Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 10/31/06
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SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/31/06
INDEX:
(1) Analysis of North Korea's nuclear test by David Straub,
associate professor at Johns Hopkins University: US needs to review
North Korea policy
(2) My view of North Korea situation by David Straub, professor at
Johns Hopkins University and former country director for Korean
Affairs at the US Department of State: Direct negotiations well
worth a try
(3) What promoted North Korea to hurry nuclear test?
(4) View of reporter assigned to Prime Minister Abe on his one month
in office: He should speak his own words while listening to diverse
opinions
(5) Editorial -- Kono statement on military comfort women: The heart
of dispute is whether there was "transportation of women for forced
labor as sex slaves"
ARTICLES:
(1) Analysis of North Korea's nuclear test by David Straub,
associate professor at Johns Hopkins University: US needs to review
North Korea policy
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Full)
October 28, 2006
Question: What was the significance of Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice's Asia trip?
Straub: I think the Secretary's Asia visit produced a certain level
of good results, for example, six-party talks member nations
(excluding North Korea) were able to move closer together and that
Japan and South Korea, allies of the United States, reaffirmed that
they were under the US nuclear umbrella. It was regrettable that
what the US was considering as sanctions against North Korea was
misunderstood, and the Secretary had to explain to Asian leaders
that the United States had no intention to take such measures as a
naval blockage that it imposed when the Cuban missile crisis
occurred.
Question: Is there a possibility that ship inspections might develop
into a military clash?
Straub: I think the US government bears in mind that cargo
inspections will be conducted when ships enter ports. There is an
increased risk, however. There is a possibility that tensions might
grow over an accidental exercise of force during a ship inspection.
Question: China has remained reluctant about ship inspections.
Straub: I don't think China will cooperate in carrying out
large-scale inspections of cargo ships. China neither wants North
Korea to possess nuclear weapons nor the Korean Peninsula to become
unstable. China has its limits when it comes to putting pressure on
North Korea.
Question: What will happen next?
Straub: It is unlikely that North Korea will return to the six-party
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talks unconditionally. There seems to be no doubt that the North
will conduct a second nuclear test. Neighboring countries must
cooperate in implementing the UN Security Council resolution. It is
necessary for them to review their policies through discussions.
Question: What should the United States do?
Straub: It's better for the United States to review its approach
toward North Korea. The president should appoint a policy
coordinator and present a roadmap containing a carrot-and-stick
policy to Pyongyang. If the United States fails or does not make
efforts, it will not be able to gain the full cooperation of other
countries.
Question: Do you think if the Democratic Party wins the mid-term
elections, there will be an impact on the US policy toward North
Korea?
Straub: The Bush administration will probably encounter increasing
criticism, but the president has strong foreign policy power.
President Bush has a strong personal view that North Korea is an
evil regime. He might have an even stronger conviction now that his
administration's hard-line policy toward the North was correct.
(2) My view of North Korea situation by David Straub, professor at
Johns Hopkins University and former country director for Korean
Affairs at the US Department of State: Direct negotiations well
worth a try
MAINICHI (Page 9) (Full)
October 31, 2006
Interviewer: Toshihiko Kawahara, Washington
President Bush actually detests (General Secretary) Kim Jong Il and
regards his regime as "evil." He thinks it is immoral for the United
States to deal with evil and that it is useless to hold talks with
an unreliable sort like him. Mr. Bush would think his righteousness
has now been proved by (the North's) nuclear test.
The Bush administration's pendulum has tilted even further toward
hardliners. They believe that financial sanctions against a Macao
bank, for instance, would deal a sizable blow to the North Korean
leadership and help put pressure on it to give up its nuclear
programs. Regime change is not on the US government's policy agenda,
but the fact is that a number of senior administration officials are
hoping such would happen. The US will likely step up its sanctions.
The US had no intention of holding talks with North Korea in a
serious manner even before the nuclear test. All the US has done to
date has been to attend the six-party talks and declare its policy
there. This stance will not change. If North Korea were to return to
the six-party talks, the US would accept that, because Washington
expects the forum to give an opportunity to other participating
countries to pressure the North.
(General Secretary) Kim Jong Il in pushing for nuclear development
feels three threats: 1) from the North Korea people themselves, who
are isolated by him from the international community; 2) from South
Korea, which has defeated him in political and economic competition;
and 3) the US. It seems to me that the Bush administration's tough
line has made it instead easier for North Korea to decide to explode
a nuclear device.
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If my reasoning proves to be correct, it would be extremely
difficult to persuade the North to abandon its nuclear programs. But
Pyongyang still hopes to have a direct dialogue with Washington.
Such talks are well worth a try for the US. In order to obtain
sufficient endorsement to sanctions measures against North Korea and
America's policy toward it, Washington needs to show flexibility
when it tries to persuade North Korea.
