheme, I believed
it would end shortly and I would be able to extricate myself
and my clients” but finding an exit “proved difficult,
and ultimately impossible. I cannot adequately express how
sorry I am for what I have done.”
The Times pointed
out that Madoff’s guilty plea was crafted to shield his
wife, Ruth, who had amassed $65 million worth of assets she
claimed were her own, his brother, Peter, and his sons Mark
and Andrew, all of whom denied any knowledge of the fraud.
Mrs. Madoff was later required to forfeit all but $2.5
million of her assets. “As a result, those who thought his
guilty plea would shed more light on Wall Street’s biggest
and longest fraud left the courtroom unsatisfied and
uncertain---about where their money had gone and who may
have helped Mr. Madoff to steal it. Indeed, the hearing made
clear that Mr. Madoff is refusing to help the government
build a case against anyone else,” the Times observed.
Although no individual reportedly wrote Judge Chin a
letter to mitigate his sentence by relating any good works
Madoff performed in his life, the fraudster might not have
been entirely unloved. He may have been the illicit love
child of the Internal Revenue Service(IRS) which in June,
2004, oddly approved him as a nonbank custodian of investor
funds “even though he was in gross violation of the
IRS’s own regulations,” according to Lawrence Velvel,
dean of the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover and a
former Justice Department attorney. Velvel raises the
possibility that Madoff was favored by the IRS because it
collected “billions” of tax dollars on “profits”
from investors he swindled when those profits were all lies.
Arvedlund said the $65 billion Madoff claimed to have taken
in was not the real number, which may have been closer to
$20 billion, but investors paid taxes on the invented $45
billion as well, “so the IRS was actually a big winner in
the Madoff case.” Velvel, who lost funds of his own
invested with Madoff, interviewed reporter Arvedlund twice
on his Comcast TV show “Books of Our Time,” first on her
book “Too Good to be True: The Rise and Fall of Bernie
Madoff,” and again after publication of the SEC Inspector
General’s 457-page report on Madoff.
Arvedlund said
SEC Inspector General David Kotz did “a very thorough
job” and “for the most part didn’t pull any punches”
in his report, which she termed a “very painstaking”
examination of “how the agency screwed up.” She said the
commission “was not used to going to independent third
parties for information” but instead went to the source
and trusted that person to tell the truth. The result, she
explained: “Madoff was feeding them lies for years and
they just didn’t double check.” They caught Madoff lying
when he told them he stopped trading options years ago but
they found sales literature from one of the big Madoff
feeder funds that said he was trading “Standard & Poor
100” options. “Why didn’t that bother them enough to
probe a little further?” Arvedlund asked.
When
reporting for her original article, Arvedlund said “pretty
much everyone on Wall Street that I talked to said they’d
never done a trade with him: not Merrill Lynch, not Goldman
Sachs, not Salomon Smith Barney. So they were all wondering
the same thing---where’s all the trading volume coming
from for this billion-dollar hedge fund? And there wasn’t
any.” She believes that a bunch of very high-ranking
portfolio managers may have suspected what Madoff was doing
“but they were very fearful of losing their jobs.” One
of the original sources for her story told her he didn’t
want his name used because his boss was an investor in
Madoff “and if he asked any questions or pulled his
clients out, he’d probably get fired.” Alone among his
peers, Madoff did not charge hedge funds the customary one
or two percent annual fee that was the norm. Instead, he
rewarded them handsomely for bringing him their business, in
effect, a legal “kickback.” Arvedlund said Madoff was
giving up perhaps $200 million a year in income---again, a
sum that should have raised eyebrows. The financial writer
said that Madoff had concocted “a complex (investment)
strategy as a cover story, and it prevented most people from
asking questions because they thought it’s too complicated
to understand. They thought “it sounds very professional,
so I’ll just trust that he’s doing it.” She added that
Madoff would not let people on Wall Street invest with him
because “he didn’t want financially savvy
investors.”
The financial writer notes that the
average investor also does not have the ability to subpoena
or inquire, “’Does Bernie Madoff do trades with you?’
That’s the regulators’ job. That is what we pay taxes
for them to do. They are acting on the customer’s behalf,
or at least that is their stated mission. They are supposed
to have that power, and that curiosity, on our behalf, and
they didn’t.” One tell-tale indication that it was more
than a lack of curiosity that stopped the SEC from exposing
Madoff is the hostility it showed toward Markopolos. True,
he had been warning them for more than a decade, asking how,
contrary to market fluctuations, in good economic times and
in bad Madoff never reported any losses but only consistent
profits ranging from eight to 17 percent. For example, even
when the market plunged 40 percent in 2008, taking most
mutual funds with it, Madoff miraculously reported that his
investments were up more than eight percent for the year.
The fact is, Arvedlund believes, “The SEC didn’t like
Markopolos personally. He was very smart and was impatient
to reveal Madoff for the fraud that he was.” Apart from Ed
Manion and Mike Garrity of the SEC’s Boston office, the
SEC “took an instant dislike to him. They thought he was
arrogant, and they pretty much found any reason they could
to dismiss his allegations.” By contrast, the SEC had a
high regard for Madoff because he was a pioneer of
electronic trading. “The SEC knew Madoff very well,”
Arvedlund said. “He was considered kind of a godfather
around the SEC, a big advisor to the
agency.”
