Cablegate: Voter Registry Verification Characterized by Low
VZCZCXRO4118
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1139/01 3451940
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111939Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0263
INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0005
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0004
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001139
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/11
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM NU
SUBJECT: Voter Registry Verification Characterized by Low
Participation, Irregularities
REF: A) MANAGUA 935; B) MANAGUA 859; C) 2008 MANAGUA 1351
D) 2008 MANAGUA 982; E) 2008 MANAGUA 417; F) 2008 MANAGUA 1367
CLASSIFIED BY: RJCallahan, AMB; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (SBU) Summary: The November 27-30 verification of the voter
registration lists for the upcoming Atlantic Coast regional council
elections was characterized by low participation and numerous
irregularities, both worrisome developments for the climate in
which March's regional elections will take place. The opposition
parties face an up-hill climb to ensure the regional elections are
transparent and fair. End Summary.
CSE minimizes low turn-out, FSLN deputy and opposition criticize
2. (U) According to local press, approximately 30% of the
electorate in Nicaragua's two autonomous regions participated in
the process to verify their domicile and the location where they
will vote on Election Day with the Supreme Electoral Council
(CSE). Robert Rivas Reyes, CSE President, characterized the
turn-out in both the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and
the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS) as "extremely low,"
citing a lack of resources for the low participation. However,
Rivas minimized the low turn-out, expressing confidence that voter
participation would reach the 35%-40% regional average during the
March 7, 2010 election. Interestingly, Rivas's opinion was not
shared by all government officials. Brooklyn Rivera, YATAMA party
leader and National Assembly Deputy aligned with the governing
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), voiced criticism of
Rivas and the CSE claiming that "thousands of people would not be
able exercise their right to vote" as a result of voter
registration irregularities. Rivera estimates that 30% of the
total population in the RAAN has been impeded from obtaining
cedulas (voter registration cards). Opposition parties, including
the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and the electoral alliance
the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance-Vamos con Eduardo-Independent
Liberal Party (ALN-VCE-PLI), blamed the low turn-out in the region
on poor government publicity and insufficient resources. In some
urban zones, low participation was attributed to the fact it
conflicted with the end of the school year and high school
graduation ceremonies.
Numerous irregularities cited by opposition and press
3. (U) Local press reported no violence during voter verification,
but cited numerous procedural irregularities in both regions. In
the RAAN, most verification centers opened on-time, except in the
capital city of Bilwi where a lack of registration materials
delayed opening. As in previous voter verifications in Bilwi, the
FSLN-controlled Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) supervised all
verification tables (Ref F). The cities of Bonanza, Siuna, and
Rosita, known collectively as the "Mining Triangle," experienced
the most verification irregularities. Guillermo Medrano, an
ALN-VCE-PLI Alliance representative in the RAAN, cited cedula
distribution problems, misuse of public funds for partisan
purposes, and lack of precinct supervisors as major irregularities
in this area. In Rosita, a traditional Liberal municipality
awarded to an FSLN mayor after the November 2008 elections, voters
were required to request their cedula from the Electoral Council
located in the FSLN party office. Medrano confirmed that FSLN
supporters were assured speedy distribution of their cedula (one
week), where as some non-FSLN voters were informed of possible
delays due to a lack of printing resources or mechanical issues.
Medrano also accused FSLN government officials in Rosita of trying
to falsely boost voter registration rolls by using public resources
to transport and register FSLN loyalists from nearby Waslala, a
municipality where citizens are ineligible to vote in the election
since they have no representation on the regional council.
4. (U) Arnoldo Aleman, former president, convicted felon and
honorary leader of the PLC, denounced the verification process in
the RAAS as flawed, claiming that the FSLN-controlled CSE excluded
PLC party officials from observing verification in the municipal of
Paiwas. Aleman also decried a lack of logistical, technical, and
promotional support in the region for the verification process and
charged that the electoral lists presented prior to the
verification process were not identical to those actually used for
the verification. Wilfredo Navarro Moreira , National Assembly
Secretary and Vice-President of the PLC, announced plans to audit
voting irregularities in order to build a case for possible
election annulations in 2010.
5). (U) La Prensa, Nicaragua's largest newspaper, reported that the
CSE and Nicaraguan Air Force used helicopters to transport FSLN
motorcycles to its campaign officials in the municipality of
Bluefields, located in the RAAS. Both the CSE and Nicaraguan Air
Force denied the La Prensa report.
Next on the election calendar
6. (U) The regional council elections are scheduled for March 7,
2010. The CSE must establish procedures for participation of
observers by January 21, which also marks the first official day of
campaigning. Final voter registration lists are due February 5 and
campaigns will officially close on March 3 in anticipation of
Election Day.
Comments
7. (C) Turn-out for the verification process was expected to be
low; however, the irregularities are disconcerting. The
verification processes for the regional council elections in the
RAAN and RAAS bear similarities to the tainted verification
processes held in past regional elections as well as the fraudulent
municipal elections in November 2008 (Refs D, E, F). Opposition
parties fear with good reason that the Atlantic Coast regional
elections will be manipulated by the FSLN as were the municipal
elections in 2008 (Ref C). Opposition leaders are already calling
for neutral, international observation of the election, a difficult
feat considering the Ortega Administration's rejection of
international observers for the 2008 municipal elections and
current declarations against such interventions. For example,
Nicaragua recently voted against the inclusion of a paragraph
presented in a U.S.-backed resolution before the United Nations
recognizing the need to fortify election observation through
harmonizing the methods of the different non-governmental and
inter-governmental organizations. Nicaragua, Russia, Libya, Iran,
Ecuador, Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela were among the 19 countries
who voted against the paragraph in the resolution (127 countries
voted in favor while 28 abstained). Much is at stake for both the
FSLN and opposition parties. The FSLN wants victories in the region
(by fair means or fraud) to demonstrate its national "popular
support" and to continue its "socialist project" (Refs A, B). The
opposition will have to work hard to ensure elections in the RAAN
and RAAS are open and fair. Moreover, opposition leaders will have
to suppress personal ambitions and overcome ideological differences
in order to unite and counter Ortega's power grab (Ref A).
CALLAHAN