Cablegate: Prt/Lashkar Gah - Governor Defends Deal with Musa Qala
VZCZCXRO8157
OO RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5487/01 3181015
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141015Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4095
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3250
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005487
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
RELS NATO/AUS/NZ
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMETT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH - GOVERNOR DEFENDS DEAL WITH MUSA QALA
SHURA
REF: (A) KABUL 4369
KABUL 00005487 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a recent meeting with PRTOff, Helmand
Governor Daud defended the Afghan government's deal with the leaders
of Musa Qala district, wherein the government recognizes the
leaders' right to administer the district in return for recognition
of the central government's authority. Daud worried about public
comments critical of the agreement that could provide fodder to
those who wish to subvert the deal for their own private interests.
He defended the arrangement, citing three points: the agreement was
not a 'provincial agreement,' but one approved by President Karzai;
the unsustainable status quo demanded change; and there was a
pressing need to recognize tribal authority. Daud hoped to see
public U.S. support for the arrangement. He continues to pursue
arrangements with other district leaders, and is near to a deal with
those of Sangin. See paragraph 12 for a summary of the Musa Qala
agreement's points. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) In an October 30 meeting with PRTOff, Helmand Governor
Daud expressed concern about the Ambassador's published comments in
the local press on the deal between the Government of Afghanistan
(GOA) and the leaders of Musa Qala, a district in the conflict-weary
north Helmand. (NOTE: Under the deal, the GOA recognizes the local
shura's authority and accepts its assurances to secure the district
center, while the shura recognizes the GOA's authority (REF); it was
followed by ISAF's withdrawal from the district center. END NOTE.)
3. (SBU) Informed that the comments did not constitute a rejection
of the deal but a caution about the need to monitor it, Daud agreed
with the need to closely watch the district, but worried that
'negative' comments lend support to those opposed to the agreement.
Daud hoped the Embassy would issue a statement in support of the
agreement, identifying it as a national-level agreement, and stating
that all parties are concerned that it be watched closely. He then
launched into a defense of the arrangement, citing (1) the fact that
the it was not a "provincial agreement," but one approved by
President Karzai, (2) the unsustainable status quo, and (3) the need
to recognize tribal authority.
4. (SBU) Daud rhetorically asked, "How much longer can we keep
platoon houses there (i.e., in northern districts like Musa Qala),
with ISAF and the Taliban firing on each other?" He said the GOA
had to consider alternatives, ones that strengthened local
communities. (NOTE: In a prior meeting at the Embassy, Daud
indicated that recognizing local authority was the only available
option, given the limited GOA resources, especially related to
security. END NOTE.) Daud said, "We had to accept a deal,"
describing one high-level meeting wherein district leaders said that
accepting their proposal would mean support for the GOA, otherwise,
"Where should we go? On what other door should we knock?"
5. (SBU) The agreement that emerged was the product of considerable
negotiation (see paragraph 12 for a summary of its points). As Daud
described it, the local leaders told the Taliban not to fire. The
leaders having delivered on the cease fire, it was important to
recognize their success and "show them respect"; ISAF's withdrawal
was the quid-pro-quo that also removed the "provocation" of ISAF's
presence from the district center.
6. (SBU) With ISAF's withdrawal, Daud says that the Afghan flag is
now flying in the district center, a local administration approved
by the GOA is in place, and local security forces are keeping the
peace. He dismissed those who might complain about the use of local
militia for security, saying, "Forget that they are not wearing
uniforms, there is peace."
7. (SBU) Daud alluded to unspecified 'others,' presumably warlords
at odds with both the GOA and the Taliban, who wish to undermine the
agreement 'for their own private interests.' He said those others
had organized a group to travel to Kabul to complain about the
agreement, claiming that Musa Qala was now under Taliban control.
"This is not true," Daud said, adding that he sent President Karzai
footage showing the Afghan flag flying in Musa Qala and interviews
with locals, and that the film was shown on Afghan state television.
