The Rising Crisis between the United States and Iran
May 14, 2019
After a year in which Iran
opted for "strategic patience," in the hope that European
nations would compensate for the United States sanctions, it
now seeks to present a price tag for the US measures against
it, and has thus embarked on a response comprising action in
three realms: nuclear, military, and oil exports from the
Gulf. In the current circumstances, Iran and the United
States are demanding conditions that would make a resumption
of negotiations difficult, although both sides apparently
understand that dialogue may ultimately be the less
dangerous option for them. The latest developments embody
the potential for escalation and miscalculation that is
liable to affect Israel's security, and therefore the
security cabinet should convene to craft an appropriate
policy for the near, medium, and long terms.
May
2019 marks the end of a difficult year for Iran, which saw
the United States withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear
agreement, known as the JCPOA, and the imposition of
American sanctions. The sanctions, which have hit primarily
the oil and financial sectors, have inflicted severe damage
on the Iranian economy. Furthermore, Iran's attempt to
entrench and build up an advanced military capability
against Israel in Syria appears to have failed.
After
a year in which Iran opted for "strategic patience," in the
hope that European nations would compensate for American
sanctions and that President Donald Trump will stand little
chance of reelection in 2020, the US administration has
succeeded in ramping up the sanctions and applying pressure
beyond Tehran’s expectations. Over the last month, Iran
has experienced intensification of the US policy of "maximum
pressure": waivers that President Trump had granted China,
India, Japan, and other countries, whereby these countries
were able to import oil from Iran, were canceled; sanctions
were imposed on the export of iron, steel, aluminum, and
copper products from Iran; and in the nuclear realm, the
United States revoked two waivers that had allowed Iran to
abide by its JCPOA obligation to export excess enriched
uranium and heavy water that it produces. The American
designation of the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist
organization was meant to denigrate the Iranian economy and
raise the stakes of doing business with shadowy elements of
the Iranian economy, from potential fines to the threat of
prison time. The regime in Iran has thus concluded that it
must devise a new strategy - or at least, update its
strategy - to one that is more proactive, albeit measured
and cautious.
Iran now seeks to present a price tag
for the US measures against it, and has thus embarked on a
response comprising action in three realms. Regarding the
nuclear realm, Iran is trying to compel European nations to
formulate and implement the promised mechanism to provide
compensation for the sanctions. In the military realm, Iran
seeks to exact a price from the United States (and Israel)
with the goal of creating deterrence and preserving national
pride. Finally, when it comes to energy supply, Iran has
threatened Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that if
it is unable to export oil, they too will be unable to do
so.
The Nuclear
Realm
Iran has three levels
of action at hand in the nuclear realm (in ascending order
of risk): a. undermining the JCPOA through minor breaches,
inter alia by increasing the scope of uranium enrichment or
boosting the level of enrichment; b. leaving the agreement
and resuming broad nuclear activity, while installing tens
of thousands of centrifuges in Natanz, renewing activity at
the Arak reactor, and annulling Iran’s acceptance of the
IAEA Additional Protocol; c. withdrawing from the NPT, which
would clear the way to the development of a nuclear
bomb.
As an initial step, Iran has opted for the
limited move of not removing the enriched material above the
300 kg limit imposed by the JCPOA, and is threatening a more
significant breach in 60 days. Iran has not withdrawn from
the agreement, because according to its calculations,
overall the JCPOA remains beneficial for Iran’s nuclear
and regional aspirations. To Tehran's surprise, this limited
move has not won European or Russian support and has even
received some backlash, and thus demonstrates that nuclear
escalation by Iran risks causing it to lose the diplomatic
and political (as well as limited economic) support it
enjoys from these countries in the face of United States
policy.
The Military
Realm
Likewise in the
military realm, Iran has a range of
possible actions at its disposal: attacking American
soldiers in Syria or Iraq, and launching low signature
attacks via proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip
against American interests or allies (including Israel). In
the 1980s, Iran used Hezbollah to attack the US Marines and
the US Embassy in Beirut, killing hundreds. In addition, the
Pentagon has determined that Iran was responsible for the
death of over 500 US troops in Iraq during the US occupation
following the 2003 invasion, via its support and training of
anti-American Shiite militias there.
Thus far, an
intelligence alert was received regarding an attempt to
attack US troops in Iraq, which explained the abrupt change
in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's travel itinerary last
week - from Germany to Iraq. Iran is also presumably
preparing actions against Israel from Syria, Iraq, or
perhaps even Lebanon.
Oil Exports and Freedom
of Shipping
In the realm of
oil exports and freedom of shipping, Iran has threatened to
strike at the freedom of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
It is capable of fomenting action by Yemen's Houthis against
shipping in the Red Sea and the production of oil on the
Arab side of the Gulf, by missiles, drones, or sabotage,
including through cyber methods (as with proxy terrorism,
here too there would be a low signature and difficulty
regarding public attribution).
Indeed, the United
States published a warning to the Gulf states relating to
their commercial shipping interests regarding a plot to
attack oil tankers in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. On May
12, the intelligence warning was actualized. Reports emerged
from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia of an attack
on four merchant ships and oil tankers. The attack, which
Saudi Arabia labeled "sabotage," occurred in the Gulf of
Oman, near the United Arab Emirates, as the tankers prepared
to enter Persian Gulf waters. According to Riyadh, the two
Saudi tankers sustained significant damage, though they were
not carrying oil at the time so no spill ensued; one tanker
was preparing to load oil bound for the United States. No
one has claimed responsibility, but the intent was apparent:
a low signature action by Iran that hints at its
capabilities.
