Cablegate: Gicnt: Encourage Singapore to Endorse Gicnt Prior

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8212 0571815
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261810Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 018212

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC US
SUBJECT: GICNT: ENCOURAGE SINGAPORE TO ENDORSE GICNT PRIOR
TO APRIL 12-13 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

REF: A. A. CANBERRA 57468
B. B. CANBERRA 54399
C. C. STATE 37989

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

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SUMMARY
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2. (U) Appropriate Embassy officials are requested to
approach the Government of Singapore (GoS) to encourage
Singapore's endorsement of the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Statement of Principles. Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation, Vann Van Diepen, recently led U.S.
participation in the Third Counterproliferation Dialogue with
the GoS (January 26-27) and strongly encouraged the GoS to
become a partner to the GICNT. Endorsing the GICNT prior to
the Nuclear Security Summit (April 12-13) would demonstrate
Singapore's staunch commitment to combating the threat of
nuclear terrorism at a time when many heads of
state/government will be assembling to focus specifically on
nuclear security. Endorsing the GICNT will also establish
Singapore as a regional leader on nuclear terrorism issues
and allow it to play a valuable role in enhancing regional
capacity to combat this shared threat in Southeast Asia.
(Note: Singapore would be the second country in Southeast
Asia to endorse the GICNT, after Cambodia.) While
participation in GICNT activities is strictly voluntary,
Singapore could benefit from taking part in a series of 2010
GICNT workshops that are only open to GICNT partners in areas
such as nuclear forensics, detection, legal frameworks,
terrorist financing, and information sharing. The GoS could
also leverage the expertise and resources of the GICNT
partnership in order to enhance indigenous nuclear security
capabilities and achieve its broader foreign policy goal of
maintaining stability in Southeast Asia.

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OBJECTIVES
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3. (U) Post is requested to pursue the following objectives
with appropriate host government officials:

-- Reinforce to GoS the benefits of endorsing the GICNT (see
para 8).

-- Allay GoS concerns about resource limitations, stressing
instead the importance of sending a strong political message
about Singapore's commitment to combating the shared threat
of nuclear terrorism.

-- Underscore that GICNT endorsement places no additional
burdens on the GOS and that participation in GICNT activities
is strictly voluntary.

-- Secure a commitment from the GoS to endorse the GICNT
Statement of Principles in advance of the Nuclear Security
Summit (April 12-13). For reference, the Statement of
Principles have been provided in this cable (para 11) in the
event that Singapore requests to view them.

-- Explain that endorsement requires only transmission of
diplomatic notes to the GICNT Co-Chairs (the United States
and Russian Federation), and provide the sample letter of
endorsement at para 12.

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REPORTING DEADLINE
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4. (U) Department requests that Post report the GoS,s
response by March 8, 2010.

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BACKGROUND ON GICNT OUTREACH TO SINGAPORE
-----------------------------------------

5. (U) The United States and Russia, sometimes in
coordination with Japan and Australia, have approached the
GoS on numerous occasions to encourage endorsement of the
GICNT (reftels A, B, and C). The most recent approach was by
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International
Security and Nonproliferation, Vann Van Diepen, during the
Third Counterproliferation Dialogue with the GoS (January
26-27). During prior outreach efforts, the GoS cited
resource constraints as preventing it from endorsing the
GICNT, as it does not want to join if it cannot dedicate the
manpower to make a substantive contribution. The GOS also
questioned what benefits it would gain as partner in the
GICNT, instead choosing to focus its limited resources on
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

6. (U) We recognize Singapore's concern about limited
resources and the ability to substantively contribute to the
GICNT through the organization and hosting of activities.
Endorsement of the GICNT Statement of Principles, however,
does not require organizing and hosting activities, nor does
it require any specific legal or financial commitments.
Participation in and hosting of GICNT activities is strictly
voluntary. Rather, endorsement sends an important political
message indicating a country's association with a
multinational consensus to develop and implement best
practices to address the shared global threat of nuclear
terrorism.

7. (U) The GICNT is complementary to PSI, UNSCR 1540, and
other nonproliferation activities and strives to implement
steps that fill gaps not addressed elsewhere. The U.S. and
Russian Co-Chairs also take steps to ensure that activities
hosted by GICNT partners are shaped in a way that permits a
coordinated approach to combating nuclear terrorism and
builds capacity in areas of specific nations, needs. Of the
77 GICNT partner nations, 65 are also members of PSI.
Additionally, the GICNT includes several prominent partners
who are not part of PSI, such as China, India, and Pakistan.

8. (U) There are several benefits, outlined below, that the
GoS would gain as partner to the GICNT at no cost.

-- Endorsing the GICNT prior to the Nuclear Security Summit,
at a time when many heads of state/government will be
assembling to focus specifically on nuclear security, would
demonstrate to the international community Singapore's
staunch commitment to combating the threat of nuclear
terrorism.