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(NOTE: There is anecdotal information at odds with the Governor's
assertion: while people and commerce have returned to the district
center, so reportedly have Taliban, albeit (possibly) unarmed.
Reports from the Governor indicate the ANP has also withdrawn from
the district. Also, in a meeting on October 31 with PRT
representatives, one local asked whether there was truth to the
rumor that the Taliban demanded that the Afghan flag be removed from
the district center. END NOTE.)
8. (SBU) The Governor is close to securing an agreement with the
shura of Sangin district, located in the north. Daud has sent the
agreement to Kabul, along with a list of district officials proposed
by the shura. The shura has agreed to guarantee security for the
road leading to adjacent Kajaki district and the dam (though it
could not provide a complete guarantee for other stretches of
road).
9. (SBU) EMBASSY COMMENT: Daud was firm in his defense of the
agreement and determined to move forward, with this and similar
arrangements with leaders in other districts (Nawzad has been
mentioned). The agreement he secured in Helmand appears to require
much from the local shura, though not always with great specificity.
Putting aside for the moment different characterizations and thus
uncertainty about the current situation on the ground, and local
leaders' alleged sympathies for one side or another, one salient
point is emerging: the cessation of violence has come at the cost of
at least a temporary lessening of central government authority in
the region. Reconstruction assistance might swing sympathies
towards the flag the Governor says is flying in the district center,
but only if it is clearly connected to an expression/acknowledgement
of state authority.
10. (SBU) EMBASSY COMMENT (CSTC-A concurring): We do not support
reliance on local militia, as it would call into question USG
strategy on police reform and ANAP development. During a recent
Policy Advisory Group (PAG) meeting, both NSA Rassoul and Minister
of Defense Wardak stated in their agreement with Ambassador Neumann
that there must be independent confirmation of the security
situation in Musa Qala. The proposal discussed involved sending 150
ANAP (training in Helmand started on Nov. 4, with the first group
coming from Lashkar Gah and Nahri Sarraj districts) once the ANAP
are trained, Minister Wardak stated that they should be sent to Musa
Qala to judge whether the people accept newly recruited and trained
police. This force will also be able to judge the situation within
Musa Qala. However, in a subsequent PAG on Nov. 8, it sounded like
all of ANAP would be recruited in Musa Qala, although they would
receive two weeks training and equipment from national forces.
11. (SBU) EMBASSY/CFC-A COMMENT CONTINUED: The situation within
Musa Qala must be told to the people of Afghanistan. The press must
portray the situation that the GOA is using innovative solutions to
provide for the safety and security of the people and furthermore
that the GOA is using Afghan solutions to provide for the security
of the people. This will demonstrate the GOA's concern and the
development of greater capability within the government. Such
information operations should be undertaken, however, only when the
GOA and ISAF are assured of the results of this agreement.
Ambassador Neumann has been pushing this point actively (septel).
END COMMENT.
12. (SBU) Summary of points in Musa Qala agreement:
- "Local Administration" (LA) will work to serve the public, under
the Afghan national flag.
- Uphold the constitution and avoid illegal activity.
- Maintain security in district, help stabilize region.
- Facilitate development and rehabilitation projects.
- Collect taxes and consult with provincial authorities on spending
them on welfare activities.
- The LA will support children going to schools and keep doors open
to the public. (NOTE: The government would tolerate the curriculum
being limited to the Koran if that was the shura's choice; no
explicit direction to permit girls' attendance.)
- Facilitate government missions and NGO activities.
- Cooperate on keeping roads open.
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- Guarantee the movement and security of international and national
security forces while relocating; protect government property.
- LA committed to not supporting any insurgency in other districts
and to not letting the district to again become a haven for
terrorists.
- LA will cooperate with Ulemas to try yo bring "Islamic unity and
fraternity" to all people in the region, bring peace and remove
enmity.
- Ban and control illegal arms.
- Facilitate the return of IDPs.
- Approved LA will commence activites only after Governor's
approval.
- Adjust arrangements only in agreement with the Governor.
NEUMANN