The United States has not been passive
in the face of Iran’s threats. Last week, in a highly
publicized move, military forces were dispatched to the
Middle East, including the USS Lincoln aircraft
carrier, B-52 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weaponry,
and a Patriot battery. These are not the expeditionary
forces that would befit a broad-based campaign, but
certainly they constitute a message that there will be a
response - perhaps surgical - to any Iranian
escalation.
In the current circumstances, the two
sides are demanding conditions that would make a resumption
of negotiations difficult. The United States seems to be
insisting on the 12 demands that Pompeo made of Iran, while
Iran is demanding an American apology and return to the
nuclear agreement as a precondition for negotiations. With
that said, both sides apparently understand that dialogue
may ultimately be a less dangerous option for them than a
military clash.
Nonetheless, the rhetoric among Iran's
military leadership has been highly aggressive. Discussing
the escalation, and specifically the deployment of the
Lincoln near Iranian shores, a Revolutionary Guards
commander said that if the United States makes a move, Iran
will "hit them on the head," and added that the American
presence in the Middle East, which previously constituted a
serious threat, was now - in Iran's view - an opportunity.
By contrast, President Hassan Rouhani, in a speech delivered
on May 11, claimed that the situation in Iran is more
difficult than what confronted the Islamic Republic during
the Iran-Iraq War. It is possible that this statement was
meant to prepare public opinion for the unpleasant options
before the Islamic Republic, somewhat analogous to a 1988
speech by then-Supreme Leader Khomeini about the need to
"drink from the poisoned chalice" when signing a peace
agreement with Saddam Hussein to end the eight-year war with
Iraq. The calculations that prompted Khomeini to assess that
continued fighting would endanger the regime's very survival
may parallel Khamenei’s current assessment of negotiations
with the US in order to avoid further dangerous
escalation.
For its part, the Trump administration is
likewise not eager for conflict, sending a message that the
United States has been acting defensively and in response to
warnings it received. Indeed, Washington's messages have
assumed a new tone. In contrast to the aggressive messages
relayed by Secretary Pompeo and National Security Adviser
John Bolton, President Trump made a point of emphasizing his
interest in preventing harm to Iran by holding a dialogue
with its leadership. In the course of two days, Trump noted
more than three times that he "would like to see them [Iran]
call me...What they should be doing is calling me up,
sitting down. We can make a deal, a fair deal…I want them
to be strong and great and have a great economy...They
should call, [and] if they do, we're open to talk to them.
We have no secrets. And they can be very, very strong
financially, they have great potential. Very much like North
Korea." In parallel, it was reported that the White House
relayed to Switzerland (which represents US interests in
Iran) a telephone number for Iran to reach Trump directly.
These statements by Trump may also point to a preference by
the President to focus exclusively on the nuclear issue in a
dialogue with Iran.
Significance for
Israel
In the near term it
seems the Israeli government would not bemoan a collapse of
the JCPOA that might result from US pressure, Iranian
breaches, and responses of the other parties to the
agreement. It is important for Israel that any future
Democratic administration in the United States not return to
the JCPOA during the deal’s later years, when the
agreement is more problematic, as this is a period in which
Iran would receive international legitimacy to build a full
scale nuclear program.
Any military clash between Iran
and the United States – be it in the Gulf, Iraq, or Syria,
or a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz – would not have a
direct impact on Israel, but there would be indirect
repercussions. The odds of Iran leaving Israel out of such a
fight, should it emerge, are slim.
Therefore, Israeli
policy would do well to include the following
components:
In the immediate term: Intelligence
vigilance and military readiness are required in order to
foil Iranian military action, whether direct or indirect,
against Israel on any front where there is an Iranian
presence. An agreed joint strategy with the United States
for responding to Iranian military action is also in order.
Israel should reevaluate and update the "campaign between
wars" that it has waged to thwart Iranian entrenchment in
Syria, so that it adjusts to the changes in Iranian
policy.
In the medium term: Given the possibility that
the United States and Iran will ultimately return to
negotiations, Israel must reach understandings with the
United States about what needs to be fixed in the nuclear
agreement - mainly regarding the extension of the sunset
clauses (as the agreement's expiration date nears), improved
monitoring of the Iranian nuclear facilities, the military
dimensions of the nuclear program, Iran’s ballistic
missile program, and Iran's efforts to destabilize and
dominate the region. Israel's positions on these issues will
likely earn support from the Gulf states, creating an
opportunity to strengthen relations with these states in the
political and other spheres.
In the long term: Israel
must prepare for the possibility that Iran will choose the
path of escalation and renew nuclear activity with the goal
of accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which would
shorten the time needed to produce fissile material, and
even prepare for the possibility of an Iranian withdrawal
from the NPT. Israel should also consider the possibility
that the United States will not take effective action to
stop the Iranian nuclear program (as, after all, the Trump
administration is not keen on further military engagements
in the Middle East). Therefore, Israel must update its force
buildup plans to enable it to cope with a potential Iranian
nuclear breakout alone. This would be a sweeping budgetary
and operational challenge. Indeed, the IDF's multi-year
"Gideon" plan, drafted under the former Chief of the General
Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, assumed at least a 10-year
deferral for preparations of a response to the Iranian
nuclear program. Yet the developments seen in this context
over the last year, and especially the last month, demand a
significant updating of the plan and allocation of
supplementary resources to the defense
establishment.
In conclusion, the combination of the
maximum pressure campaign by the United States against Iran,
Iran's decision to depart from its "strategic patience," and
America’s determination to respond to any attempt to harm
US troops and interests in the Middle East embody the
potential for escalation and miscalculation that is liable
to affect Israel's security. The security cabinet should
therefore convene to craft an appropriate policy for the
near, medium, and long
terms.
ends