With no concessions expected from North Korea and given that the
Bush administration's term of office expires in two years, it is
highly probable that the North will conduct another nuclear test.
The most desirable scenario would be for Pyongyang not to conduct a
second nuclear test before a new US administration, which is more
likely to assume a pragmatic approach to the issue, will come into
office, and the possibility of military conflict on the Korean
Peninsula is minimized.
Will North Korea explode another nuclear device and continue
developing nuclear weapons? What will happen to the issues of
nuclear weapons and missiles? The Mainichi Shimbun in this series
interviews experts on the Korean Peninsula situation from a number
of countries.
(3) What promoted North Korea to hurry nuclear test?
SANKEI (Page 15) (Abridged slightly)
October 28, 2006
By Toshiyuki Shikata
Three viewpoints to fathom North Korea's aim
The series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea was linked
to its nuclear test. The North has been pushing ahead with two
projects simultaneously: One is to develop ballistic missiles
(Taepodong) capable of reaching the United States, and the other is
to develop warheads small enough to fit onto ballistic missiles. The
two projects are intended to realize Pyongyang's political goal of
dragging the United States to direct bilateral talks with North
Korea.
But the test launches of ballistic missiles capable of reaching the
United States failed, and the underground nuclear test, too, seemed
short of total success. Why did North Korea rush to test missiles
and a nuclear device still in the development stage with low
credibility?
That can be explained by three reasons. First, the North was
gradually suffering from America's economic sanctions and a lack of
hard currency under the international community's watchful eye on
the country's weapons exports to the Middle East.
Second, although the six-party talks have been an opportune arena
for the North to buy time, the framework made it difficult to elicit
direct bilateral talks from the United States.
The United States has been preoccupied with blocking Iran from
possessing nuclear weapons, while leaving North Korean affairs to
China, which cannot let that country fall. North Korea needed to
acquire a nuclear capability ahead of Iran.
Power struggle in North Korea
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Third, a power struggle dividing North Korea has been out of
control, a factor often overlooked.
There is a struggle between the Korean Workers Party "open-door"
civilian group urging General Secretary Kim Jong Il to take a
Chinese-style open-door policy and the military xenophobic group
(upholding Juche), which opposes the former for fence sitting.
The Korean People's Army fears that once the country adopts a
Chinese-style open-door policy, the North will become a satellite of
China, with its all areas -- from politics to economics to diplomacy
to the military -- under China's influence.
Exchanges between the People's Liberation Army and the Korean
People's Army have not been active. China has conducted large-scale
joint drills with Russia but not with North Korea. In terms of
equipment, North Korea's dependence on China is also limited. The
North's equipment is overwhelmingly connected with weaponry made in
the former Soviet Union.
The Korean People's Army, which prioritizes Juche and the
military-first policy, apparently wants to keep its distance from
China at least on the military front.
In the wake of North Korea's announcement on its nuclear test, the
United Nations has adopted a sanctions resolution under Chapter 7 of
the UN Charter. Top diplomats of Japan, the United States, China,
Russia, and South Korea also discussed how to deal with the
situation, crisscrossing the globe.
North Korea going nuclear would be followed by Iran, a major
anti-Western Islamic state with tremendous oil reserves, bringing a
sea change to the strategic environment surrounding the Middle East.
Such anxiety prompted the international community to take concerted
action.
Unlike North Korea's case, Iran going nuclear might spill over to
Europe, where there is no non-nuclear zone treaty.
Even if North Korea becomes a nuclear power, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan are unlikely to follow suit. Chances are extremely slim that
Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons against China and Russia. South
Korea is also convinced that the North will not use them on their
fellow Koreans. The North could aim them at the United States to
send out a political message, not a militarily signal. This means
that Japan will be the only country directly exposed to the nuclear
threat from North Korea.
Nuclear debate in Japan
There are calls for a nuclear debate in Japan. They are not for
arming Japan with nuclear weapons but for an active debate on what
kind of "power" other than nuclear weapons Japan should possess in
order to have a strong voice in the international community.
They are asking how Japan can secure "power" in a future
international community where neither checkbook diplomacy nor being
friendly will work.
Clinging to America's nuclear deterrent must not be the only answer.
Is having the ability to collect, analyze, and send out intelligence
by utilizing a large number of reconnaissance satellites and
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monitoring signals an answer? Does Japan need to have cutting-edge
technology? Or Japan perhaps needs to have the moral power to
convince major powers that often rely on double standards.
As the only victim of atomic bombings, Japan has opted to remain a
nonnuclear power although it has the technical ability to go
nuclear, and that in itself is the largest deterrent, in my view.
Caution must be practiced so that Japan will not be regarded as a
threat simply because there are calls for a nuclear debate in the
country.