-- Endorsement would allow Singapore to leverage the
expertise and resources of the GICNT partnership in order to
enhance indigenous nuclear security capabilities and achieve
its broader foreign policy goal of maintaining stability in
Southeast Asia. In particular, Singapore would be able to
participate in a series of 2010 GICNT workshops that focus in
areas such as nuclear forensics, detection, legal frameworks,
and terrorist financing.

-- Singapore would be a valuable partner to the GICNT given
its geostrategic location and if it chooses, could play an
important role in enhancing regional capacity to combat
nuclear terrorism in Southeast Asia.

-- The GICNT provides a forum for Singapore to cooperate on
these issues with non-PSI nations such as Pakistan, India,
and China. As an active PSI member, Singapore would join
with the 65 GICNT partner nations who participate in both
initiatives in order to take a holistic approach to
counterproliferation issues and combating nuclear terrorism.

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BACKGROUND ON THE GICNT
-----------------------

9. (U) The GICNT is a cross-cutting strategic framework of
77 partners and 4 official observers that are determined to
strengthen individual and global capacity to prevent, detect,
and respond to a nuclear terrorist event. Partners of the
GICNT are committed to a set of nuclear security principles
that encompass a broad range of deterrence, prevention,
detection, and response objectives. Through voluntary
participation in multilateral activities and exercises,
partners share best practices and lessons learned in order to
strengthen both individual and collective capabilities to
combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. Since the inception
of the GICNT, partners have conducted over thirty GICNT
activities and five senior-level meetings. These events have
resulted in greater networking and transparency among the
international community and enhanced coordination within
individual partner nation governments.

10. (U) During his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama
called for the GICNT to become a &durable international
institution.8 The United States and Russia, Co-Chairs of
the GICNT, are currently taking tangible steps that will
transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and
institutionalized program. Additionally, the GICNT has a
series of workshops scheduled for 2010 covering topics such
as nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, legal frameworks,
counterterrorist financing, and information sharing. The aim
of these workshops is to develop nuclear security core
competencies that would assist partners in implementing the
GICNT Statement of Principles.

11. (U) Begin text of the GICNT Statement of Principles:

Participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism are committed to the following Statement of
Principles to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear
terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent
with national legal authorities and obligations they have
under relevant international legal frameworks, notably the
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
and its 2005 Amendment, United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1373 and 1540. They call on all states concerned
with this threat to international peace and security to make
a commitment to implement on a voluntary basis the following
principles:

-- Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and
physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive
materials and substances;

-- Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities;

-- Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other
radioactive materials and substances in order to prevent
illicit trafficking in such materials and substances, to
include cooperation in the research and development of
national detection capabilities that would be interoperable;

-- Improve capabilities of participants to search for,
confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held
nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or
devices using them.

-- Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and
financial or economic resources to terrorists seeking to
acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and
substances;

-- Ensure adequate respective national legal and regulatory
frameworks sufficient to provide for the implementation of
appropriate criminal and, if applicable, civil liability for
terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism;

-- Improve capabilities of participants for response,
mitigation, and investigation, in cases of terrorist attacks
involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials
and substances, including the development of technical means
to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and
substances that are, or may be, involved in the incident; and

-- Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression
of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking
appropriate measures consistent with their national law and
international obligations to protect the confidentiality of
any information which they exchange in confidence.

Global Initiative participants recognize the role of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the fields of
nuclear safety and security and the IAEA has been invited to
serve as an observer to the Initiative. All participants
commend the IAEA for its action in the field of nuclear
security. Participants intend for the IAEA to contribute to
the Initiative through its ongoing activities and technical
expertise.

The initial partner nations intend to establish a terms of
reference for implementation and assessment to support
effective fulfillment of the initiative, including by
facilitating the provision of assistance to participants that
may require it, and facilitating suitable exercises.

They express the desire to broaden participation in the
Global Initiative to other countries who share the common
goals of the Initiative, are actively committed to combating
nuclear terrorism, and endorse the Statement of Principles.

End text of the GICNT Statement of Principles.

12. Begin text of sample letter of endorsement.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore presents it
compliments to the (Department of State of the United States
of American) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation) and has the honor to inform herewith of the
Government of Singapore,s decision to endorse the Statement
of Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism.

The Government of Singapore endorses the Statement of
Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism as adopted during the first meeting in Rabat,
Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore avails itself to
this opportunity to renew to the (Department of State of the
United States of American) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation) the assurances of its highest
consideration.

End text of sample letter of endorsement.

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POINT OF CONTACT
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13. (U) The Department greatly appreciates Post's
assistance. All cables associated with the GICNT should be
slugged to the Department for ISN/WMDT and the relevant
regional bureaus. E-mails regarding the GICNT may be sent to
.
CLINTON

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