Death Sentence for Costa Rican Foreign Investment
CAFTA’s October Referendum: A Death Sentence for Costa Rican Foreign Investment?
With a little under two
months until the October referendum on the Dominican
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA),
time is quickly running out for Costa Rican president,
Óscar Arias, elected for a second time in 2006, to gain the
necessary public support to pass CAFTA. The trade pact is
strongly opposed by those who believe that it will not help
the Costa Rican economy, while being significantly
beneficial to the U.S. CAFTA is likely to supply Costa Rica
with availabilities that it does not necessarily need, nor
even seek, in the meantime, threatening the Central American
country’s fundamental business interests. Its opponents
insist that the danger in implementing CAFTA not only may
threaten the future of Costa Rica’s commercial sector
which has been growing in recent years. With the fate of
CAFTA resting on public perceptions as well as massive
efforts being carried out by advocates on its behalf coming
from agro-industrial sectors and large-scale financial
interests with big business, big agriculture and the U.S.
and the other industrial nations in avid support of the
pact. It is up to the opponents of CAFTA to marshal their
forces in order to convince the public that CAFTA does not
serve Costa Rica’s national interests. President Arias is
a strong supporter of CAFTA, although he is permitting his
people determine its fate, as opposed to pushing through his
own agenda. He is well aware that his own standing has been
significantly hurt after he narrowly won an election that
had been largely focused on the issue.
CAFTA: NAFTA For
Central America
DR-CAFTA is the Central American version
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); it
embraces the countries of Central America, the Dominican
Republic and the U.S. CAFTA’s aim, similar to that of
NAFTA, is to “liberalize U.S. and Central American
markets, creating a free trade zone,” by eliminating
tariffs on basic grains such as rice, beans and corn.
A
Troubled Beginning to CAFTA
CAFTA is perhaps unique since
it is one of the few pacts signed by such assymetrical
signatories. Currently CAFTA does not include Belize, and
Costa Rica has yet to ratify the document. CAFTA’s current
member countries include the U.S., Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. In spite of
President Arias’ strong deference to the Bush White House,
his efforts to have his legislature ratify CAFTA have been
thwarted by opposition from important sectors of civil
society. Costa Rica has until March 1, 2008 to ratify the
agreement. When the pact goes into effect, 80 percent of
U.S. industrial and commercial goods will enter Costa Rica
duty-free, with the remaining tariffs to be eliminated
entirely after 10 years. In order for CAFTA to be
successful, it requires “transparency and efficiency in
administering customs procedures,” as stated the U.S.
Government Export Portal. With its ratification and
implementation in the six current member countries, CAFTA
would be the “second-largest free trade zone in Latin
America for US exports,” claims International Information
Programs.
At the onset of deliberations over CAFTA, only El Salvador was ready to join, with the other member countries having to modify legislation in order to bring themselves into agreement with the draft proposal. The March 2, 2006 New York Times article, “Central American Trade Deal Is Being Delayed by Partners,” noted that “[w]hile the delay is in part a sign of how complex the negotiations have been, it also reflects the extent of the concerns about the agreement in the tiny economics it will affect.” It was at this time that domestic Costa Rican realities were beginning to delay the ratification of the agreement. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce hype, CAFTA gives “American businesses, workers, and farmers greater access to 44 million Central American consumers,” showing positive exports for the U.S. but not explicitly pledging itself what benefits Central American economies are likely to receive, or at what cost.
The Debate Brought to the
U.S.
On July 25, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
welcomed John G. Murphy, Vice President of the International
Affairs of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Ottón Solis,
Costa Rica’s left-leaning presidential candidate and
staunch opponent to CAFTA, to engage in a debate over the
potential utility or detrimental effect that CAFTA would
have on Costa Rica. The proposed agreement covers virtually
every category of trade and commercial exchange among the
affected countries. For Central America, CAFTA would require
market liberalization for the majority of its goods and
services, such as agriculture, manufacturing, public
services and government procurements. For the U.S., it would
supply increased market access to most economic sectors in
Central America, including textiles and a limited increase
in sugar quotas.
The Vote: Uncertainty Reigns
The Costa
Rican mindset appears to be ever changing regarding CAFTA.
According to a poll conducted by Universidad de Costa, as
published by Angus Reid Global Monitor on August 7, 2007,
56.7 percent of decided voters say that CAFTA should not be
ratified. This is a change from the results published in the
August 3, 2007 issue of La Nación, which showed that the 52
percent majority would vote yes while the 42 percent
minority would vote no on CAFTA. There needs to be a minimum
of 40 percent of registered voters participating in the
referendum to make it valid, and “53 percent plan to cast
their ballot, which means the outcome of the referendum will
be a definite one, in either direction.” But what these
two polls show is that the population is not entirely
certain which way it will vote, with the majority shifting,
but when the referendum takes place, there will be a winner,
but probably by a very narrow margin.