(4) View of reporter assigned to Prime Minister Abe on his one month
in office: He should speak his own words while listening to diverse
opinions
By Haruka Osugi
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 20) (Full)
October 31, 2006
On the night of Sept. 27 soon after his administration was
inaugurated, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with reporters attached
to the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) and said
nervously:
"I keenly sense the grave responsibility I now have. Since it is
important for politicians to achieve results, I will devote my
energies to making results so that the public will laud my
efforts."
One month has passed since then. Prime Minister Abe has handled his
job in a steady fashion. However, I sense now once in a while that
he has lost the modesty that he had immediately after assuming
office.
I compared the number of visitors to Prime Minister Abe had in the
first month to that of Junichiro Koizumi during his first month as
premier. Koizumi had 24 meetings all told with administrative
vice-ministers, the top officials of the ministries and agencies,
but Abe held only five meetings with such officials. He has
apparently been trying to demonstrate his policy stance of
distancing himself from the bureaucracy by indirectly receiving
their reports through the chief cabinet secretary. I am concerned
about whether he can make appropriate decisions by not getting
information firsthand, but relying on an aide most of the time.
The only chance for us as reporters to sense his character is at
meetings. Reporters questioned Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and his
predecessors while walking alongside them. Koizumi, however, set up
a place for the reporters to question him. Abe has taken over the
Koizumi style. However, his secretary often breaks off our meetings.
We understand that the prime minister is very busy, but he should
not ignore our questions. We see him as cold to us.
Prime Minister Koizumi responded to our questions twice a day. Abe
intends to reduce the press meetings to once a day. When asked about
his reason for the reduction, he just said: "I will always responded
to questions by reporters covering me once a day, speaking before
the public."
One high government official said: "Jumping to conclusions is not
good." The prime minister is not the only person to produce
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achievements. I would like Prime Minister Abe to speak to the public
in his own words, while listening to a variety of views. I would
like him to produce better results that way.
(5) Editorial -- Kono statement on military comfort women: The heart
of dispute is whether there was "transportation of women for forced
labor as sex slaves"
YOMIURI (Page 3) (Slightly abridged)
October 31, 2006
We wonder why those remarks are problematic?
The remarks in question are the ones recently made by Deputy Chief
Cabinet Secretary Hakubun Shimomura, in which he indicated the need
to study the so-called "Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono's statement on
military comfort women."
The opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan
(Minshuto), cite a contradiction between Shimomura's remarks and
Prime Minister Abe's Diet replies, in which Abe stated he would
follow the Kono statement, to criticize the government as there
being a discord in the cabinet.
Shimomura's remarks were specifically something like: "Personally,
there is a need to study the facts more carefully, and we should
take time to collect objective and scientific knowledge and consider
the results (of the studies)."
The Kono statement offered an apology and expressed remorse to
former military comfort women. The premise for the statement was the
acknowledgment of the fact that the former Imperial Japanese Army
and police authorities "transported women for forced labor." This
acknowledgment was approved at a cabinet meeting without conducting
a thorough investigation because the Japanese government was under
pressure from the South Korean government to admit that there had
been transportation of women for forced labor as sex slaves.
A threshold of the comfort-women issue was some nationwide dailies'
false reports describing the women volunteer corps organized under
the labor mobilization system as a means to "hunt military comfort
women." To add to that, even a Japanese who "confessed" that he
gathered comfort women emerged, but this confession, too, was a
fabricated story. No direct materials showing transportation of
women for forced labor as sex slaves have been found so far even in
the government's investigation.
Obviously, the Kono statement was not a product generated from a
social, scientific approach in line with objective data. Rather, it
was the result of giving excessive diplomatic consideration to South
Korea, whose public was filled with anti-Japanese sentiment. Heeding
these circumstances, Shimomura indicated the need to study the
statement.
Nonetheless, if Minshuto and other parties challenge Shimomura's
remarks, they should first show what is their view about the
question of whether there was transportation of women for forced
labor, the crux of the Kono statement, and then should pursue the
government.
Prime Minister Abe stated he abides by the Kono statement, but at
the same time he commented that "No data supporting" transportation
of women for forced labor as sex slaves "have been found even now,"
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by employing the expression of "enforcement in a narrow sense."
Shimomura's remarks are not contradictory to Abe's replies.
The government's view is not necessarily the golden rule. It is only
natural to correct it if there is something wrong with it.
The point is the facts.
Namely, was there the fact of transportation of people by the
military or police authorities for forced labor? Aside from
political calculations or excessive diplomatic consideration, this
question should be considered; for that reason, it should be
entrusted to historians and other experts' research.
As a result of the research, if no facts demonstrating
transportation for forced labor are found, the Kono statement must
be revised
SCHIEFFER