Arvedlund said the SEC never tumbled to the
fact that Madoff had two major bank accounts, one for his
legitimate brokerage firm with the Bank of New York, the
other with JP Morgan Chase(JPMC). This was on the phony
hedge fund side, basically his “slush fund” into which
he’d have new investors write checks and out of which he
paid old investors, “so there was no trading ever taking
place.” Yet, Arvedlund says, the examiner sent by the SEC
“had no idea how the cash flows worked” and to conceal
her own ignorance “didn’t ask the right questions.” If
Madoff had been buying and selling stocks and stock options
there would have to be wire transfers or checks in an out of
the JP Morgan Chase account going to other financial houses.
Arvedlund says JPMC is being sued because by 2008 it
“should have had a very good idea that Madoff was not all
that he seemed to be.” That bank, she said, “had a view
of both sides of the House of Madoff” because in 2008 it
had taken over Bear Stearns, which had a long trading
relationship with Madoff. And when JPMC started asking
around, “How does Madoff do it?” Bear Stearns employees
replied they had no idea. “Meanwhile, over on the banking
side,” Arvedlund said, JPMC “has the old Chase bank
account, and they see that in ’08 the bank account’s
starting to dwindle to zero, and according to one lawsuit,
they pulled their money out before Madoff confessed.” By
not blowing the whistle revealing the suspicions they should
have had, Velvel pointed out, JPMC “permitted the fraud to
continue for many years.” He noted “about $12
billion” got pulled out in the last six months as the
market was collapsing and Madoff’s clients were demanding
their money to pay off other people. Indeed, the reason
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme collapsed was because his fund
simply ran out of money. Madoff was arrested on Dec. 11,
2008; pleaded guilty in March, 2009; and was sentenced in
June of that year. His firm was in liquidation as of Dec.
15, 2008.
Stock market investors supposedly are
protected by the Securities Investor Protection Corp.(SIPC),
which the public has thought of an insurance policy in the
event of a fraud. “In fact,” Arvedlund said, “SIPC is
now saying it is not an insurance agency and it’s a big
mess. How they’re going to either pay back the Madoff
investors, or not pay them back…is what’s at issue right
now.” She noted that court-appointed Madoff trustee Irving
Picard and the SIPC are arguing that investors cannot use
the last statement they received from Madoff as the basis of
what Madoff owed them. On the other hand, the investors’
attorneys are responding, “‘Well, if I invest on Wall
Street, what else can I rely upon except the statements I
get?’” What the SIPC is essentially saying, she adds,
“is if you had a brokerage account at Madoff, you’ll be
paid back the money that you put in---and that could have
been 10 or 20 years ago---not the profits that were
accrued.” If Velvel is correct, investors may have trouble
getting anything back through SIPC. He’s charged that
Picard is not revealing vital information in order to reduce
the amount SIPC would otherwise legally have to reimburse
the swindled investors. This want of information is apparent
at many levels across the Madoff fraud, Velvel said, adding
that Judge Chin “did us no favors by letting Madoff plead
guilty instead of forcing a trial at which much would
inevitably be revealed.” Velvel concluded, “I do not
remember a major crime in which, at the times of plea and
sentencing of the lead culprit, the details of what happened
and what was done were as little known publicly as in
Madoff.”
Madoff’s imprisonment dropped the curtain on
his lavish lifestyle. Money swindled from charities was used
for his own private pleasure. His assets were said to
include a $21 million home on the Intercoastal Waterway near
the Palm Beach, Fla., country club where he played golf; a
beachfront home on Montauk, L.I.; as well as his primary
residence in an Upper East Side co-op duplex which he
purchased in 1990 for over $3 million. There were also two
private planes, one a 2008 Embraer business jet registered
to BLM Air Charter at Madoff’s business address and two
boats valued at $11 million, one a 55-foot yacht named
“Bull”. According to Kathryn Kroll, writing in a May 13,
2009, article in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, credit card
records that surfaced in Manhattan Bankruptcy Court indicate
Madoff and his wife ran up eye-popping bills. Just one of
the credit card bills, Kroll writes, "provides a window into
the lives of the Madoffs and their inner circle. A vacation
to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, over the holidays shows what
seemed to be a lavish ski trip: They spent thousands at the
Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, hundreds more for car rentals,
and ate and drank at places like a Mexican restaurant where
they rang up at $2,879 bill. They also ran up a $254.38 tab
at the Nikai Sushi Bar, but they left a tip on the card of
only $15.”
According to newspaper accounts, Madoff was
beaten up in the Federal prison in Butner, N.C., last
December, and sustained a broken nose and fractured ribs at
the hands of an inmate judo expert. The man did so, he
claimed, because Madoff owed him
money.
(The above article is by Sherwood Ross, a media consultant to the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover. This law school is purposefully dedicated to providing a rigorous, quality legal education to minority students and students from immigrant and low-income backgrounds who would otherwise be unable to obtain a legal education. The school is also dedicated to disseminating information on vital topics, which it does through its publications and Comcast broadcasts such as Books of Our Time. Reach Ross at sherwoodross10@gmail.com)
ENDS