Washington:
Unabashedly Pro-CAFTA
Eva Carazo Vargas said in his March
8, 2007 article, “Costa Rica: Why We Reject CAFTA,” for
the Americas Program Citizen Action Focus, that the
“pro-CAFTA camp goes between promises of new opportunities
and a fear campaign- saying there will be commercial
repercussions from the United States if the agreement
isn’t ratified, despite the fact that U.S. congress
members have indicated, and reiterated, that cutting off
current trade benefits is not a possible course of
action.”
John G. Murphysays that CAFTA offers Costa Rica “unparalleled opportunities” and looks to other CAFTA-approved countries as purported evidence to prove this. El Salvador, since implementing CAFTA, has seen its economic growth increase 68 percent, and in 2006, the economic growth rate (including trade and investment) increased by six percent among CAFTA members. He notes the need to create new textile apparel markets in order to remain competitive with Asia, acknowledging that the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is inadequate in today’s market. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the CBI “is intended to facilitate the economic development and export diversification of the Caribbean Basin economies.” The CBI provides duty-free access to the U.S. for the 24 Caribbean Basin countries, including the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Costa Rica.
Those Against CAFTA,
Make Yourselves Known
CAFTA could have a markedly
deleterious effect on Costa Rica’s agricultural sector
because relatively small-scale farmers will not be able to
compete with subsidized agricultural imports from the U.S.,
which could, it is argued, destroy Costa Rica’s rice
industry. Oscar Camps, head of the CONARROZ rice federation
stated that rice is “the only product that continues to be
regulated by law.” By allowing a more internationalized
market to have access to Costa Rican products, local farmers
would be competing against U.S. producers, and CAFTA could
lead to “privatization of the state-run telephone company
and hurt the social security system,” thus losing domestic
control of production. According to The Economist’s July
12, 2007, “Trading Arguments: Costa Rica’s Referendum on
CAFTA,” “unions oppose a requirement to open up to
competition the country’s telecommunications and insurance
industries, both of which are state monopolies.”
Maintaining local control over telecommunications, though
inefficient, has kept costs low, and if international
multinationals had power over the industry, this would
certainly not have been the case. What Murphy failed to
stress is that the telecommunication industry is the vehicle
of choice for the deluge of bribes to one Costa Rican
president after another for recalling kickback from
foreigners controlling cell-phone and related
contracts.
In order to launch CAFTA, “13 implementation bills, of which the most controversial bills would dismantle the telecommunications monopoly and dismantle the insurance monopoly,” would have to be put into effect, according to Global Exchange article, “CAFTA Faces New Uncertainty in Costa Rica with Public Referendum.” That act alone would open markets where privately held companies would have to compete with state monopolies, a situation that the country has been trying to shun for many years.
Ottón Solis, founder and president of the Costa Rican Citizen’s Action Party and who was narrowly outflanked by Arias in the last election, heads the opposition to CAFTA. During the EPI debate, Solis stated that the agreement is not a bilateral one and while Costa Rica, in principle, does not object to such an agreement, he believes that it deserves a better deal. His reasons for opposing CAFTA include the possible lack of transparency in negotiations and failed past political promises, insufficient parliamentary discussion and oversight and his belief that Costa Rica will lose something substantial through CAFTA’s implementation. Solis affirms that the substantive issue of the international labor market is not advantageous to Costa Rica. Market forces are performing poorly, there often are very few openings, and the idea of liberalized immigration is not an option with CAFTA. He believes that the U.S. places capital above all else in importance and that CAFTA forbids performance criteria, something that Costa Rica would like to see. Solis has declared that, while there may be universal rules regarding some topics, in terms of economics, “countries must be allowed to design and agree upon their own strategy and apply it.”
The Threat of
Failing to Ratify CAFTA
While CAFTA is viewed as aiding
Costa Rica’s economy, both within an international as well
as domestic venue, it is being faulted for not taking into
account the fate of workers that will be adversely affected
by it. Albino Vargas, Secretary of the National Association
of Public and Private Employees (ANEP), says that, “not
only will this free trade agreement fail to generate
employment, but we have shown in various studies that it
actually threatens up to 200,000 service, agriculture and
manufacturing jobs.” That is not to say that all trade
unions object to CAFTA, but rather, that they want
“another kind of deal—preferably bilateral.” This
would take into account the natural advantages that Costa
Rica has over its neighbors, including its average minimum
wage of $250 per month, which is significantly higher than
that of its largely impoverished neighbors. Nevertheless,
this high minimum wage could be a potential competitive
liability.
If Costa Rica rejects CAFTA, the country faces the possible migration of the companies now housed there to CAFTA-ratified countries, as well as the future disappearance of corporations looking to establish Central American headquarters in Costa Rica. Without CAFTA, goods exported by the country to the U.S. can look forward to being subject to 35 percent tariffs. Shirley Saborío, executive director of the Union of Private Sector Chambers and Associations (UCCAEP), which represents Costa Rica’s private business sector in Costa Rica, stated that if Costa Rica failed to ratify the pact, the country would be at a competitive disadvantage in global markets. There is no alternative to CAFTA and its indecisiveness places Costa Rica’s development at stake. Saborío says, “what we have now is a worst-case scenario, where every country except ours has ratified CAFTA. The pressure to cut off unilateral benefits for a country that negotiated but did not ratify CAFTA will be tremendous.” Furthermore, according to Murphy and other CAFTA militants, failure to sanction CAFTA would place 73,000 jobs and $1 billion dollars in exports at risk in Costa Rica.
Costa Rica: The
Strongest Central American Democracy
Costa Rica can be
seen as the most successful Central American country,
economically and socially speaking. It has the area’s
highest minimum wage and it also has the most foreign
investment within the CAFTA group. Cesar Trujillo, in the
Latin Business Chronicle article “Costa Rica Awaits
CAFTA,” wrote “Costa Rica continues to be a major
hot-spot for multinational companies looking to establish
their operations centers in Central America.” Unlike other
area countries, Costa Rica is a constitutional social state
that invests in healthcare, insurance, education, energy and
telecommunications and has a much more balanced and
successful society than the CAFTA-ratified countries. The
October referendum “opens the possibility that Costa Rica
might well reject the deal altogether,” which Costa Rican
President Arias is allowing the people to debate so that the
country could decide its future. This referendum makes Costa
Rica the first country to hold a popular vote on the issue
rather than having a legislative body approve or reject the
trade pact.
Other CAFTA-ratified countries, such as El Salvador, have done so because of what theu hope to achieve through the pact with respect to broader relations with the U.S. But Costa Rica has a better constituted economy than the area’s other countries and is widely considered to be Central America’s oldest and strongest democracy. While Costa Rica is currently more economically secure than the other member countries, which would make it appear to be better positioned to deal with these various problems as well as the beneficent prospects of an expanded CAFTA-DR, many fear that the country’s social security and health care system could still be undermined through CAFTA. Solis has stated that rejection of the pact, rather than signing onto CAFTA, would strengthen Costa Rica’s position rather than weakening it.
What Ratifying CAFTA Would Signify To
Other Democracies in the World
Murphy states that many
countries want to be part of an FTA and that Costa Rica’s
rejection of CAFTA will not change the desire of some
developing economies to join them. But if Costa Rica backs
away from adhering to CAFTA, it will “set off warning
bells,” seeing that it had previously been one of the
initial countries seeking an FTA with the U.S. and because
it was an active participant all along in the CAFTA
discussions. While Peru and the U.S. renegotiated their FTA,
it did not set a precedent, because the U.S. amended the
agreement before it was passed. But in the case of CAFTA and
Costa Rica, other countries already have implemented CAFTA,
and Costa Rica now insists upon further discussion it to
make the agreement more amenable to its basic interests, an
act which would be a violation of CAFTA’s ground rules
regarding the negotiation process.
What Murphy failed to state in the July 25 debate, Is CAFTA Good For Costa Rica?, were concrete reasons how CAFTA would be able to help Costa Rica. He brought up past examples of what CAFTA has done for other countries, such as El Salvador, but he failed to mention that economically, as of now, that El Salvador falls far behind Costa Rica. If Costa Rica were in a position where it was in pressing need of help to attract more foreign investment and to expand its economy, CAFTA would be a sensible next step, but as a country not particularly in need of such help, Costa Rica might better serve its cause by continuing to act independently and waiting for certain CAFTA provisions to be more usefully renegotiated.
However, Murphy did insinuate that Costa Rica should be less apathetic about adhering to CAFTA, because of the fact that it could lose the physical presence of current and potential new international companies if it rejects the agreement. But, if Costa Rica accepts CAFTA due to a fear of losing business, it would set a worrisome precedent for U.S.-Costa Rican relations. In the two years between the initial drafting of CAFTA and its implementation, Costa Rica’s economy has boomed and it would be unwise for its planners to settle for an agreement that may not be mutually beneficial. If Costa Rica ratifies CAFTA as it currently stands, it shows that the U.S. is able to intimidate a small, less developed country through pressure and bully tactics that lead to decisions that are not necessarily in the country’s best interests.
Current
Legislative Conflicts with CAFTA
The Supreme Elections
Tribunal (TSE) has decided, with regards to CAFTA, that
instead of voting in the National Assembly where pro-CAFTA
members have a majority, there will be a nationwide
referendum. The TSE postponed the national referendum from
September 23, 2007 to October 7, 2007. The high court will
want to examine whether the assembly violated its procedures
in its handling of legislation in relation to the pact and
whether CAFTA violates the country’s constitution. If the
justices of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court
(Sala IV) find errors in procedure, the Tribunal would have
to call off the referendum and, in that eventuality. The
country would not have the opportunity to approve CAFTA in
its present shape.
This analysis was prepared by COHA
Research Associate Martha Lauer
August 14th, 2007
ends